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Abstract 
 
The Liverpool dockers’ dispute 1995-98 exemplifies the type of environment 
many workers’ faced during the 1990s. The British experience provides a 
particularly relevant paradigm due to the specific interactions that developed 
between economic restructuring, political deregulatory processes and trade union 
responses after the 1979 election which saw Thatcher’s government embark 
upon a complete overhaul of this relationship. The Liverpool case brings 
together all those issues. The thesis draws on a wide range of materials, both oral 
and archival, which have been previously unstudied, presenting the first full-
length academic study of the dispute and its background. The focus of the thesis 
examines how workers articulate solidarity in the new environment marked by 
economic restructuring and political deregulation. It does so by proposing three 
analytical categories: (1) economic restructuring and political regulatory 
processes, (2) trade union strategies and (3) workplace and community 
experience and popular historical memories. The thesis argues that the 
interaction between these three categories is what shaped the different political 
articulations of solidarity and their successes and failures, during the 1990s. The 
analysis of this interaction suggests that the organisational dynamics that 
developed during the dispute, exemplify a tension between centralising processes 
of trade unionism and searches for organisational autonomy by particular groups 
of workers. These dynamics are not necessarily specific to that period, but rather 
rooted in their remembered historical experience. Thus, a conceptualisation of 
the political articulation of solidarity as a contested arena can provide an 
indication of workers’ organisational capabilities in particular periods.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction – workers’ organisational 
capacities in the 1990s 
 
The close of the 1970s signalled the end of a specific relationship 
between the state, the economy and trade unions that had developed during the 
period after the Second World War in some advanced democracies. The way in 
which this relationship developed in Britain, and subsequently contracted, is of 
particular interest, since “nowhere in western Europe were trade unions 
confronted by such a concerted neo-liberal assault as in the United Kingdom 
between 1979 and 1997” (Betcherman 1996, p. 214). By the 1990s, British trade 
unions had gone from Jack Jones, the leader of the TGWU in the 1970s, being 
lauded as the most powerful man in Britain (Gallup, January 1977), to suffering 
rapid decline in density and membership, especially in key economic sectors 
such as mining, ports and manufacturing. 
There are two themes running through the literature which attempt to 
understand the organisational capabilities of workers in the new hostile 
environment.  First, there is a pessimistic interpretation represented by those who 
argue that workers’ organisational fortunes are in terminal decline. The 
pessimistic accounts are well represented by those (such as Tilly 1995)  that 
consider labour movements have entered an unstoppable downward spiral; a race 
to the bottom. Secondly, contrary to the pessimistic analysis, Kelly (1998), using 
Tilly’s own mobilisation theoretical framework (Tilly 1978), and Moody (1997)  
suggest an imminent resurgence of trade union power. For the optimists, the 
resurgence of trade union power can be realised in different arenas, with a 
juxtaposition of the national versus the international as spheres of action, in 
terms of which may be the more desirable for the development of effective 
organisational strategies. Some scholars argue that the resurgence should be 
based around national frameworks (e. g. Fairbrother 2000; Fairbrother and Yates 
2003a; Frege and Kelly 2004). This view is contested by those who argue that 
capital is global and, therefore, workers’ organisations must become somewhat 
global, international or transnational (e. g. Munck and Waterman 1999; 
Waterman 2001). 
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In order to consider the challenges labour movements faced during this 
crucial period, the 1990s, this thesis poses the question: how do workers 
articulate solidarity in the new environment marked by economic restructuring 
and political deregulation? The question will be dissected into different aspects, 
in order to be able to consider the different theoretical propositions discussed in 
this chapter. The question will be explored through the use of the Liverpool 
dockers’ dispute of 1995-1998 as a case study. The dispute exhibits a 
considerable number of features characteristic of the 1990s and, as such, can 
shed light on debates over the way in which workers’ organisational capabilities 
took shape in the 1990s.  
 
Setting out the problem 
 
Rapid economic restructuring, aided by increased political deregulation 
and a direct attack on the traditional sources of power held by trade unions, has 
led to a decline in the power, density and membership of unions. This has been 
further reinforced by the restructuring of labour markets which has led to 
“uncertainty, short-term arrangements, insecurity and fragmentation” (Martínez 
Lucio 2006, p. 3). The situation has been considered extensively in the literature, 
leading to irreconcilable debates over the role of the state in this process (Strange 
1996; Burnham 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1999). The importance of such 
debates for this thesis lies in the way workers’ fates have been linked to the 
future of the state. In a rather depressing way, Kapstein provides a good example 
of this link: 
“The Global economy is leaving millions of disaffected workers in its train. 
Inequality, unemployment, and endemic poverty have become its handmaidens. 
Rapid technological change and heightening international competition are 
fraying the job markets of the major industrialized countries. At the same time 
systemic pressures are curtailing every government’s ability to respond with 
new spending. Just when working people most need the nation-state as a buffer 
from the world economy, it is abandoning them” (Kapstein 1996, p. 16). 
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This is because political alternatives, and in particular social democracy, 
have been defeated. Or so John Gray tells us. John Gray in his apocalyptic 
bestseller False Dawn: the delusions of global capitalism (Gray 2002) exposes 
how the development of a global free market has deepened social and economic 
inequalities as well as removing political alternatives. Yet Gray’s account, 
although concerned with inequality, remains worker-less. A quick glance 
through the book’s index shows no entry for ‘workers’, ‘work’, or ‘trade unions’, 
or even the less politically loaded terms of ‘employee’ or ‘employment’, even 
though some scattered comments are made about those who work for a living. 
However, they are only mentioned in regard to their loss of economic power, 
rather than in relation to their political capacity or passivity. More importantly, 
the book relates to them as faceless victims of laissez-faire capitalism, as “the 
global economy deskills people and organizations” (Gray 2002, p. 76). This is 
due to a change in corporate culture as, according to Gray, “there has been a 
hollowing out of the business corporation as a social institution” (Gray 2002, p. 
72). Inasmuch as corporations were employing their entire workforce they 
became social institutions, Gray argues, yet this has been reversed with the 
growth of sub-contracting and an alternative employment relationship, as there 
has been a “further commodification of work. Labour has become something that 
is sold in pieces to corporations. Businesses have shed many of the 
responsibilities that rendered the world of work humanly tolerable in the past” 
(Gray 2002, p. 72). 
In other words, public policy is no longer changeable in response to 
democratic demands and businesses are only concerned with profit making. This 
is due to the economy (or the accumulation process as Drache 1996 puts it) 
escaping the state. The explanation is that “with corporations more footloose 
than ever, states have less power to manage their own economic affairs. With the 
accumulation process no longer state-centred, the global economy leads more 
and more and the national (…) economy follows” (Drache 1996, p. 40-41). This 
is made worse as “union representation has also suffered a dramatic reversal of 
fortune everywhere” (Drache 1996, p. 45). In turn, this leaves workers 
unprotected as “historically, workers have looked to governments and unions to 
protect their interests and to redress any power imbalances between labour and 
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capital” (Betcherman 1996, p. 256). The distancing of the state, whether 
orchestrated by the state, or by the economy, has led to what Peter Burnham has 
termed a process of depoliticisation. This process affects workers in a very direct 
way as it involves the removal of direct political regulation of labour relations. 
Whilst this shields the state from future labour demands it also blames 
international competitive pressures for these political actions. In other words,  
global pressures “are translated directly into apparently automatic and inevitable 
constraints upon individual employers and workforces” (Elger and Burnham 
2001, p. 251). 
A combination of political and economic pressures led to a radically 
changed pattern of employment relations in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Three developments worked in parallel. Firstly, traditionally unionised industries 
(such as manufacturing and nationalised industries) were restructured in a way 
that led to large scale closures and a considerable reduction in the total number 
of people employed in them. For example, according to Census data (ONS), 
there was a return to pre-1930s levels of employment in manufacturing after the 
peak in the 1960s and 1970s when a quarter of the working population in Britain 
was engaged in manufacturing related employment. However, it was not just 
employment in manufacturing that suffered a decline. Nationalised industries 
were largely privatised by Thatcher’s government. This had a deep effect on the 
sources of trade union membership since “by 1979 union density was typically 
above 90 per cent in these organizations compared with around 55 per cent for 
British industry as a whole” (Pendleton and Winterton 1993, p. 3). 
 Second, four key  areas of employment regulation were overhauled by 
Thatcherism, and resulted in: (1) compulsory involvement of collective 
institutions  in wage determination; (2) abolition of wage councils; (3) reduction 
in social insurance provisions for the unemployed and the retired; and (4) 
restrictions on employment protection (Deakin and Reed 2000, p. 116). As the 
table below shows, these four areas were dealt with by using a regressive 
legislative strategy over a period of nearly twenty years. A crucial aspect of these 
changes was the involvement of the state in the payment of redundancy money in 
the restructured industries, whether in the form of statutory redundancy pay until 
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the late 1980s, or corporation tax relief on payments above the statutory levels 
(Deakin and Reed 2000, p. 123). In certain industries, such as ports, the 
government heavily subsidised large redundancy payments, as chapter two will 
consider in more detail. 
Table 1.1. Legislative developments affecting labour market flexibility in 
Britain 1963-1998 
Legislative change Year Protective Deregulatory 
Pre-1979    
Regulation of notice of termination 1963   
Statutory redundancy compensation 1965   
Extension of earnings-related unemployment 
benefit 
1965   
Equal pay for men and women 1970   
Unfair dismissal protection 1971   
Regulation of agency work 1973   
Prohibition of sex discrimination 1975   
Strengthening of employment protection laws 1975   
Consultation over collective dismissals 1975   
State earnings-related pension scheme 1975   
Prohibition of race discrimination 1976   
Post-1979    
Extension of qualifying periods for 
unemployment protection 
1979   
Restriction of industrial action 1980   
Abolition of extension legislation 1980   
Abolition of earnings-related supplement to 
unemployment benefit 
1980   
Widening of derogations for fixed-term 
employment 
1980   
Protection of employment on transfers of 
undertakings 
1981   
Further restriction of industrial action 1982   
Rescission of fair wages resolution 1982   
Restriction of closed shops 1982   
Extension of equal pay for men and women 1983   
Industrial action ballots 1984   
Further extension of qualifying periods 1985   
Limitation of powers to set minimum wages 1986   
Restriction of state earnings-related pension 
scheme 
1986   
Increase in qualifying period for unemployment 
benefit 
1986   
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Legislative change Year Protective Deregulatory 
Tightening of contribution conditions for 
unemployment benefit 
1988   
Compulsory competitive tendering in local 
government 
1988   
Further restriction of post-entry closed shop 1988   
Repeal of working time controls 1989   
Enlargement of disqualifications for 
unemployment benefit 
1989   
‘Actively seeking work’ requirement for 
unemployment benefit 
1989   
Restriction of pre-entry closed shop 1990   
Abolition of powers to set minimum wages 1993   
Strengthening of rights to consultation 1993   
Further restrictions on industrial action 1993   
Abolition of restrictions on Sunday trading 1994   
Job-seekers allowance replaces unemployment 
benefit 
1995   
Extension of rights of part-time workers 1995   
Prohibition of disability discrimination 1995   
Implementation of EC Working Time Directive 1998   
Statutory minimum wage 1998   
(Source: Deakin and Reed 2000, p. 117) 
Third, restructuring was accompanied by a series of legislative measures 
designed to restrain the power of trade unions. These involved changes in the 
way union elections and internal affairs were conducted, as well as limits on 
trade union action, particularly the lawfulness of strike action which was 
seriously curtailed. Chapter two offers a specific breakdown of the legislation 
introduced during this period relating to trade unions and employment relations.  
Thus, the global restructuring of manufacturing and employment 
relations, in particular the way in which corporations engaged in manufacturing 
have used their possible geographical mobility as a way to counteract trade union 
power, has been the key informant of some approaches to the relationship 
between workers’ organisational capacities and neoliberalism (for a particularly 
sophisticated example of this type of analysis see Silver 2003). In a sense, the 
approaches reviewed in the remainder of this chapter place different emphases 
on how footloose capital actually is.  
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Although the changes sketched here were to be found in all advanced 
industrial democracies, it was in Britain, where the changes took a more rapid 
and radical turn. Following the rise in trade union membership, the number of 
nationalised industries and employment in manufacturing in the post-war period 
(peaking in all three cases during the late 1960s and early 1970s), the election of 
a Conservative government under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 
led to an unprecedented reversal of the situation. The extent to which this 
reversal, at least for trade unions, can be equated with complete defeat has been 
considered at length in the literature. What follows is a review of how the 
literature argues this situation can not only be understood, but possibly reversed. 
 
The race to the bottom – pessimistic accounts 
 
Charles Tilly published a controversial article in 1995 in the journal 
International Labor and Working Class History entitled “Globalization 
Threatens Labor’s Rights”.  The article capitalised on an emerging concern 
within the globalisation literature of the 1990s which considered the relationship 
between rapid global restructuring of capitalism and changes in national states. 
In a nutshell, Tilly argues that “globalization threatens established rights of labor 
through its undermining of state capacity to guarantee those rights” (Tilly 1995, 
p. 4). Tilly bases his essay on seventeen ideas which help him develop his 
argument. Three of them are particularly important as they provide the key tenets 
in the article. Firstly, there is the issue of rights. “Rights are publicly enforceable 
claims” (Tilly 1995, p. 6), which means that rights are only acquired as rights 
“when authorities agree to act in reinforcement of their claims” (Tilly 1995, p. 
7). This is of paramount importance for Tilly’s argument, as rights are at least 
enforced by states and, with states losing power, the ability to enforce rights may 
be jeopardised. In Tilly’s words “rights (publicly enforceable claims) come into 
being as a result of negotiations that produce contracts, to which authorities, 
especially governments, are always parties – sometimes principals, sometimes 
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enforcers, sometimes both. Without authorities, no rights exist. The relevant 
authorities, however, are by no means always sovereign states” (Tilly 1995).  
Secondly, a social contract arises between the state and its citizens once 
the state accepts some of the citizens’ claims as enforceable rights, perhaps in a 
similar progressive model to that proposed by Marshall (1991), where civil, 
political and social rights follow a linear evolution which leads towards the 
establishment of citizenship. As Tilly maintains: “Citizenship and democracy 
came to depend on the maintenance of those rights” (Tilly 1995, p. 5).  
Citizenship was understood as consisting “of a set of mutual rights and 
obligations binding agents of a state to a category of people defined exclusively 
by their legal relations to that state” (Tilly 1995, p. 10). Citizenship, therefore, is 
the embodiment of the social contract.  
Finally, what is happening is that this social contract, and at least, certain 
aspects of citizenship, is subject to erosion as “both globalization of many 
economic activities and creation of powerful supranational organizations are now 
undermining the capacity of states to monitor and control such stocks and flows 
– hence, undermining their capacity to pursue effective social policies, including 
the enforcement of workers’ rights” (Tilly 1995, p. 5). This process will have 
damaging consequences for the idea of citizenship as a whole, not just for labour 
rights, as “the organized power of labor both signals and fosters democratic 
politics. Its decay therefore threatens democracy” (Tilly 1995, p. 22). 
Therefore, it appears labour rights are the first victims in this wider 
process. The wearing down of the social democratic state has a specific effect as 
the state had been seen “as an instrument to achieve labor’s goals” (Cox 1971, p. 
208). More importantly, “historically, the geographically based power of the 
state has been the only power capable of counterbalancing unequal forces in the 
interests of welfare” (Cox 1971, p. 234). It is precisely this idea, that the state has 
been able to protect workers’ interests in the past, and yet it is no longer able to 
do so, which underlines some of the more pessimistic views on the future of 
labour movements.  
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Tilly however offers a tentative way out. The way out is international 
action, or in other words the framing of claims at the international level, “if 
workers are to enjoy collective rights in the new world order, they will have to 
invent new strategies at the scale of international capital” (Tilly 1995, p. 21). 
This is simply because “no individual state will have the power to enforce 
workers’ rights in the fluid world that is emerging” (Tilly 1995, p. 21). 
Therefore, the up-scaling of labour action internationally is not just desirable, but 
rather absolutely necessary, because “if labour does not find ways of organizing 
effectively at the scale of international capital, one of our era’s great 
achievements – incomplete (but still often substantial) democratization – runs the 
risk of trampling by capital’s new oligarchies” (Tilly 1995, p. 22).  
In a particularly sophisticated way, Silver (2003) offers an account that 
moves away from the state and considers the conflict between capital and labour 
a global one. Silver’s (2003) magisterial work Forces of Labor has provided a 
long-term view across time and space of the relationship between labour unrest 
and capital mobility. Silver abstracts capital from the everyday, geographically 
bound reality of life, as well as abstracting labour from such reality. By doing so, 
the picture that emerges is one where capital mobility arises from its need to 
escape labour unrest, yet it encounters such unrest everywhere it goes. This is 
particularly acute in the automobile industry as “it appears that corporations in 
the automobile industry have been chasing the mirage of cheap and disciplined 
labour around the world, only to find themselves continuously recreating militant 
labor movements in the new locations” (Silver 2003, p. 64). 
Silver provides a framework which is well suited to ideas of resurgence, 
as she argues that what we are witnessing is systemic. In the case of the 
automobile industry, Silver identifies a return to older production locations in 
countries from where production had previously moved away. This return, 
however, is to locations where particular industries had not been based, where 
there would be no historical experience of trade unionism in that industry within 
the local popular memory. For example, relocation to places such as the south of 
the United States, has brought about a “reconcentration in the core [which]  has 
been accompanied by major transformations in the organization of production 
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and labor process over the past two decades that raise questions about whether 
we are witnessing a repeat of the cycle of relocation and militancy” (Silver 2003, 
p. 66). 
However, the use of spatial relocation to discipline labour is not always a 
possibility. Instead, Silver finds there are other types of ‘fixes’1 such as financial, 
product or technological fixes. The case of the transport industry is a suitable 
example, as spatial fixes are more difficult to complete due to the nature of these 
industries, “thus, the disincentives to geographical relocation facing the 
transportation industries are on average significantly higher than the deterrents 
facing even the most capital-intensive manufacturing industries” (Silver 2003, p. 
100). Instead, capital has searched for other ways to keep labour under control in 
these geographically-bounded industries. Capital does that in two ways, either by 
“technological fixes” (Silver 2003, p. 101) such as the development of 
containerisation in the second half of the twentieth century, which was able to 
reduce dramatically the number of dockworkers (a process which is explained in 
detail in chapter two of this thesis), or as “product fixes” (Silver 2003) in the 
case of “railroads and railroad workers [who] have come under increasing 
competitive pressure from new alternatives: trucking and aviation for cargo and 
the automobile and aviation for passengers” (Silver 2003). These industries were 
also central when it came to state regulation (which is also covered in detail in 
chapter two with reference to the port transport industry in Britain), because of 
two key reasons: “the importance of smoothly functioning transportation systems 
to capital accumulation – combined with the strong workplace bargaining power 
of transportation workers and the limited scope for spatial fixes” (Silver 2003, p. 
101). 
Silver agrees with Tilly, in that there has been a weakening of labour 
movements which became sharply apparent by the 1990s. However, for Silver 
the culprit is not footloose capital, as it fails to “explain a general weakening of 
                                                     
1 The concept of ‘fixes’ that Silver elaborates on is developed from David Harvey’s concept of 
spatial fixes. A fix is a continuation of a product cycle by other means. So, for example a 
financial fix is explained by Silver: “As competition becomes intense, rather than invest in new 
manufactured products, capital is pulled out of trade and production entirely and reinvested in 
financial deals and speculation” (footnote 28, p. 106). Silver, B. J. (2003). Forces of labor: 
workers' movements and globalization since 1870. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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labor movements” not just in places where capital flies from but also in those 
places where capital goes to, where “new movements would be created and 
strengthened in the new site (…). Rather, a central part of the explanation for the 
severity and spread of the crisis of labor movements appears to be rooted in the 
enormous ballooning of the financial fix in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as a 
shift in its character” (Silver 2003, p. 165-166). Therefore, capital mobility, per 
se, is unable to explain the weakening of labour movements.  
Silver’s abstraction of labour and capital means that her work provides a 
long term view which demonstrates that capital and labour will constantly be 
chasing each other under a capitalist system of production. However, this 
analysis does not imply that labour organising will be progressive (whether 
social democratic, communist or syndicalist), or even forthcoming. Silver 
grounds her abstract reality in quite stark terms when comparing the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century period of globalisation with the late 
twentieth/early twenty-first: 
“In both periods national-protectionism with racist and xenophobic overtones 
has been an important part of the reaction by workers (and others) to the 
dislocations provoked by an unregulated global labor market. (…) there is no 
reason to expect that just because capital finds it profitable to treat all workers 
as interchangeable equivalents, workers would themselves find it in their 
interests to accept this. Rather, insecure human beings (including workers), have 
good reason to insist on the salience of nonclass boundaries and borders (e.g., 
race, citizenship, gender) as a way of making claims for privileged protection 
from the maelstrom. The de-socialization of the state thus does not in itself 
supply fertile ground for labor internationalism to take root” (Silver 2003, p. 
177-178). 
The pessimists reviewed here, Charles Tilly and Beverly Silver, leave us 
almost at a dead-end. Tilly offers a way only if a new, but unlikely, international 
social contract could be built, Silver reminds us of the boundary-creating power 
of culturally specific groups of workers and localities and the ways in which 
certain states may still be able to protect certain rights for certain workers, 
thereby accentuating division, rather than internationalism, amongst trade 
unions. 
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The resurfacing power of unions – optimistic accounts 
 
Following from Tilly’s pessimistic account in 1995, two important works 
were published in 1997 and 1998 respectively, which provided a very different 
outlook on the possibilities for labour movements.  John Kelly published in 1998 
Rethinking industrial relations: mobilization, collectivism, and long waves where 
he sets out the idea that the decline of the labour movement is not terminal, but 
rather part of a cycle. Therefore, “by drawing on long wave theory it can be 
shown that the fluctuating fortunes of national labour movements follow 
predictable patterns that are closely synchronised with the rhythms of the 
capitalist economy. Contrary to postmodernist claims that the classical labour 
movement is in terminal decline, long wave theory suggests that it is more likely 
to be on the threshold of resurgence” (Kelly 1998, p. 8). Interestingly, John Kelly 
uses Tilly’s own mobilisation theory (Tilly 1978) in order to build the idea of 
resurgence. This enables Kelly to develop a view of collectivism over-time 
which is compelled to follow a cycle, rather than a linear decline.  
Moody (1997), on the other hand, in a more politically loaded work, 
advocates a view of trade unionism that is rooted in rank-and-file organisation. 
Moody poses a strong critique of the model of business unionism prevalent in the 
United States, as it has shown the “complacency and routinism that contributed 
to their own decline and loss of influence” (Moody 1997, p. 195). Moody’s 
evidence for this argument is based around the experience of the AFL-CIO. This 
criticism, that trade union decline cannot be  blamed simply on structural 
changes at the economic and political levels, is echoed, in a more sophisticated 
manner, by Bronfenbrenner (2003), which traces trade union decline in a broader 
context than that of anti-trade union legislative measures. For example “the 
decline in US union density and organizing success began decades before the 
Reagan era” (Bronfenbrenner 2003, p. 36).  
Moody’s criticism of business unionism as a model and in particular, the 
short-sightedness of American trade union leaders, is matched by his optimism 
over the power of the rank-and-file. This idea was developed in his 1997 work in 
the form of a social movement unionism, based around loosely related networks 
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of community based workers’ centres and the news organisation behind Labor 
Notes. Although there is little evidence of such links having moved beyond the 
local communities, Moody published a further work 10 years later (2007) which 
continues to juxtapose the idea of failure by the union leadership, with the 
impetus from workers to achieve a rank-and-file model of unionism. Moody 
envisions a union movement in which “neither the unions nor their members are 
passive in any sense” (Moody 1997, p. 276). The extent to which this is indeed 
the case remains untested empirically, and could be considered naïve.  
Moody’s social movement unionism remains an unclear and contested 
concept. Initially, popularised by the South African trade union confederation 
(COSATU), it was  concerned with unions being not just agents in the workplace 
but social agents, involved in their communities, their political life and their 
workplaces. This had particular implications for South Africa, due to a lack of 
citizenship for large sections of workers. The concept has since been criticised 
by Peter Waterman as “a number of writers on trade unionism in the third world 
(mis)understood social movement unionism to mean an alliance between unions 
and ‘communities’. The latter were understood to be local and/or national-
popular communities, and to exist primarily in the third world” (Waterman 1999, 
p. 247). Instead, Waterman proposes a new social unionism which would 
collaborate with new social movements (such as feminism, antimilitarism, 
etc…). This plural model views labour as one interest amongst many, rather than 
as the revolutionary subject in Moody’s Trotskyism.  
It is important to consider the concept in more detail. COSATU intrigues 
Moody as “South Africa’s unions, and COSATU in particular, are far from 
facing the sort of decline many unions in the North have experienced” (1997, p. 
211). In fact, COSATU has managed to grow steadily even in an environment of 
economic restructuring. For Moody “COSATU provides living proof that unions 
with an aggressive organizing policy, a militant bargaining record, and strong 
ties to working-class communities can grow in a period of relative instability” 
(Moody 1997, p. 211). Of course, COSATU faces a situation which is rather 
difficult to replicate, and which is not dissimilar to that of Brazilian or Spanish 
unions after their respective transitions to democracy. Additionally, COSATU’s 
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success, as perceived by Moody, suffers from a premature assessment. Moody 
published this work in 1997, only three years after the ANC came to power 
(1994). COSATU’s success or failure require a deeper assessment. However, 
Moody does not attribute COSATU’s effectiveness to their role as actors in 
democratisation, but rather to the organisational structures of COSATU, which, 
he argues, are more open to “debates on tough issues” (Moody 1997, p. 277).  
The problem with both Kelly’s and Moody’s approach is that their 
optimism brings them close to an over-deterministic view of working class 
solidarity. It is often unclear if their theoretical models are meant to fit empirical 
realities or rather empirical realities are analysed in a way that ensures they fit 
within their theoretical models. Over-determinism, or the belief in a cyclical 
pattern of decline and resurgence, removes the capacity of workers to act, to 
determine their own future. That future, however, is not necessarily a 
revolutionary one. After all, there is the possibility of “the recrudescence of 
currently less influential left-wing fables such as the inevitability, despite 
everything that has happened, of the revival of labour’s progress or the essential, 
if presently invisible, revolutionary instincts of the rank and file trade unionist” 
(McIlroy, Campbell et al. 1999, p. 2). As the remainder of the chapter will 
consider, the revolutionary instincts of the rank and file trade unionist remain as 
a ghost in the background. 
 
National optimists – national trade union renewal thesis 
 
The idea of national trade union renewal follows John Kelly’s resurgence 
model based around business cycles. It is primarily informed by two influential 
theoretical models in political economy. First, new institutionalism, as 
represented by the work of Hall and Soskice (2001) which focuses its attention 
on what they term Varieties of Capitalism. The argument attempts to model 
different types of capitalism according to their relationship to the internal 
institutions of a national state. It contrasts sharply with some Marxist and hyper-
globalists arguments which focus on the global character of capitalism. 
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Secondly, others in the Marxist tradition, following Cox’s (1987) attempt to use 
Gramscian concepts such as hegemony to understand the nature of capitalism,  
have argued (for example, Morton and Bieler 2001; Bieler 2006; Bieler 2007)  
that in fact the domestic structures of capital do matter, inasmuch as they provide 
the frameworks from within which material capabilities are negotiated, 
contested or changed. The main argument is that “despite the common problem 
of declining memberships and converging labour market conditions, national 
industrial relations institutions and morphologies of national labour movements 
play a decisive role in how organizing is understood and strategically pursued. In 
essence, the particular strategic response by unions and labour federations across 
five continents continues to be path dependent, arising from the historical legacy 
of each union movement” (Fairbrother and Yates 2003b, p. 16).  
The countries which provide the basis for Fairbrother and Yates’ 
conclusions are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and the USA. Two inter-
related issues mark the way in which their renewal is path dependent. On the one 
hand, the reason why unions in these  countries were attacked so fiercely was 
due to their “inability (…) to secure an institutionalised and privileged role in 
policy-making and the increasing emphasis on a neo-liberal agenda of labour 
market reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s [which] set the stage for unions 
to become prime targets of restructuring by employers and governments” 
(Fairbrother and Yates 2003b, p. 11). On the other, this apparent weakness is 
also their strength, as: 
“The decentralization of labour movements in these three[USA, UK and 
Canada] countries, in part a consequence of the enterprise-based industrial 
relations system, left open more political space for local divisions of unions and 
clusters of activists to initiate change in unions. For this reason it is often at the 
local or branch level that new organizing initiatives are spearheaded and most 
successful” (Fairbrother and Yates 2003b, p. 9).  
What the approaches reviewed have in common, is the way in which they 
argue that workers’ organisational capacities are best realised domestically 
(Regini 1992; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Frege and Kelly 2004) as opposed to 
internationally. Peter Fairbrother offers a well reasoned argument towards trade 
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union renewal in Britain (Fairbrother 2000; Fairbrother and Yates 2003a). The 
renewal is not just based on a cyclical idea of trade union resurgence as Kelly 
and Moody would argue, but rather on the way in which unions are organised; it 
is driven by them, to a certain extent. Hence, certain “forms of unionism in the 
1980s” which “served to underwrite bureaucratisation, incorporation and 
economism” were able to provide the foundations “for forms of independent and 
autonomous workplace unionism in the 1990s. After a decade of restructuring in 
manufacturing, utilities and the state services, there may now be a prospect of 
union renewal” (Fairbrother 2000, p. ix). Restructuring in such sectors was 
marked by a restructuring of employment. As figure 1.1 demonstrates, there was 
a general decline (from 8,879,000 to 6,529,000) in total employment in 
production, construction, transport and utilities between 1982 and 2002. More 
importantly, the majority of the decline in these sectors came from public sector 
employment which reduced from 1,888,000 in 1982 to 426,000 in 2002. This 
would suggest obstacles to Fairbrother’s argument, which places a huge 
importance on trade union renewal based around public sector workers.  
Figure 1.1. UK employment in production, construction, transport and 
utilities, 1982-2002 
 
Office of National Statistics (Black, Richardson et al. 2003) 
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 However, Fairbrother considers that the strength of unions in these 
sectors during their heyday (in the 1970s) is somewhat of a myth. “The apparent 
strength of many unions in the 1970s was revealed to be rather hollow and 
insubstantial at a local level, at the workplace” (Fairbrother 2000, p. 7). In 
Britain, the voluntarist character of industrial relations led to a decentralisation 
of collective bargaining. In order to operate effectively in this system, unions 
developed networks of shop stewards which became “essential in sustaining 
power in a voluntarist system. This structure reinforced close ties between union 
activists, local branches and workers, ties that were not, however, always 
translated to national union structures or leaders” (Fairbrother and Yates 2003b, 
p. 7). 
The argument for national trade union renewal, then, is based around two 
pillars. On the one hand, the British experience of workplace unionism was 
seldom in unison with national leaderships and therefore, it was unable to 
counteract the neoliberal offensive. Instead, it is argued that what is needed is an 
organisational model, as the latter part of this chapter explores further (Frege, 
Heery et al. 2004, p. 148). This requires that “members are active participants in 
the way unions organize and operate, thereby contributing to the collective focus 
and practice of the union” (Fairbrother and Yates 2003b, p. 19). On the other 
hand, the seeds for trade union renewal are to be found in the public sector, 
partly because it has maintained higher levels of union density than other sectors, 
but also because since the mid-1990s the sector is reversing the decline in the 
number of people employed by it (even if this may be in decline after the May 
2010 election), as figure 1.2 shows.  
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Figure 1.2. UK total employment in public corporations, 1962-2002 
 
Office of National Statistics (Black, Richardson et al. 2003) 
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determine his/her outlook in struggle, but rather a much more complicated set of 
factors, such as the historical contexts of struggle that Bieler mentions. In 
Bieler’s view, these historical contexts of struggle include the institutional 
arrangements embedded in the state. 
Internationalism, therefore, does not have to be the automatic choice. 
Instead, the relationship between production sectors, in particular their level of 
internationalisation and the national institutional arrangements, are the key 
factors in deciding whether a national or an international union strategy should 
be pursued. This is the key distinction between the approaches analysed in this 
section and the ones that will be considered next, which do not place such an 
emphasis on the specific national relationships between the state, capital and 
labour. 
 
International optimists – internationalism as the way to 
counteract global capital 
 
The views analysed in this section are chiefly associated with the work of 
Peter Waterman (Munck and Waterman 1999; Waterman 2001; Waterman and 
Wills 2001; Waterman 2005), scholar and labour activist. The main assumption, 
which contrasts sharply with the previous approaches, is that “where capitalism 
was once industrial and national, it is now social and global” (Waterman 2001, p. 
53). This, in a sense, agrees with the pessimistic approaches presented in this 
review, in particular that of Charles Tilly. Waterman also appears to agree that 
the terrain has shifted, from a geographically bounded arena to a global one. 
However, where Waterman differs is that in his view labour is not ruled out from 
the arena, rather it needs to upscale. 
Waterman is quite openly concerned with a normative exercise. In other 
words, Waterman’s work attempts to turn “general philosophical statements into 
political statements” (Waterman 2001, p. 238), or at least into prescriptive 
statements for political action. These approaches follow a Marxist logic, but one 
which is constantly seeking a non-deterministic path. For example, Waterman 
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argues that, “there are no natural, spontaneous, economically determined subjects 
or vanguards of internationalism. (…). In the face of internationalization 
processes, options other than internationalism are clearly available” (2001, p. 
53). 
 This means that internationalism is not the natural stage towards which 
workers are being propelled to, but rather that “internationalization ‘leads to’ 
internationalism only through the self-creation of popular non-territorial 
identities and their combination into self-conscious, democratic and self-
activating internationalist subjects” (Waterman 2001, p. 48). Nothing is assumed 
or determined, rather it must be built,  “unity [peasants, labour, etc.] must be 
constructed politically and cannot be assumed” (Munck 2007, p. 135). 
The argument towards internationalism is a deep critique of Tilly’s 
argument as Munck reminds us: “if you argue, as Tilly does, that ‘as states 
decline, so do workers’ rights’ (Tilly 1995), then the logical slogan would be 
‘build the state’2, not a new labour internationalism based on a social movement 
unionism” (Munck 2002, p. 144). And this is a crucial difference between this 
approach and those reviewed earlier. All the approaches consider that something 
has been eroded (the state, democracy, the left, trade unions…) but not all 
approaches agree on what needs rebuilding, or in what order. The internationalist 
approach, as theorised by Waterman and Munck, attempts to move away from 
rebuilding the state, or democracy, or left wing political parties and trade unions. 
Instead, the focus is on building a movement that considers the new situation, 
and works from there. The old formulas are no longer viable and there is no 
better place to start than in building new communication methods across social 
and labour movements: “The new global solidarity movements are, in large part, 
‘communication internationalisms’. Communication is here increasingly 
understood not simply as a technical means to be used but as an ethical end to be 
valued” (Waterman 2001, p. 215). This is not simply an opening up of 
possibilities, but rather it provides a new emancipatory arena as: 
                                                     
2 This presents the problem of whether it is possible to rebuild the state at all, as earlier parts of 
this chapter have considered. 
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“the idea, value and practice of networking opens wide perspectives to 
emancipatory global movements, previously (self-) condemned to reproduce the 
pyramidical and hierarchical structure of the corporation, factory, state, army, 
prison, church or university” (Waterman 2001, p. 219). 
Therefore, the internationalism espoused by Waterman and Munck offers 
an opening up of some Marxist approaches that are focused on cyclical 
determinations and single revolutionary subjectivities. It also provides a 
refreshing alternative to the “methodological nationalism” (Radice 2000; Radice 
2007) that is characteristic of some of the analyses related to the national trade 
union renewal thesis. Whilst Munck and Waterman open the door towards new 
ways of analysing workers’ organisational capacities, they still rely on a 
systemic view of workers, which removes subjectivity and, therefore, the 
creative capacity to act and organise themselves autonomously. Actors still 
appear to lack initiative and creativity and are apparently enslaved by structures.  
Political action is somewhat removed from their repertoire. The next section will 
deal with this in more detail. 
 
Old ghosts 
 
 In this section, a critique of the assumptions found in both the pessimists 
and the optimists reviewed earlier, will follow. Firstly, Tilly’s argument (1995) 
has been best contested from within. In an excellent article, Antonina Gentile 
and Sidney Tarrow (2009) use a selection of international campaigns organised 
by dockworkers during the 1990s and early 2000s (including campaigns which 
were part of the dispute analysed in this thesis) to discuss Tilly’s argument that 
globalisation threatens labour rights. Although Gentile and Tarrow accept that 
labour rights have been threatened, they use Tilly’s idea of repertoires to show 
that workers, and in this case, dockworkers, are able to use other repertoires 
besides labour rights. They argue that the cases show that when dockworkers use 
a repertoire based around the idea of citizens’ rights, their campaigns are far 
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more successful, in terms of achieving their stated aims, than when they are 
framed around labour rights.  
However, Gentile and Tarrow’s critique of Tilly still views labour 
campaigns as being concerned with the state. In other words, the site of 
contention remains the state, which does not remove the core of Tilly’s 
argument; the fate of the state will inevitably determine the fate of workers (even 
if they frame their demands as citizens). In a sense, it mirrors the ‘globalisation 
debate’ that became so popular in the 1990s and which has been briefly 
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. Gentile and Tarrow’s framing of their 
analysis around successful and unsuccessful repertoires of contention misses a 
key component, which has to do with the different shapes labour 
mobilisation/disputes/unrest can take. The problem was not that the Liverpool 
dockers framed their struggle around labour rights rather than citizens’ rights, as 
the article argues (in fact, this thesis shows that they compiled a rather mixed 
repertoire), but rather, the way in which the construction of historical experience 
in their popular memory interacted with their political capabilities. 
It is now time to bring the other pessimist back. Silver (2003) reminds us 
that labour unrest can take two forms. Labour unrest may target the employer 
directly or it may target the state. This implies that switching repertoires between 
labour and citizen rights would only be appropriate if workers changed sites of 
contention accordingly. In other words, if there are two separate sites of 
contention (the employer and the state), then workers/citizens will have two 
different types of struggle. Yet, it remains uncertain if that conceptual distinction 
is appropriate to the way struggles are framed in the modern period. Instead, the 
modern period appears marked by a blurring of these two concepts. 
Furthermore, there is a rather more basic problem with the literature 
reviewed so far. This is not unique to this literature, and in fact, Tilly (2001) 
argues that the same problem can be found in the democratisation literature, that 
is “where competing practical proposals lie close at hand; ostensibly competing 
explanations of democratisation link to competing programs for 
democratization” (Tilly 2001, p. 27). It is precisely the way in which the 
literature uses explanation and wishful thinking interchangeably, that makes 
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the process of creating understanding almost impossible. This is what makes 
building a robust conceptual and theoretical framework to analyse labour 
movements in the neoliberal period almost impossible. Programmatic approaches 
muddy the water, rather than provide the tools for analysing the struggles that 
have developed. 
However, there is a strong theme throughout the literature. It is an old 
ghost which many thought had long been buried, particularly after Hyman’s 
(1979) critique. This was the dichotomy between bureaucratic trade unionism or 
a trade unionism based on rank-and-file organisation. In other words, a 
dichotomy that contrasts capitalist collaboration with revolutionary action. 
Shorter and Tilly used the dichotomy to try and explain French strikes in the post 
Second World War period: 
“The Popular Front and the post-World War II period emerge, therefore, as the 
crucial period in the modernization of the French strike, waged by workers more 
militant and politically-oriented than ever before. What the meaning of this new 
militancy is, however – whether it aims at the class war of a social revolution or 
at the fatter pocketbooks of business unionism – is another matter” (Shorter and 
Tilly 1971, p. 85). 
This politicisation of workers, and what it may mean, is crucial for the 
way in which trade union organisational dichotomies are understood. The 
debates have now become far more sophisticated, yet the constraining dichotomy 
between a bureaucratic model of unionism, which appears to follow an “iron law 
of oligarchy”, against a rank-and-file model of unionism, has not gone away. The 
terms have changed, and the literature now conceptualises these two ‘ideal’ 
models as “service model” versus “organising model”. 
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Table 1.2. Models of trade union renewal: the service model vs. the organising 
model 
The service model The organizing model 
1. Union leaders solve problems for 
members. 
2. The union relies on the grievance 
and arbitration procedures. 
3. Membership is passive or limited 
to leader requests for cooperation. 
4. Members rely on specialists, 
experts and union staff. 
5. The union develops secretive and 
closed communication channels. 
6. Union structures are centralized 
and top heavy. 
7. The union grows dependent on and 
is reactive to management. 
8. Distinctions are made between 
internal and external organizing 
activities. 
1. Stimulates and involves members 
in problem solving in group 
process or collective actions. 
2. Is not limited to the bargaining 
process. 
3. Is committed to education, 
communications, and member 
participation in the union. 
4. Develops and depends on 
members’ skills and abilities. 
5. Shares information and develops 
open communication channels. 
6. Has a decentralized organizational 
structure. 
7. Operates independently of 
management, and is proactive. 
8. Makes no distinction between 
internal and external organizing 
activities. 
(Schenk 2003, p. 246-247) 
The dichotomy can be, and often is, brought into different levels of 
sophistication and includes a distinction, for example, between “social 
partnership” (Fairbrother and Stewart 2003) and “social movement unionism”. 
One problematic issue is that “the dichotomous conception of power in trade 
unions misrepresents the problem and thus obstructs analysis and ultimately 
confuses strategy. Between ‘trade union bureaucracy’ and ‘rank and file’ there 
exist many forms and processes of mediation” (Hyman 1979, p. 61). 
The approaches reviewed here share the rather gloomy view that 
“globalization often invokes the image of an increasingly homogeneous world 
economy dominated by footloose capital, and workers are often portrayed as 
being powerless in the face of capital mobility unless they can themselves 
develop a global strategy in response” (Turnbull 2000, p. 383). It is evident that 
each approach differs on how such a strategy will or should develop. The 
problem, however, is that “international labor cooperation is in no way 
‘inevitable’ and is unlikely to follow simply from a realization of economic 
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interdependence. In fact, globalization is arguably more likely to produce 
economic nationalism rather than international cooperation. This is also true on 
the waterfront, but on numerous occasions dockers have been able to transcend 
their immediate economic interests and their dependence on national opportunity 
structures to mount successful campaigns of international solidarity” (Turnbull 
2000). It is precisely the type of conjuncture that Turnbull points towards that 
provides a more appropriate way of analysing workers’ organisational 
capabilities.  
This argument points in a different direction, one which moves away 
from theories of trade union organisation which were inspired either by readings 
of Michels (Michels 1966) or by readings of Marx, where either any organisation 
will inevitably lead towards oligarchy, or where the proletariat will inevitably 
fight capital. The first question that needs addressing is in relation to what type 
of organisations unions are and their internal contradictions. These arise from 
unions’ institutional aims which are “1) the social construction of worker identity 
and autonomy according to their occupational involvement in the productive 
system (the job); and 2) to contribute – on the basis of this differentiation from 
and even confrontation with employers – to workers’ integration into the 
capitalist system” (Catalano 1999, p. 28). 
 However, unions, as organisations, do not present dichotomies. Rather 
they offer a multiplicity of organisational features as they are carriers of 
“multiple contradictions and ambiguities, (…).Their roots in individual social 
and occupational identity constitutes their strength, in terms of a capacity for 
workers to create autonomous identity-forms” (Catalano 1999,  p. 34). Yet, in 
apparent contradiction, it is precisely these internal divisions that can be the 
springboard for autonomous organisation. Dockworkers, as the thesis will show, 
appear well suited to this contradiction. 
It is precisely the agency of workers, their capacity to create 
“autonomous identity-forms”, that should provide the theoretical thread. 
Therefore, rather than a dichotomy, the theoretical debate can be moved forward 
by investigating workers’ searches for autonomy. Autonomy, when it refers to 
organisation, involves a collectivity and the self-organisation of that collectivity 
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(Thwaites Rey 2004). In the context of this thesis, what matters is the tension 
that exists between political articulations of solidarity that aim towards a unified 
set of politics, in order to overcome divisions that arise from contradictory class 
experiences workers can have, and workers’ searches for autonomy which 
develop within the course of certain struggles and experiences. It is precisely the 
ways in which the search for autonomy arises and the political struggles that it 
creates, that is the focus of the thesis.   
A conceptual and theoretical framework 
 
 It has become evident that there appears to be a relationship between the 
theoretical outlook of both the pessimists and the optimists and the types of 
industries that the writer has in mind. This is due to each industry following 
different patterns and practices. If this proposition was to be pursued, there 
would be at least two theoretical standpoints that could be followed. Considering 
the dockers’ internationalist strategy and organisational creativity and ability to 
innovate, the framework could follow in Waterman3’s footsteps. Alternatively, 
the fact that the dockers’ dispute ultimately ended in defeat, as the dockers did 
not achieve reinstatement, could be considered to reinforce Tilly’s pessimistic 
view. Yet, neither the pessimists nor the optimists are able to grasp the richness 
of the case study. Instead, it is a study of the political dynamics, understood as 
the arena that goes beyond direct ‘bread and butter’ issues, from the arena related 
to the struggle towards workers’ organisational autonomy, which can open the 
door towards conceptualising the kind of organisational capacities workers had 
during the 1990s. 
 One of the key issues to consider when exploring workers’ organisational 
capacities is the contrast offered in the literature between a service and an 
organising model of trade unionism, which has been a common thread 
throughout the approaches reviewed here. A service model of trade unionism 
appears as the direct descendant of bureaucratic models of trade unionism, whilst 
                                                     
3  Waterman has in the past completed research on dockworkers, as chapter 4 of his most 
comprehensive work shows: Waterman, P. (2001). Globalization, Social Movements and the New 
Internationalisms. London, Continuum. 
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an organising model works within a framework that imagines active trade union 
members who become agents in their own organisations, rather than the 
receivers of ‘services’.   
 However, the return to dichotomies offers little help when trying to 
analyse labour movements. It reinforces the piecemeal approach evident in much 
of the literature, which views workers’ organisational capacities to be either in a 
political vacuum or as being forever linked to the fate of the state. Instead, this 
thesis offers a conceptual framework based around the development of struggle, 
of tensions, in the political articulation of solidarity within workers’ movements. 
This political articulation of solidarity is neither predetermined nor it is static. On 
the contrary, it is the outcome of three interrelated factors and, especially, of how 
these factors relate to each other within different historical periods and in 
different institutional contexts. The three proposed analytical categories are: 
• Economic restructuring and political regulatory processes. In 
agreement with the approaches considered under the ‘national optimists’, 
the thesis considers the type of economic restructuring and political 
processes characteristic of the British port industry, as the direct 
institutional context in which the Liverpool dockworkers were placed. 
• Trade union strategies. Rather than a dichotomous approach to trade 
union organisational strategies, the thesis considers trade union strategies 
as the temporal resolution of tensions between unifying tendencies within 
the labour movement and autonomy-searching tendencies. In other 
words, certain labour movements, and the British case is exemplary in 
that sense, have placed crucial importance on the development of a strong 
and united labour movement. This, it can be argued, may help overcome 
divisive tendencies which arise from contradictory working class 
experiences. However, these contradictory working class experiences, at 
times, find themselves constrained by heavy bureaucratic machines, and 
their quest for autonomy may lead to different types of strategies being 
pursued.   
• Workplace and community experience and popular historical 
memories. Both the previous two factors operate at a further level, that of 
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individual and collective experience. It is argued in the thesis, that 
workplace and community experience, and the popular historical 
memories produced and maintained, are crucial analytical tools to 
understand the struggles over the political articulations of solidarity in 
different local contexts. 
 
Research strategy and methodology
4
 
 
In order to analyse the research question “how do workers articulate 
solidarity in the new environment marked by economic restructuring and 
political deregulation?” the thesis uses a case study. The case study chosen is the 
Liverpool dockers’ dispute 1995-1998. The choice of case study research 
appears as natural when considering that “case studies are the preferred method 
when (a) ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has 
little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within a real-life context” (Yin 2009, p. 2). In that sense, the search for how 
solidarity was articulated and why the dispute arose and developed in the way it 
did, would fulfil the first requirement. Secondly, I, as a researcher, have very 
little control over events as they happened fifteen years before the research was 
conducted. Finally, the thesis argues that the dispute has many contemporary 
characteristics, and as such is able “to elucidate features specific to a particular 
case” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, p. 296) as well as contribute to the debates 
surveyed in this introductory chapter. Methodologically, the research conducted 
has relied on qualitative methods of research. In particular, the thesis has relied 
on archival documents, semi-structured interviews and observation of the port 
and dockworkers’ meetings. 
 
  
                                                     
4 Appendix 3 consists of a detailed methodological discussion and reflection. 
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An outline of the thesis 
 
Chapter two focuses on the economic restructuring of the port industry 
and the political processes behind the regulation and deregulation of labour 
relations in British ports. First, it considers the economic restructuring of ports, 
particularly in relation to the technological changes brought about after the 1960s 
with the development of containerisation. The biggest change in this area was the 
way in which the industry moved, globally, from being labour-intensive to 
becoming capital-intensive in a very short space of time (about a decade). This 
had huge consequences for dockside employment and communities, with many 
port operations actually moving away from no longer suitable locations.  
The following two sections consider the regulatory and deregulatory 
processes that characterised employment relations in many British ports after 
1945. First, the period between 1945 and 1979, and the efforts by successive 
governments to regulate employment in the industry under the National Dock 
Labour Scheme (NDLS) are analysed. Secondly, the period from 1979 to 1989, 
which saw the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme with the resulting 
major overhaul of employment relations in ports, is considered. The chapter pays 
particular attention to the nuances in the regulatory and deregulatory processes 
that affected employment in British ports in order to understand their 
contribution to institutional processes in which the Liverpool dockers had been 
involved. 
Chapter three explores the development of Liverpool’s political culture 
during the twentieth century. This chapter, together with chapter five, contributes 
to the third variable proposed before, in relation to community and popular 
historical memory. The chapter focuses on the characteristics of Liverpool’s 
distinctiveness. The chapter considers local politics and the development of trade 
union identities in the city during the twentieth century. Furthermore, two main 
explanations have been provided to account for Liverpool’s exceptionalism, 
religious sectarianism and Liverpool’s over-reliance on a maritime economy. 
The chapter argues that it is the timing of the emergence of these two factors that 
it important. 
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Chapters two and three together provide the necessary historical 
background for the case, both providing a sense of the institutional context in 
which the port industry operated and the city of Liverpool. Chapter four widens 
the background, by focusing on the Transport and General Workers’ Union, one 
of the largest in Britain at the time and the union of the dockers. This chapter 
contributes directly to the second variable identified in this introductory chapter, 
trade union strategies. The chapter analyses the historical development of the 
TGWU as a large union with a heterogeneous membership. It particularly 
focuses on Bill Morris’ leadership in the 1990s and his efforts to manage the 
rapid decline the union suffered during the 1980s.  
Chapter five, using Phillips’ (2009) conceptualisation of workplace 
conflict, analyses the nature of workplace relations in the Port of Liverpool after 
the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme until the start of the dispute in 
September 1995. Specifically, the chapter considers the type of relationships that 
developed between workers, shop stewards, the union and management in the 
period leading up to the dispute.  
The following two chapters, six and seven, examine the dynamics of the 
dispute. Chapter six focuses on the local and national dynamics. The chapter 
develops a chronological account of the dispute, focusing on the relationship 
between the dockers’ shop stewards committee and the TGWU’s regional and 
national leadership as well as the networks the dockers developed outside the 
formal structures of the union, with other unions, with groups within the British 
left and with varied other groups such as ‘Reclaim the Streets’. This chapter also 
analyses the negotiations between the dockers, the union and the Mersey Docks 
and Harbour Company (MDHC), with a particular focus on the different offers 
the dockers received throughout the 28-month dispute. 
Chapter seven explores the international dynamics of the solidarity 
campaign that the dockers organised. Specifically, the chapter considers two 
interrelated questions. First, what were the factors which prompted the need for 
international action? Secondly, what were the characteristics of the 
internationalism that developed from the Liverpool dockers’ dispute? The 
chapter offers a contribution to issues of trade union strategy, specifically the 
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issue of competing trade union politics and action at the international level, 
which offers some leverage to the literature reviewed in this chapter. Finally, 
chapter eight assesses the three variables proposed in this chapter and, in the 
process, returns to the debates considered in the literature. 
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Chapter 2. Economic restructuring and political 
deregulation in British ports in historical perspective 
 
This chapter traces the historical development of British ports relevant to 
an understanding of the Liverpool dockers’ dispute 1995-98. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. First, economic restructuring of ports, in terms of 
their development from a labour-intensive towards a capital-intensive industry, is 
considered, paying particular attention to the effects these changes had on 
employment. Secondly, the efforts of successive governments from 1945 to 
1979, to regulate employment relations in British ports are analysed. Finally, the 
deregulation of employment law and employment relations on the docks, 
culminating with the abolition of National Dock Labour Scheme in 1989 is 
elucidated. 
 
Economic restructuring in ports 
 
Ports were slow in developing technology. They had been a traditionally 
low-cost labour-intensive industry which was characterised by fragmentation. 
Aside from some early technological innovations (electric cranes and grain 
elevators) introduced between 1896 and 1907 in some of the largest ports, such 
as Rotterdam (Marges 1999), followed by palletisation – organising cargo on 
pallets to reduce the time spent loading and unloading–  ports did not radically 
change the way they worked until the 1960s when containerisation was first 
introduced.  Crucially, this change would have a direct impact on employment. 
Previously, “technological change had had a minimal effect on employment in 
the industry, which fluctuated largely in response to the trade and business 
cycles” (Turnbull 1993, p. 194). Although the numbers of dockers had already 
begun to decline, prior to containerisation, it was technological change rather 
than the various attempts at registration and decasualisation of employment that 
brought about the largest change to employment levels. 
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However, it was not just the number of dockers required to work that 
would change; the appearance and location of ports was also radically altered, as 
the old locations and dockside equipment were no longer suitable for the loading 
and unloading of large container ships. This changed the appearance and location 
of the dockers’ work environment, as “the ‘clutter’ of a conventional berth with 
narrow quays and tall warehouses, seething with men and equipment,” was 
replaced by “the container terminal [which] is like a giant car park, or more 
precisely container park, with a long straight quay and massive cranes” (Turnbull 
1993, p. 195). 
Therefore, ports and the work carried out within them were moving away 
from the traditional quayside. For dockers across the world, this meant a sea 
change in the way they lived and worked. Due to the casual nature of dock work, 
dockers, and other port workers, lived around the dock area, in order to be close 
by when work became available. With the advent of containerisation, fewer 
dockers were required to load and unload cargoes and ports moved to areas that 
were purpose built in order to operate larger machinery and to accommodate 
vessels requiring deep water berths. This rapid period of change, when a labour-
intensive industry moved towards becoming a capital-intensive industry, had 
contradictory consequences for dockers. On the one hand, dock work became 
less physically strenuous, and a different set of skills, based around the operation 
of large machinery, rather than the artisan skill of stevedoring, became the norm 
for the majority of the work. On the other hand, dockers were increasingly 
worried about the effects technological advances would have for jobs. Although 
it may be considered that dockers adopted a Luddite attitude to change, the 
reality was far more complicated and included a range of concerns, such as the 
effects of large scale redundancies in already deprived areas, or retraining in 
order to be able to operate new technology, all often considered under the 
umbrella term ‘social consequences’ (WFTU 1969).  
Furthermore, the geographical relocation of the workplace had 
implications for dockworkers which were two-fold. On the one hand, as 
mentioned before, dockers had traditionally lived close by the docks where they 
worked. Container terminals were often built a considerable distance away from 
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these docks. In Liverpool, older working docks such as Albert Dock gave way to 
the Royal Seaforth Container Terminal, inaugurated in 1972, and Birkenhead 
docks, with smaller docks such as Garston being maintained or refurbished. On 
the other hand, large spaces of land on the waterfront were left empty, as 
wasteland. This increasingly gave way to the idea of waterfront redevelopment 
(Breen and Rigby 1996), a new way of creating profit from ports which did not 
require dock work, based instead on urban speculation. 
The benefits for capital of reducing the number of required dock workers 
were not grasped by ports and employers until fairly late in most British ports. 
Possibly due to the fragmentation of capital in ports (with several different 
companies carrying out different types of work), investment in technology was 
slow. As Mankelow notes when considering the changes in the port of London: 
“the dock employers were slow to introduce capital equipment to improve 
efficiency, preferring to operate a low-wage low-technology system” (Mankelow 
2000, p. 370). Employers found little incentive for change, as this system 
allowed them to continue working without having to invest in technology.  
British ports offered a particularly stark example as the industry was 
characterised by extreme fragmentation and an unwillingness to invest. Dock 
employers had become habituated to making money out of limited responsibility 
with little or no investment.  In fact, minimal start up capital was required to 
become a dock employer, and even less investment was required in order to stay 
in business. 
Fragmentation has characterised British ports to this day. The next 
section will consider in more detail the implications of this system for the 
development (or underdevelopment) of a consistent port transport policy in 
Britain. For the time being, however, it is important to consider how this 
fragmentation was expressed both in the diverse number of employers within 
ports as well as in the diverse patterns of ownership of ports. These two factors 
coupled with a separation between the British port industry and the shipping 
industry led to patterns of uneven technological development and often 
inefficiency within port operations. 
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 The port industry is characterised by a wide range of port ownership and 
administration models. There are different ownership patterns, which involve 
different configurations of private and public ownership. Baird (1995) identifies 
four different models of port administration, as table 2.1 shows. Baird’s 
framework is based around the idea that there are three key areas of ownership 
and administration in ports. First, there is the area related to ownership of land, 
of ports as landlords. Secondly, there is the area of regulation, in other words, 
whether the making and enforcing of rules is made by the public or by the 
private sector. Finally, there is the function of utility cargo-handling in the port.  
 
Table 2.1. Models of port administration 
 Port functions 
Models Landowner Regulator  Utility 
Pure public sector Public sector Public sector Public sector 
PUBLIC/private Public sector Public sector Private sector 
PRIVATE/public Private sector Public sector Private sector 
Pure private sector Private sector Private sector Private sector 
(Baird 1995, p. 136) 
 
Most European 5  ports operate within the first three models, with the 
second model being the most popular. In Britain, the third and, increasingly, the 
fourth model are the most common. In fact, the fourth model appears as being 
particularly British, with only rare examples of the fourth model outside Britain. 
Importantly, both the “Mersey Docks & Harbour Company, and the ports 
portfolio of Associated British Ports (privatised in 1983) conform to this model” 
(Baird 1995, p. 135). This way of considering port administration is useful in so 
far as it points towards a balance, or imbalance, of power between the public and 
                                                     
5 Phillips and Whiteside (1985, p. 282-283) identify three key differences between British and 
other European port employers. First, the tidal nature of major British ports meant that work was 
unpredictable, unlike work in European ports such as Rotterdam, where regular shift patterns 
were the norm. Secondly, European ports were far less fragmented than British ports, making 
coordination and the pursuit of common goals easier. Thirdly, in Britain “waterside firms 
encountered union organization a generation before it emerged in the leading continental ports, 
and encountered it in a form which evoked a discordant and insular response” (p. 283).  
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private sectors. There is, however, a more sophisticated way of considering 
variants of port administration and ownership. Ports have been characterised as 
being either comprehensive or functional ports, service ports or landlord ports 
(Chlomoudis and Pallis 2002, p. 23) . This way of analysing ports moves away 
from ownership and administration patterns and considers in more detail the 
types of services that port owners can offer. In other words, it specifically 
assesses the extent to which port owners are involved in cargo-handling 
operations, and therefore the employment of dock workers. Table 2.2 offers a 
summary of the major characteristics of the different forms of port organisation: 
Table 2.2. Models of port organisation 
 Organisational model 
 Comprehensive Service Providing 
the tools 
Landlord 
Infrastructure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(basic) 
Superstructure Yes Yes Yes No 
Provision of general 
services 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Provision of public 
welfare services 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Cargo handling onboard No Yes No No 
Cargo handling at the 
docks 
Yes Yes No No 
(Chlomoudis and Pallis 2002, p. 23) 
 
The most common types of port organisation around the developed world 
are the comprehensive and the landlord models. They both incorporate a mixture 
of private and public involvement, yet “both types involve the existence of a 
public authority, while their differences lie in the room for manoeuvring they 
allow to private companies”(Chlomoudis and Pallis 2002, p. 22). In Britain, the 
lack of a public authority in most cases has led to more complicated models of 
port ownership, administration and organisation. Particularly, the fragmentation 
within the British port industry mentioned earlier can be attributed to two main 
factors. On the one hand, the multiplicity of models within the port industry 
(trust ports, Associated British Ports, private port authorities, etc) has led to 
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different and, more often than not, disjointed patterns of development and, more 
recently, of distinct types of privatisation. On the other hand, public involvement 
in British ports, and the political regulation of them, have been characterised by a 
piecemeal approach, rather than a unified strategy. 
The consequences of a disjointed approach towards port privatisation are 
best explained by the use of an example, which is particularly relevant to the 
focus of the thesis. Medway Ports was privatised in a very peculiar fashion. 
Medports MEBO Ltd placed a bid of £29.7 million, which was accepted as there 
were no further bidders. The way trust ports had been encouraged to privatise by 
the Conservative government was paradoxical. The bidder would get half of their 
bid back, after expenses, from the government. So, for Medports MEBO Ltd, a 
handy £13.2 million went back to them. The privatisation process, however, was 
seen as a positive step as workers were allowed, and encouraged to buy shares. 
“However, further analysis revealed that while five directors had acquired 
250,000 shares between them (giving an average management holding of 50,000 
shares), 250 employees were allowed to buy only 307,000 shares in total 
(resulting in an average employee holding of 1228 shares)” (Baird 1995, p. 138). 
No matter how unfair this may seem, it was not to be the worst part of the story. 
“In November 1992, 269 dockers were dismissed6 because they refused to accept 
new conditions of work. Furthermore, the successor company’s articles obliged 
the sacked dockers to sell back their shares […] to the company at £2.50, a price 
set by accountants KPMG Peat Marwick” (Baird 1995, p. 138). 
If this sounds like a poor deal, it, in fact, got worse. Medway was to be 
taken over by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC). By then 
“because of the capital structure of Medway, shares bought for £1 at privatisation 
were now worth £37.25 each in the takeover” (Baird 1995, p. 138). The deal was 
certainly detrimental to both the government and the sacked workers, “with the 
government also holding 20% of MDHC, it was evident that while they (the 
government) had sold public assets (Medway) for £13.2 million, they had then, 
eighteen months later, helped to buy the book back (through their holding in 
MDHC) for £104 million […]. A strange commercial transaction indeed!” (Baird 
                                                     
6 The sacked dockers were awarded £10,000 compensation for unfair dismissal. 
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1995, p. 138). The relevance of this episode, besides providing an understanding 
of the incoherence of government policy, will become clear when analysing the 
negotiations (in chapter 6) regarding a labour supply company in Liverpool 
during the 1995-98 dispute, where KPMG were involved. 
Government regulation in British ports has focused on labour relations. 
Both Conservative and Labour governments, not always openly, have 
concentrated on regulating, deregulating or investigating labour relations in the 
ports. It has long been assumed, by both parties, that these relations are the main 
constraint on the productivity of British ports. Although this approach towards 
regulating labour relations in an otherwise unregulated and fragmented industry 
will be considered in more detail in the next section of the chapter, for the time 
being it is important to highlight how the fragmentation of the British port 
industry is perhaps a factor long forgotten by British policy-makers. As the 
Greek experts in the European port industry Chlomoudis and Pallis have 
expressed: “Port productivity partially depends on the improvement of the total 
transport chain, consequently the competitiveness of a port and of port planning 
relate to the relevant characteristics of the other parts of the transport network” 
(2002, p. 18). Yet, in Britain, port competitiveness has traditionally been seen as 
an issue of cost-cutting and geographical location in relation to trade routes, 
rather than as part of a British transport network (perhaps with the exception of 
the ports operated by British Rail before privatisation). 
Containerisation can be considered one of the main technological 
advances which have facilitated the globalisation of the world economy, as 
“transport services are not simply the object of globalization; they are also the 
fundamental cause of this process” (Turnbull 2000, p. 368). This view is echoed 
by some economists who argue that “while attributing the vast changes in the 
world economy to a single cause would be foolhardy, we should not dismiss out 
of hand the possibility that the extremely sharp drop in freight costs played a 
major role in increasing the integration of the global economy” (Levinson 2006, 
p. 11). This sharp drop in cost is due to a reduction in the labour needed to load 
and unload vessels. Therefore, as a crucially influential report on containerisation 
argued, dockworkers were a key problem in achieving ‘rationalisation’ of the 
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industry as “the rapid adoption of container technology will necessitate the 
redeployment of large numbers of workers in this currently labour-intensive 
industry” (McKinsey 1967). This was not just going to affect dockworkers; all 
industries related to ports would face a deep restructuring. For example, “ships 
and hence crews required on the North Atlantic could ultimately be reduced by 
more than 70 per cent” (McKinsey 1967). As tables 2.3 and 2.4 show, overall 
transport activity in key European ports did not change massively in the twenty-
nine years between 1970 and 1999, yet container traffic continued to grow year 
on year.  
Table 2.3. Transport activity in selected ports, millions of tones: 
Port Country 1970 1980 1990 1997 1998 1999 
Rotterdam NL 226.0 276.0 288.0 303.3 306.6 299.1 
Antwerp B 78.0 82.0 102.0 111.9 119.8 115.7 
London UK 64.0 48.0 58.0 55.7 56.4 52.4 
Liverpool UK 31.0 13.0 23.0 30.8 30.3 28.9 
Source: Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, Bremen, quoted in (Chlomoudis 
and Pallis 2002, p. 6) 
Table 2.4. Container traffic in selected ports
7
, (1,000 TEU
8
)  
Port Country 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 Change 
99/98 
(%) 
Rotterdam NL 3,667 4,787 5,495 6,011 6,343 +5.5 
Antwerp B 1,549 2,329 2,969 266 3,614 +10.7 
Felixstowe UK 1,436 1,924 2,237 500 2,697 +7.9 
Liverpool UK 239 406 461 487 515 +5.7 
Source: Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, Bremen (Chlomoudis and Pallis 
2002, p. 9) 
                                                     
7 Please note that London is not in the top 20 container ports in Europe, instead Felixstowe is the 
top UK container port, only 3 British ports are in the list: Felixstowe (4th), Southampton (13th) 
and Liverpool (18th). 
8 TEUs Twenty-foot equivalent units, a standardised maritime industry measurement used when 
counting cargo containers of different lengths. 
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Containerisation could also provide the key towards a more integrated 
transport network. The story of how the container was invented was well 
narrated by Ian Lloyd when he was MP for Havant and Waterloo in 1975. He 
had been chairman of the United Kingdom Committee of the International Cargo 
Association and had been associated with British shipping for a long time. His 
narration originates in the Port of Newark, New York in 1957:  
“C. S. McLean […] invented this device. He was what is known in the United 
States as a trucker. In the United Kingdom he would be known as a lorry 
operator. He found that his lorries were being delayed for 10, 15, 24, 48 or 68 
hours in Port Newark. The idea occurred to him that it was technologically 
unnecessary for large lorries to be driven either to warehouses or to the dockside 
and, piece by piece, physically unloaded or, piece by piece, physically loaded 
into ships. He thought ‘Why not lift the back of a lorry straight off and put it 
straight into a specially designed ship?’” (Lloyd 1975) 
 
The changes brought about by containerisation required a complete 
overhaul of how the industry was regulated. The commitment towards regulation 
shown by the 1945 Labour Government’s creation of the National Dock Labour 
Scheme, soon after taking power, was quickly proving to be insufficient. If the 
capital investment needed to develop container terminals was to be put forward, 
there had to be a system which ensured workers would be available to work such 
containers. This meant that workers had to be in the dock ready to load/unload 
containers, and that they had to be sufficiently skilled to be able to operate the 
new machinery.  
 
The political regulation of dock labour 
 
 Regulation came in as the creation of a national register of dockworkers. 
Earlier attempts at registration, such as the 1912 Liverpool scheme, had proved 
successful in securing an adequate level of labour power within ports. Liverpool 
had created the first version of a somewhat rudimentary register as early as 1912. 
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During the Second World War, the docks were seen as an indispensable industry, 
required to maintain the necessary traffic of commodities in and out of Britain. 
Several schemes were created at the time and managed by the Ministry of War; 
the two most important ones were the ones covering the Mersey and the Clyde, 
on the one hand, and the scheme covering the East Coast ports. Before 
considering the implications of containerisation for the regulation of employment 
in the docks, the creation of the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1947 needs to 
be briefly explained. 
 Ernest Bevin, the man behind the amalgamation of several unions to form 
the Transport and General Workers Union in 1922 (Coates and Topham 1994), 
joined Churchill’s war-time coalition government as Minister of Labour and 
National Service in 1940.  Bevin was concerned to secure the smooth operation 
of his previous industry during the war. He is seen as the forefather of the 
Scheme created in 1947 (by which time he was no longer Minister of Labour, but 
he was a member of the post-war Labour Cabinet as Foreign Secretary). The 
Schemes created during the Second World War were conceived by Bevin, and he 
worked to ensure that, after the War, rather than abolishing them, they were to be 
introduced in other ports. The Second World War in this case acted as a catalyst 
towards the regularisation of employment in British ports (Jackson 1973, p. 25). 
 The Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946 was vague. It 
was created to regulate local dock labour schemes which would be coordinated 
by the National Dock Labour Board. Both the local and the national boards 
would be characterised by joint control. This would involve the equal 
representation of employers and workers. The scheme was, originally, a 
voluntary arrangement but it was introduced as a statutory scheme on 28 June 
1947. For the first time, the 1946 Act defined some of the key terms, in a rather 
open fashion. The definitions were as follows: 
“‘cargo’ includes anything carried or to be carried in a ship; 
 ‘dockworker’ means a person employed or to be employed in, or in the 
vicinity of, any port on work in connection with the loading, unloading, 
movement or storage of cargoes, or work in connection with the preparation of 
ships for the receipt or discharge of cargoes or for leaving the port; 
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 ‘employer’, in relation to a dockworker, means the person by whom he 
is employed or to be employed as aforesaid; 
 ‘port’ includes any place at which ships are loaded or unloaded” (1945, 
p. 4). 
 The definitions’ vagueness was to prove a challenge as technological 
advances, and particularly containerisation, made some of the definitions less 
clear-cut than perhaps policy-makers thought in 1946. Beyond matters of 
definition, of delimitation of what was dock work and who was involved in it, 
which would become key areas of contention in years to come, the Scheme 
contained the following points at its core: 
(i)  “The establishment of a national administering board with local boards 
at the ports. 
(ii) The registration of employers and workers who thereupon are deemed 
to have accepted the obligations of the scheme. 
(iii) A prohibition on registered employers from engaging dock labour other 
than registered workers. 
(iv) That registered daily workers, where not employed in pursuance of the 
scheme by any other employer are in the employment of the National 
Board and if they are available for work, they are then in the reserve 
pool. 
(v) A prohibition on registered workers from engaging for work with a 
registered employer except as weekly workers or being selected by a 
registered employer or allocated to him in accordance with the scheme. 
(vi) A corresponding obligation on the employers to accept the daily 
workers so allocated and on the workers to accept the employment. 
(vii) The control of wages paid by the employers and entitlement of workers 
in the reserve pool to payment from the National Board (remuneration 
due from employers in respect of daily workers being paid to the 
National Board). 
(viii) Disciplinary powers (including provisions for disentitlement of workers 
to payment for non-compliance with certain provisions of the scheme) 
and provisions for the termination of employment of daily workers, for 
appeals by persons aggrieved to appeal tribunals, and for the cost of the 
operation of the scheme” (Jackson 1973, p. 36).  
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Furthermore, the Scheme did not abolish casualism. Instead, it almost 
institutionalised it. Registered dockworkers would have to attend a ‘free call’ in 
the morning in order to be picked by a foreman or allocated to a gang9. If they 
were left with no work, they would come back to the afternoon call. If they were 
again unsuccessful, they would get paid attendance money. This was, in a sense, 
the main benefit of the Scheme for dockworkers, as before the Scheme, they 
would have gone home with nothing. The new system, however, maintained 
favouritism. In Liverpool, many older dockworkers recall how they and their 
fathers would be often picked by an employer of the same religion, or who 
supported the same football team. If, on that day, the employer was of the 
opposite side, they might have gone home with no work, or left with the work 
nobody else wanted. 
Casualism was inhuman, as Eddie Loyden, MP for Garston who had 
worked for the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company for 28 years, maintained. 
In his participation in a House of Commons Debate into Dock Work and Port 
Reorganisation, Loyden described the casual hiring system as a “cattle market”: 
“Such a system had the effect of squeezing several hundred men into a pen 
where they were driven to holding up their books to the hirer to show him that 
they wanted work. If there was no work, home they would go” (Loyden 1975). 
The Scheme soon ran into its own problems. By 1950 a Commission of 
Inquiry under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederick W. Legget was asked by the 
government to investigate the unofficial disputes which had affected the Port of 
London since the introduction of the Scheme. Legget’s report found that one of 
the main problems in London was that “the Dock Labour Scheme has brought 
little change from the habits and practices of casual employment and it is to be 
hoped that it will be only a stage towards a form of organisation which will 
provide more direct and stable relations between employers and workers” 
(Leggett 1950, p. 12). There is little reason to believe that the same situation was 
not happening in other ports. Furthermore, no welfare or health and safety 
                                                     
9 Being picked by a foreman was always the preferred option, as the alternative of being allocated 
to a gang meant that the docker ended up either with a gang of dockers they did not like or 
working a cargo no one else wanted (this was particularly the case with ‘dirty’ or dangerous 
cargoes). 
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facilities were provided: “We could not find evidence of any provision of 
washing facilities for men working on dirty cargoes beyond the crude provision 
of buckets for which hot water could be obtained only from a ship. We were told 
in evidence that, after working on cargoes of wet hides or even lamp black, a 
dock worker may often have to travel home in public transport in his dirty 
clothes without any proper opportunity of washing. This is embarrassing to the 
man and an annoyance to other travellers” (Leggett 1950, p. 32). Again, this was 
also common elsewhere: in Liverpool John Jenkins, an ex-registered 
dockworker, recalled how they were treated like the rats of society (interview 
data). 
Lord Devlin was first asked to inquire into dockwork by the Conservative 
government in 1955. The reason for setting up the inquiry was the growing 
labour unrest in the docks, which rose from an annual average of man-days lost 
of 39,800 between 1930/38 to 344,400 from the introduction of the 1947 Scheme 
to the setting up of the 1955 Devlin inquiry (Devlin 1955, p. 9). By 1955, the 
scheme was running with 81,000 registered dockworkers and 1,248 registered 
employers (Devlin 1955, p. 2). Devlin’s growing concern with the large number 
of employers in the industry was fundamental to the decasualisation attempt he 
embarked upon ten years later.  
However, before moving on to the later inquiry, there are a few points 
worth highlighting about this earlier report. One of the worries of the 
Conservative government, and the Transport and General Workers Union, was 
the strength of the unofficial workers’ movement within the docks. There was a 
sense that the unofficial strike-committees were led by Communists10 who were 
considered to be agitators who utilised any grievance to further their own 
revolutionary ends. This coupled with the inter-union rivalry existing at the time 
between the TGWU and the National Association of Stevedores and Dockers 
(NASD, the ‘Blue union’) meant that most strikes were difficult to understand 
for those outside the industry.  
                                                     
10 Chapter four deals in more detail with some of the issues pointed out here. In particular, it 
considers the Canadian Seamen Strike. 
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Nevertheless, Devlin found that Communism within the docks was not 
necessarily prevalent, rather that certain Communists were quite able to 
articulate workers’ demands: “While the dockers as a whole do not care about 
Communism, they do not regard a vigorous leader as disqualified from 
expressing their grievances because he is a Communist and prefer to ignore the 
fact that his motives are not necessarily the same as theirs” (Devlin 1955, p. 16). 
The influence of Commuism, or of Communist unofficial leaders, was not the 
only reason for unrest. Devlin identified eight reasons as outlined by previous 
inquiries into unrest in the docks:  
1. “Past history 
2. Solidarity 
3. Large ports 
4. Communist influence 
5. Trade union organisation 
6. Inter-union rivalry 
7. Resistance to obligations under the Scheme 
8. Impersonality and remoteness” (Devlin 1955, p. 15-17). 
Interestingly, most of the causes in the list appear to blame dockworkers 
for the unrest, or some kind of impersonal force. Yet dockers saw things 
differently. If the Scheme was a tool for achieving joint management of 
employment in the industry, how come it was always they who suffered 
disciplinary procedures? “To dock workers it seemed that punishments were 
often inequitably administered and, worse, that offences were arbitrarily defined 
and invented. It appeared unfair, in the first place, that penalties should be 
imposed with such frequency upon workmen, but scarcely ever upon their 
employers” (Phillips and Whiteside 1985, p. 247). 
This inequality in a system that was to provide a jointly managed 
structured was exemplified by the fact that whilst an unsuitable “gang could be 
returned […]; the docker who left his employer before the job was finished broke 
continuity and ran the risk of official reprisals” (Phillips and Whiteside 1985, p. 
248). The issue of disciplinary matters was of crucial importance, and it affected 
a large number of dockworkers. In the early 1950s around 18 per cent of the 
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workforce had been appearing annually in front of a disciplinary committee 
(Phillips and Whiteside 1985, p. 246-247). 
Yet, for Devlin the key was in the dockworker, and how his attitudes, if 
turned around, could be decisive in ensuring a thriving industry: 
 “The docker has two qualities, which, if they can be captured and used, will 
prove decisive. The first – it is one with which we have all been struck in the 
course of this Inquiry – is his sense of pride in the industry which he serves. It 
would be natural to think that an industry built up on casual labour amd which 
in the past attracted those who could not find work elsewhere, would be one 
from which men would in better times want to escape; or they should at least 
wish that their sons should escape it. It is not so. The docker has immense pride 
in his skills. The tendency is not towards a flight of labour from the docks but 
much more that the offer of employment there should be governed by the 
hereditary principle. If the docker can look upon his place in the industry as an 
estate in which his son will share and his grandson perhaps inherit, he can surely 
also be made to see that it must be cared for and maintained; that as a business it 
needs customers; that no customer will come indefinitely to a place where he 
cannot rely on his orders being executed; that international trade is got in 
competition and can more easily be lost than won. The docker well understands 
what competition means; he knows the effect on his earnings if he is five 
minutes late, whether he has good reason for it or not, and misses the job; if he 
could enlarge that understanding to take in the thought of what may happen to 
the larger earnings on which he is dependent if the port misses trade, he would 
be less likely to stop work, whether or not he thought he had good reason for the 
stoppage. The other great quality of the docker is his sense of loyalty. Everyone 
agrees that his readiness to strike is largely due to a sense of loyalty to his 
fellow workers. But that means that at least that virtue is there. The power that 
now explodes and disrupts is there to be used, it if can be brought under control, 
to drive the wheel of order and contentment. If the Employers demand loyalty as 
partners and not as benefactors, they may get it” (Devlin 1955, p. 47). 
It is worth highlighting some points of the above quote: pride, property 
and loyalty. Devlin was quick to identify these three characteristics of dockers in 
a way which he felt could be used for the benefit of the industry, rather than for 
the benefit of the unofficial workers’ movement. Pride in the job, and the identity 
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the job confers, means a strong sense of occupational boundaries. Not just in 
regard to what a docker does but also in relation to what should not be part of the 
job. The issue of property is very important, and will recur repeatedly throughout 
the thesis. Dockers had fought hard to achieve the kind of job they had: the 
reward was that when it did become a good job, their children would be able to 
inherit it. Loyalty, or perhaps solidarity, was another quality which Devlin 
considered should have been used differently. Loyalty to an employer became 
impossible in a situation where employer-employee relationships were highly 
unstable. Dockworkers could find themselves working for many different 
employers at any given time. 
The next inquiry to follow the Devlin Inquiry 1955 was very different in 
character. It was forever disregarded as no Act of Parliament followed its 
recommendations. The committee of inquiry was asked “to carry out a 
comprehensive survey of the major ports of Great Britain” (Rochdale 1961, p. 4). 
Surprisingly, it was not the Ministry of Labour, which usually commissioned 
reports regarding ports, but the Ministry of Transport which requested it. The 
main thrust of the inquiry was not to blame the problems of the port industry on 
its workers: 
“Our first point is that it is fruitless to attempt to lay the blame for labour 
troubles in any one quarter. Strikes in the docks naturally make national 
headlines, for they clearly have an adverse effect on the country’s economy. 
However, persistent under-utilisation of existing facilities of labour and 
equipment are in themselves more damaging to the country’s economy than 
periodic localised strikes. In our view dock strikes are at least as much a 
symptom as a cause of the malfunctioning of the port industry” (Rochdale 1961, 
p. 128).  
This malfunctioning was blamed on the fragmentation within the industry 
which, unsurprisingly, led to under-investment or bad investment decisions. “It is 
noteworthy that capital expenditure at British ports since World War II has been 
devoted mainly to minor projects. No single additional deep water berth for 
general cargo has been started since the 1930’s, apart from those now nearing 
completion at Teesport. We believe too that wasteful competition has been 
responsible for some duplication of facilities and that this goes some way 
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towards explaining the financial difficulties in which many ports find 
themselves” (Rochdale 1961, p. 22). It leads to the conclusion that “a 
fundamental defect in the organisation of ports in this country is the lack of any 
central planning” (Rochdale 1961, p. 53). 
The second Devlin inquiry in the mid-1960s, which led to decasualisation 
measures introduced in 1967, needs to be understood against the backdrop of the 
1950s inquiries and the Rochdale report. The changes brought about by Devlin 
were designed to ensure a cooperative workforce. If the large amounts of capital 
investment needed for containerisation were to create a worthwhile return, the 
workforce had to cooperate. In a sense, “the employers now believed that only a 
secure workforce with permanent status would accept the changes demanded by 
the new technology coming into use in the port transport industry” (Mankelow 
2000, p. 379). More importantly, the industry needed workers willing to work 
the machinery who would cooperate to do the work, but who would also obtain 
the necessary skills to operate the machinery. The main problems still plaguing 
the industry were identified as follows (without being in order of importance): 
(1) “the dockers’ lack of security, 
(2) the preferential treatment given to ‘blue-eyed boys’, 
(3) the dockers’ lack of responsibility, 
(4) defects in management,  
(5) time-wasting practices,  
(6) piecework,  
(7) overtime,  
(8) welfare amenities and working conditions, and 
(9) trade union organisational difficulties” (Devlin 1965, p. 2). 
There are, however, for Devlin three factors which appear as particularly 
problematic. First, the role played by solidarity. For Devlin, there is an 
exaggerated sense of solidarity or loyalty. As casual labourers in constant fear of 
underemployment, dockers learned that solidarity was even more vital to them 
than it was to the ordinary worker; and as a tight community, originally living in 
a close neighbourhood round the docks, they learnt the importance of loyalty and 
the fear of ostracism. The loyal acceptance of a majority decision may often be 
due to a sense of solidarity. But in the docks solidarity – ‘one out, all out’ – often 
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follows on a minority decision accepted on the principle that the man who wants 
to strike is always right” (Devlin 1965, p. 8). This may be overcome, according 
to the report, via a better system of workers’ representation. As it stood then, 
either the foreman, who should be part of the supervisory structure, or the most 
vociferous man would bring grievances to management, and often the outcome 
would be a dispute. If dockworkers were to have a system of representation 
based around shop stewards, then grievances could be brought up via appropriate 
procedures, rather than walking out on a job. 
The second challenge was what Devlin termed ‘casual management’ 
(Devlin 1965, p. 10). The point made earlier that the port transport industry had 
developed as a labour-intensive industry before the development of 
containerisation is directly linked to the casual management that Devlin found. 
“The only qualification for entry on the register of employers is a wish to employ 
dock labour. In July 1964 there were 1,514 employers on the register. Many do 
practically no work at all and many are casual employers who do an occasional 
job. These latter could not carry on without a supply of casual labour available 
when they want it” (Devlin 1965, p. 10). The 1967 Scheme also tackled this 
issue. Following the Scheme, a rationalisation of employers within the industry 
occurred (Devlin anticipated that Liverpool would go from having 114 registered 
employers to a much reduced figure of 10 (Devlin 1965, p. 104)). Many went out 
of business. Each dockworker was from then on to be attached to a particular 
employer who had a set of responsibilities towards him. Many of the employers 
were unable to meet such obligations. In order to counteract the negative effects 
this would have had on dockworkers, the Scheme included a provision, whereby 
the port authority would act as ‘employer of last resort’. This meant that the 
authority had to absorb the dockworkers who would have otherwise lost their 
jobs when their employers went bust. The main consequence of this was that, for 
example, in Liverpool, the MDHC went from not employing dockworkers before 
the 1960s to being the main employer of dockworkers from the end of the 1970s. 
Devlin’s recommendations highlight the paradox that as containerisation 
approached; Britain initiated the strongest effort to politically regulate labour 
relations on the docks.  Following Lord Devlin’s Committee of Inquiry between 
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1964-65 the introduction of the Dock and Harbours Act 1966 and the Dock 
Labour Order 1967, commonly known as the 1967 Scheme, introduced 
safeguards in the National Dock Labour Scheme aimed at the achievement of 
decasualisation. The new system was designed to ensure that dockworkers had a 
guaranteed working week. However, as the new economic and technological 
changes were quickly spreading, many dock workers were quickly becoming 
redundant. In Liverpool, a new container terminal was opened in 197211, the 
Royal Seaforth Container Terminal, which led to a series of voluntary 
redundancies and the closure of many stevedoring companies. This was the start 
of large scale voluntary redundancies, which at this stage worked to remove 
many ageing dockworkers. However, decasualisation had introduced a safeguard 
for dockworkers which became crucial during this period. Many stevedoring 
companies were unable to move towards a capital intensive industry and they 
went bust, but the new changes to the NDLS meant that dockworkers employed 
by them would not lose their jobs. Instead, the local dock board would then 
become the employer. In places such as Liverpool, it led to the removal of 
fragmentation, and, between 1972 and 1982 most Liverpool dock workers were 
transferred from being employed by smaller stevedoring companies to working 
directly for the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company. 
Nevertheless, Devlin’s recommendations, in the form of a wide ranging 
decasualisation scheme, did not solve the employment situation in the port 
industry. By 1972, the Temporary Unattached Register (TUR) was causing 
widespread resentment amongst registered dockers. Lord Aldington and Jack 
Jones, by then General Secretary of the TGWU, were asked by the Conservative 
government of the time to jointly chair a committee to look into the situation. 
Following on from that, the Temporary Unattached Register was abolished as it 
was seen as a remnant of casualism. This, however, did not stop disputes from 
occurring in the three main British ports: London, Liverpool and Hull. 
In fact by then a larger problem had appeared, as containerisation brought 
with it a new challenge for dockworkers besides the reduced manning levels 
                                                     
11 1972 saw the last intake of dockworkers in Liverpool until the creation of Torside Ltd: 500 
new jobs were created. Carden, M. (1993). Union Democracy and Incorporation: A Case Study 
of the Transport and General Workers Union Merseyside division with particular reference to 
the dock industry. Liverpool, University of Liverpool. Doctor of Philosophy: 469. 
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required for loading and unloading ships. The new challenge came in the form of 
‘groupage’ work. Groupage work is the loading and unloading of containers in 
warehouses outside the docks and where the work is done by non-registered 
dockworkers. Usually, the work is done at a much lower rate and with 
considerably worse conditions. This is why the Labour government in 1969 set 
up the Bristow committee. Its recommendations included that the protection for 
dockworkers should be extended to five miles, and even perhaps 10 miles from 
the port. However, even though it took until 1975 for such recommendations to 
be debated in the House of Commons, they were never approved. 
The issue of ‘groupage’ however was not going away. In a sense, there 
was an issue over the exclusive right to do specific jobs by a specific group of 
workers, regardless of location, or within a specified radius. The issue centred on 
the question of definition that the NDLS had attempted in 1947 but the old terms 
had become obsolete. Issues over ownership of jobs became food for the Right, 
and were used to divide workers. As the Conservative MP Kenneth Baker 
pointed out, there were some key difficulties when considering the extension and 
reform of the scheme proposed by the Labour government in the late 1970s: 
“which is trying to give one section of the Transport and General Workers' 
Union, the dockers’ section, the right to claim the jobs of other workers — not 
those of non-unionised workers, but those of members of other unions” (Baker 
1978). 
 
Political deregulation  
 
The 1960s and 1970s attempts to pacify labour relations on the docks via 
decasualisation were not completely successful: strike levels peaked between 
1967 and 1973 (Turnbull 2000, p. 375). Together with many other industries, 
labour relations were proving difficult to manage. The combination of this 
pattern with the electoral victory of Margaret Thatcher led to a thorough reform 
of trade union regulation from 1979 onwards. To what extent this reform was a 
carefully considered incremental policy is debatable. The aim of the legislation 
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was to reduce the bargaining power that trade unions had in workplaces. 
Deregulation was accompanied, in many cases, with the restructuring of several 
industries such as coal mining, leaving communities without their traditional 
sources of work, and many trade unions without their sources of power, as the 
previous chapter has discussed in more detail in relation to the literature. 
However, Britain’s legislative tradition in regard to workers’ rights did 
lend itself to such level of restructuring. As opposed to other European national 
systems of labour relations, characterised often by a social partnership embedded 
in the state structures (see for example Regini 1992), Britain had developed a 
“tradition of non-involvement of the state” (Visser and Van Ruysseveldt 1996, p. 
44). Instead, “in Britain there is no legal system of positive rights with regard to 
trade union representation, collective bargaining or strikes. Union law has 
developed in the form of exemptions to the common law” (Visser and Van 
Ruysseveldt 1996, p. 50). The way in which employment and trade union 
legislation was developed since 1979 reinforced such characteristics. Table 2.5 
offers a summary of the relevant legislation developed by the successive 
Conservative governments: 
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Table 2.5. Conservative employment legislation since 1979  
1980 
Employment 
Act 
• Restriction of the closed shop; legal remedies are provided for 
workers if they are excluded or expelled from a company for 
refusing to join a closed shop; new closed shops are lawful only 
if a majority is in favour in a secret ballot in which 80% of 
those entitled vote; 
• Restriction of picketing; limited to strikers in lawful strikes at 
their own place of work; secondary picketing is restricted to the 
first supplier or customer; 
• Removal of all provisions for compulsory arbitration in the case 
of unions seeking recognition from employers, provided for 
under the 1975 Employment Protection Act; 
• Reduction of employee rights in the case of unfair dismissal 
provisions; burden of proof is removed from employer; 
maternity rights to reinstatement are reduced. 
1982 
Employment 
Act 
• Restriction of lawful union action; removal of immunity of 
trade unions against action in tort, as defined under the 1974 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, thereby enabling, for 
the first time since 1906, a trade union to be sued for damages 
in the case of an unlawful strike; restriction of definition of 
trade dispute to make solidarity action, sympathy strikes or 
inter-union disputes unlawful; 
• Further restrictions on closed shop (ballot required on existing 
closed shop and 85% majority vote needed for lawful 
continuation); union-only commercial contracts are outlawed. 
1984 Trade 
Union Act 
• Members of principal executive bodies of trade unions must be 
elected by secret ballot every five years; unions lose immunity 
unless a secret ballot is conducted and won before strike 
action; unions which operate political funds must ballot their 
members every 10 years. 
1986 Wages 
Act 
• Restriction of minimum wage provisions; removal of workers 
under the age of 21 from the jurisdiction of the Wages Councils. 
1988 
Employment 
Act 
• Post-entry closed shop is made illegal and unenforceable; no 
strike seeking to enforce post-entry closed shop is lawful; 
• During a lawful strike, union members who cross a picket-line 
cannot be disciplined even if the majority of workers involved 
supported the strike in a secret ballot; 
• Extension of secret balloting in union elections; new 
Commissioner for union member rights. 
1989 
Employment 
Act 
• Various provisions which extend labour market regulation to 
the small firm sector are withdrawn; repeal of discriminatory 
provisions restricting hours of work for women and young 
people above school age; abolition of Training Commission – 
previously Manpower Services Commission – its functions 
being taken over by the Department of Employment; unions no 
longer represented on industrial training boards, which are 
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downgraded to non-statutory status. 
1990 
Employment 
Act 
• Abolition of all legal protection for the pre-entry closed shop; 
refusal of employment to non-union members made unlawful; 
• Employers are given greater freedom to dismiss persons 
taking part in unlawful strike action; immunity removed from 
union officials, including shop stewards, who organise 
support for persons dismissed for taking part in an unlawful 
strike; all remaining forms of secondary action made 
unlawful. 
1993 Trade 
Union 
Reform and 
Employment 
Rights Act 
• Check-off arrangements unlawful unless there is a written 
agreement every three years; workers have the right to join the 
union of their choice; employers are allowed to offer workers 
monetary inducements to leave the union; 
• Employer must be given seven days warning in advance before 
official industrial action; all pre-strike ballots must be postal 
and are subject to independent scrutiny; users of public services 
have the right to seek an injunction against unlawful strike 
action; 
• Withdrawal of support for collective bargaining (removal of 
requirement for Arbitration Commission to encourage collective 
bargaining); 
• Removal of all remaining minimum wage fixing (abolition of 
Wage Councils); 
• Requirement for employers to give a written statement of terms 
and conditions to full-time employees under regular contract; 
extension of jurisdiction of industrial tribunals to cover 
breaches of employment contract; extension of maternity leave 
for women and protection of pregnant women against unfair 
dismissal; protection of workers victimised over health and 
safety at work issues. 
(emphases added, Visser and Van Ruysseveldt 1996, p. 53-54) 
There are two main themes which emerge from table 2.5. First, the issue 
of secondary action was restricted with the 1980 Employment Act, and it was 
constrained further by the 1990 Employment Act. This was particularly 
important in a labour market which was moving towards restructuring and where 
the fragmentation of employment contracts was becoming increasingly 
commonplace. Second, on the legislation directly aimed at reducing the power of 
industrial action. Increased restrictions were placed on how industrial action 
could take place, in the restriction of picketing (1980 Employment Act); the 
possibility of suing a union if unlawful action takes place (1982 Employment 
Act); the stipulation that secret postal ballots must take place before industrial 
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action can take place (1984 Trade Union Act); and the provision that there has to 
be a notification period of seven days before industrial action can be carried out 
(1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act).   
As has become evident in this chapter, ports in Britain went through a 
slightly different process of political regulation and deregulation. They had 
traditionally been autonomously managed, even though the state had sometimes 
been a stakeholder in them. Patterns of employment had been traditionally 
casual, dependent on the requirements of shipping companies. The regulation 
drives which characterised labour relations in British ports in the 1960s and 
1970s were to be reversed in the 1980s. However, it was one of the later 
industries to be deregulated. Figure 2.1 shows how from the 1970s peak, levels 
of industrial action in British ports had already been decreasing in the 1980s, 
prior to the deregulation of labour relations. 
Figure 2.1. Dock strikes in Britain, 1947 to 1989 
(Turnbull 2000, p. 375) 
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The abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme 
 
In 1989, the NDLS was abolished rapidly and without much consultation, 
offering dockworkers severance payments of up to £35,000. Many dock workers 
took this payment. The workforce in British docks was reduced dramatically, 
from several thousands in each port to just a few hundred, as more than 80 per 
cent of the formerly registered dock workers took severance pay (Turnbull 2000, 
p. 367). It was clear that the Conservative government used redundancy 
payments as a strategy to remove dockworkers from British ports. Those few 
dock workers left were no longer registered dock workers and therefore lacked 
the employment protection offered by the previous scheme. Additionally, new 
employment agencies were created in many ports, such as Torside in Liverpool. 
Some were workers’ cooperatives; others were created in agreements between 
the TGWU and the employer, such as Torside. By October 1992, Associated 
British Ports (APB) no longer recognised “unions for the purpose of 
representation or collective bargaining, with the exception of marine pilots” 
(TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee Minutes, 1 October 1992 
Circular No. 920745). Liverpool12, then, remained one of the few exceptions in 
recognising trade union representation for the purposes of collective bargaining.  
The abolition of the NDLS had a clear objective in mind: destroying 
unions on the British waterfront. In a confidential report on the Dock Labour 
Scheme produced by the National Association of Port Employers (NAPE) in 
1986/7 the following argument was made: 
“the power which the Scheme provides to the RDWs [Registered Dock 
Workers] is vested in the Union through appointments to the local boards and 
the National Board. The institutional power which the Union is thus able to 
command through the NDLB adds substantially to its industrial strength, which 
is already considerable due to the strategic nature of the industry. The Scheme 
also provides a common cause which binds all RDWs together and increases the 
Union’s ability to mount unified national industrial action. It is significant that 
                                                     
12 The ports of London and Liverpool had never been part of the Associated British Ports group. 
(In  Turnbull, P. (1993). "Docks". A. Pendleton and J. Winterton Public enterprise in transition. 
Industrial Relations in state and privatized corporations. London, Routledge. ) 
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the two national dock strikes which occurred in 1984 were called by national 
union officers not in support of the NUM but in defense [sic] of the Scheme 
against alleged breaches by employers. If the Scheme was removed the potential 
for national dock strikes would greatly diminish, because RDWs from different 
ports actually have very few material interests in common outside the Scheme” 
(NAPE 1988). 
In a sense, what NAPE argued was that dockworkers were not united in 
class terms with other workers outside the industry, such as the miners. Even 
during the Miners’ Strike, dock strikes were not in solidarity with the miners but 
rather as a way of defending the Scheme, which for NAPE was the reason why 
dockers across the country joined the picket line. What this quote appears to miss 
was the fact that the TGWU could not call a strike in solidarity with the miners, 
so these two national dock strikes in 1984 had to be called in relation to 
something that was directly related to the dockers’ employment, or it would have 
been an illegal strike. However, NAPE was right in saying that national dock 
strikes would diminish if the Scheme was abolished. The reason was not that 
dockers in different ports had different material interests, but that unionised 
dockers were physically removed from ports, whether by buying them out or by 
sacking them as in the Port of Tilbury.  
The abolition of the Scheme deserves some further consideration. For the 
Conservative government drastic reform was justified as the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Department of Transport, Lord Brabazon of Tara put 
it: 
"Management is unable to manage its own workforce effectively, and restrictive 
practices add to the costs of the ports. The public have to pay for the costs of the 
scheme, both as customers for goods that come through the ports and also as 
taxpayers. Since the early 1970s, the taxpayer has contributed over £420 million 
in today's prices in payments for voluntary severance, the only means of 
reducing any surpluses of registered dock workers. A further £350 million of 
public money has gone to help certain scheme ports survive.” (Brabazon 1989) 
 
The justification made regarding the financial cost for the taxpayer was 
interesting. Particularly when the sale of Medway port, explained earlier in the 
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chapter, is considered. Additionally, the under-calculation that the Conservative 
government made, meant that abolishing the Scheme ended up costing an 
estimate of over £250m with all costs included (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, 
p. 233). 
More importantly, however, is how quickly the bill to abolish the scheme 
was to be introduced. The day after the announcement of a White Paper (the 
paper however was embargoed), there was a debate in the House of Lords (6 
April 1989), and the Scheme was finally abolished in July 1989. This would 
mean that by the summer of 1989 the Scheme would be a thing of the past. The 
reasons for acting in such rapid manner and without consultation were given 
unequivocally: 
“I am afraid that the views of the Transport and General Workers Union are so 
clear-cut as to make consultation unnecessary. I can quote from Mr. John 
Connolly, the national secretary of the docks, waterways and fishing group of 
the Transport and General Workers Union, on a number of occasions. As 
recently as 24th February 1987, he said that the policy of the docks and 
waterways group has not changed, and that there will be opposition to the 
amendment or revision of the scheme and that opposition will take the form of a 
national dock strike. On Saturday 1st April he was quoted as saying in The 
Times that any move to abolish the scheme which effectively prevents the 
dismissal of registered dock workers would be met with a national strike. I am 
therefore afraid that there is no reason to consult on this issue. The views of all 
concerned are well known and it is therefore time that the Government acted” 
(Brabazon 1989). 
 
The abolition of the Scheme was carried out without consultation. A 
strike of all Scheme ports followed, and Liverpool was the last port to go back to 
work after a six-week strike. In Liverpool, as in other ports, things were never 
going to be the same13. The lure of redundancy payments against an antagonistic 
return to work proved quite attractive for a large number of British dockers. 
 
                                                     
13 Chapter five will pick up from here, as it will focus on employment relations in the Port of 
Liverpool between 1989 and 1995. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has emphasised the importance of economic restructuring 
and political regulatory and deregulatory processes in understanding the type of 
employment relations that developed in British ports throughout the twentieth 
century. Firstly, the chapter has outlined the economic restructuring of ports, 
with attention to technological development. Ports underwent a vast 
transformation with the introduction of containerisation. This transformation 
involved a move from being a labour-intensive industry to becoming a capital-
intensive one. Additionally, traditional docks were no longer suitable for large 
container ships, and therefore a physical relocation of ports occurred throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
 Secondly, the chapter has analysed the attempts to regulate employment 
in the industry between 1945 and 1979. Three concerns have been shown to be 
crucial for understanding regulatory attempts during this period. First, there was 
a concern with the inhumane and insecure conditions that dockworkers had to 
work in, which stood in stark contrast with new ideas on social welfare that 
became popular in post-1945 Britain. Second, unofficial trade union action often 
led to what were often considered unwelcome influences within the docks. Third, 
technological development required a more disciplined workforce and it was 
becoming evident that such discipline was difficult to achieve within such a 
casual labour market. 
 The last section of the chapter has considered the abolition of the 
National Dock Labour Scheme in 1989. This ended the regulatory circle initiated 
in 1945, and brought British ports back to a bygone era, at a particularly high 
cost to the taxpayer. The changes introduced after 1989 are considered in more 
detail in chapter five, which will focus on workplace conflict in the port of 
Liverpool in the period between 1989 and September 1995. Before that, the 
following chapter will assess the development of Liverpool’s political culture 
during the twentieth century in light of claims that Liverpool is characterised by 
exceptionalism. 
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Chapter 3. Political culture in Liverpool 
 
 This chapter analyses the development of Liverpool’s political culture 
during the twentieth century. It does so in order to understand to what extent 
Liverpool is politically exceptional as compared with other British cities with 
which it shares some key characteristics, such as Glasgow or London. For 
example, whilst Liverpool and Glasgow shared sectarian characteristics, 
sectarianism turned out to be not as prevalent in Liverpool after the Second 
World War.  London also had a large number of Irish immigrants working in 
their docks, but that did not translate into the influence of Irish nationalism in the 
city’s politics. In fact, Liverpool sent an Irish Nationalist MP to Westminster, 
T.P. O’Connor MP (1885-1929), leading many to joke whether Liverpool could 
be considered the thirty third county of Ireland. 
Although the existence of sectarianism, and the large proportion of Irish 
immigrants in Liverpool, will be considered in this chapter, it is important first to 
identify what is distinctive about Liverpool; what makes Liverpool’s 
exceptionalism. Liverpool’s distinctiveness has been characterised in this way: 
“People who know Liverpool know that ‘scousers’ are different. A 
conglomeration of Celts around a busy seaport has produced more ‘characters’ 
per square yard than anywhere else in the country” (Beynon 1975, p. 68). 
 It is precisely the production of these ‘characters’ that this chapter is 
concerned with. But, before considering how they are produced, it is important to 
find out what makes them ‘characters’. This chapter explores Liverpool’s 
distinctiveness across two specific aspects. On the one hand, the development of 
local politics, which includes electoral politics, has followed a distinctive path. 
On the other hand, the way in which trade union identities have been shaped in 
Liverpool also offers a rather exceptional picture, particularly in terms of the 
relationship between trade unionism and community based politics and 
identities. Overall, however, the chapter argues that what is more striking about 
Liverpool’s exceptionalism is not necessarily the development of local politics or 
how trade union identities have been shaped, but rather the timing of when these 
developments happen; their chronology. 
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 Hence, Liverpool’s exceptionalism is not ahistorical. In fact, attempts to 
‘normalise’ Liverpool show the way in which different social and community 
forces have been configured during different times and spaces. For example, 
urban restructuring of the city since the end of the Second World War has 
attempted to ‘modernise’ the city and its communities. The results have been 
mixed though, as the removal of certain ‘exceptionalisms’ led to the creation of 
new ones, by the 1980s such initiatives had been largely unsuccessful. Old 
communities around the docks were broken down together with a weakening of 
their associational bases (often organised around religious grounds). Yet the new 
communities that formed, such as Kirkby, created their own organisational bases. 
However, these new communities did not manage to eradicate the poverty and 
deprivation that had been so prevalent in Liverpool. In fact, parts of Merseyside 
have remained some of the poorest areas in Europe into the twenty-first century 
and, as such, they have been the beneficiaries of European Union Objective I 
Programmes (Boland 1999). 
Returning to the two characteristics of Liverpool’s exceptionalism that 
this chapter focuses on, local politics and trade union identities have both been 
shaped by the seemingly endemic prevalence of poverty and deprivation in the 
city. The relationship between poverty and the way the city was organised was 
noted by Waller (1981), when he described the urban division that occurred 
between social classes which was further accentuated by the existence of poor 
transport systems, urban geography (such as the river Mersey) and a marked 
indifference towards the poor by the wealthier members of society (Waller 1981, 
p. 15). Liverpool city was not unique in terms of poverty. Bootle, a separate 
borough from 1868 until 1974, where some of the docks were and where many 
dockers lived was, and still is, also well known for the prevalence of its poverty.  
In fact, Liverpudlians would see Bootle as the poor relation, the one beyond 
redemption: 
“Bootle was a nadir vital to Liverpool’s amour propre. If Liverpool’s officials 
were imperfect, at least they were above the Bootle Town Clerk who embezzled 
£24,000. If Liverpool was rough, at least its violence paled by ‘Brutal Bootle’ – 
‘where the bugs wear clogs’. […], though its slums were shocking, Liverpool 
contained some handsome districts. Bootle displayed only ‘dirty streets, 
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deserted mansions, public-houses, brickfields, and waste-land’” (Waller 1981, 
p. 94). 
The shocking Liverpool slums were protagonists of more studies than 
Bootle. For example the relationship between poverty and identity was 
considered by Kerr’s study of a Liverpool slum, originally published in 1958, 
which exemplifies the fascination with the way in which poverty appears to 
translate into pride: “the rather astonishing persistence of the past when 
conditions are favourable for its retention. Roles are rigid and simple, and the 
rate of change, whether of habitat or ideas, is slow in Ship Street. The past 
persists, therefore, in this group to a much greater extent than is generally 
realised” (Kerr 1998, p. 189). The persistence of the past is something this 
chapter, and to an extent this thesis, will revisit.  
Liverpool’s local politics 
 
 Liverpool, compared to other British cities, has been considered to have 
very distinctive local politics, which have often been translated into peculiar 
electoral politics. The distinctiveness of politics in Liverpool was to be found in 
two areas. First, the type of parties that developed and that were successful in 
Liverpool appeared to follow very different patterns, and timings of success and 
failure, than in the rest of Britain. Secondly, the way in which political parties 
organised in the city was also atypical. Tony Lane’s characterisation of “boss 
politics” (Lane 1997) or Baxter’s (1972) article on the relationship between the 
working class and the Labour Party in Liverpool offer a sense of this 
distinctiveness in the nature of politics in the city. Each of these two aspects 
needs to be elaborated further. 
 In terms of the development of political parties in Liverpool, and 
specifically their patterns of development as well as the timings of their 
successes and failures, “Liverpool’s politics have never been less than puzzling 
and exasperating to outsiders and insiders alike” (Lane 1997, p. 99). The 
distinctiveness, for Lane, lies in the way in which local politics in Liverpool do 
not appear to conform to preconceived ideas of politics, or even to whatever may 
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be the norm, or the political mood, elsewhere. This is what makes its politics 
puzzling and exasperating, its inability to conform to the norm.  
It took about a hundred years for Liverpool’s politics to become 
‘normalised’. In a sense for much of the early part of the twentieth century, “the 
‘commonsenses’ available were of Tory Democracy and Irish nationalism” 
(Smith 1980, p. 297). And both ‘commonsenses’ were to have their very own 
peculiarities. In terms of the Tory party in Liverpool, it was a party that 
attempted not to take sides in the conflict between capital and labour. The 
working class nature of the Liverpool Conservative Party became another 
contradictory characteristic of Liverpool’s politics.  As Howell maintains: “for 
decades economic insecurity and religious sectarianism combined to maintain a 
significant working-class Conservatism” (Howell 1996, p. 132).  In fact, the 
Tory party in Liverpool made efforts to separate itself from being on the side of 
the bourgeoisie (Ingram 1987, p. 273-274). For example, it soon became the 
party of the Protestant working class in Liverpool. 
Similarly, in a detailed analysis of the way in which political parties were 
organised in the city, Baxter (1972) argued that it is precisely the high degree of 
involvement of the working class in local party leaderships that helps explain 
local politics in Liverpool. Firstly, Baxter asserted that “Liverpool is in fact the 
most atypical of British cities imaginable” (1972, p. 97). For Baxter, this unusual 
situation was exemplified in what he termed “a peculiar power structure in both 
the Conservative and Labour Parties” (1972, p. 97). Specifically, Baxter was 
concerned with what he thought were the effects of a high rate of leadership 
positions achieved by the working class in local Labour politics. And the effects 
were not necessarily positive. The idea is that whilst the middle classes may 
enter politics they will not be doing so in order to achieve status or prestige, as 
they already have it. On the contrary, working class politicians will be more 
likely to enter politics as a way of improving their own personal status. In other 
words, “these people are not necessarily motivated by policy objectives but may 
adhere to a leadership to obtain position rather than power, and in doing so will 
give the leadership more power than is normal or perhaps acceptable in a liberal 
democratic system” (Baxter 1972, p. 100). 
76 
 
For Baxter, this explains the development of patronage politics in the 
city. However, it was not just working class participation that led to a political 
culture marked by political favours. It was also the legacy of Irish nationalist 
politics. The Irish Nationalist Party in Liverpool had been, according to Baxter, a 
socially working class party with no class consciousness. Therefore, when the 
Irish Nationalist Party was absorbed into the Labour Party in Liverpool in 1928 
“it handed over to the Labour Party a substantial body of politically active 
working-class people who were not socialist; who indeed were not in politics for 
class reasons at all, but were involved for nationalist and religious reasons – 
motives that were basically irrelevant to the Labour Party” (Baxter 1972, p. 106). 
This is important. It impacted on the role that sectarianism was to have in 
the Liverpool Labour Party. The absorption of the Irish Nationalist Party into the 
Labour Party meant that “when Labour was at last adopted in the Catholic 
districts it only meant putting a different label on old machinery” (Lane 1997, p. 
110). This made the Labour Party much larger in Liverpool, yet more divided as 
“it was in practice two parties and the Catholic section, organised as a caucus, 
was dominant” (Lane 1997, p. 111). However, the contribution that sectarianism 
made to the weakness of Liverpool’s Labour Party may have been over-
emphasised. Davies (1993; 1996a) points towards another issue that may have 
impacted the Liverpool Labour Party more directly: distortions in the electoral 
system, particularly at the municipal level. This will be considered in more detail 
in the next few paragraphs. In the meantime, it is important to highlight that 
whilst there may have been other reasons why the Labour Party was weak in the 
city, the existence of sectarianism proved a useful scapegoat. It can be argued 
that “religious sectarianism was always the first excuse that Labour leaders 
turned to when faced with electoral disappointment, to the extent that they 
seemed blinded to any other possible reason” (Davies 1996a, p. 158). 
Therefore, Davies’ argument points towards a move beyond Baxter’s 
argument which views the type of participation in working class politics in 
Liverpool to be marked by sectarianism and patronage. He points out that there 
were severe exclusions from the municipal franchise during the inter-war period 
(Davies 1996a, p. 119-129). This had a crucial impact on the level of working 
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class participation in electoral politics as the franchise was given according to 
whether someone was a rate payer or not. In Liverpool, with a high level of 
casualism in the labour market, and high levels of immigration, the amount of 
rate payers was low. As such, “the casual nature of much employment in the city, 
the poor housing stock, the existence of a large and rich middle class, the huge 
domestic-service sector, with particularly large numbers of young women 
employed, all meant that if the exclusions from the franchise disadvantaged 
Labour, then they may have been more marked in Liverpool than in some other 
parts of the country” (Davies 1996a, p. 130).  
Table 3.1 shows the differences between the municipal electorate and the 
estimated population for each ward in Liverpool. Whilst the impact of exclusions 
from franchise can be seen on some wards (such as Castle St or Exchange, which 
were almost exclusively business wards), generalising in this case would be 
dangerous: “there are too many unquantifiable variables to make definite 
conclusions” (Davies 1996a, p. 129). 
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Table 3.1. Municipal electorate as a proportion of estimated population, aged 
21 or over, living in wards, 1931 (in descending order) 
Ward Municipal 
electorate (1) 
Estimated 
population 21+ (2) 
(1) as a % of (2) 
Castle St. 2,360 254 930 
Exchange 2,492 1,879 133 
St Peter’s 2,979 3,429 87 
Croxteth 10,851 13,050 83 
Aigburth 8,493 10,771 79 
Vauxhall 3,783 4,843 78 
Fazakerley 10,866 13,923 78 
Allerton 4,379 5,682 77 
Netherfield 12,090 15,779 77 
West Derby 18,498 24,437 76 
Walton 16,395 21,692 76 
St Domingo 11,734 15,600 75 
Dingle 15,469 20,580 75 
Garston 7,131 9,501 75 
Wavertree 14,575 19,491 75 
Breckfield 10,369 13,892 75 
Childwall 3,105 4,163 75 
Old Swan 15,881 21,302 75 
Scotland N 8,758 11,762 74 
Wavertree W 8,906 12,037 74 
Sefton Park W 6,438 8,776 73 
Edge Hill 13,274 18,183 73 
Kensington 11,351 15,605 73 
Sandhills 9,499 13,101 73 
Scotland S 8,712 12,025 72 
Much Woolton 2,299 3,182 72 
Kirkdale 17,017 23,738 72 
Prince’s Park 9,913 13,878 71 
Anfield 10,869 15,360 71 
Fairfield 10,220 14,472 71 
Brunswick 9,088 12,897 70 
St Anne’s 9,253 13,360 69 
Low Hill 11,271 16,293 69 
Warbreck 12,376 17,966 69 
Sefton Park E 8,969 13,155 68 
Granby 9,918 14,854 67 
Everton 13,501 20,346 66 
Little Woolton 592 935 63 
Gt George 5,043 8,139 62 
Abercromby 9,493 16,270 58 
    
Total 378,287 516,619 73 
Source:  1931 census; Liverpool Official Red Book (1993), p.100. (Davies 1996a, p. 
128) 
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Therefore, the disenfranchisement at the municipal level was considerable in 
Liverpool, because of the size of the business wards as well as because of 
exclusions from the franchise as the table above shows. The effect of such 
disenfranchisement becomes clear when it is seen against the number of 
parliamentary voters, as table 3.2 demonstrates. 
Table 3.2. Parliamentary and municipal voters in Liverpool, 1919-1938
14 
Year Parliamentary 
voters 
Municipal 
voters 
Difference 
(%) 
1919 352,407 275,320 21.9 
1920 355,755 283,762 20.2 
1921 357,034 289,817 18.8 
1922 362,208 297,164 18.0 
1923 373,283 307,514 17.6 
1924 381,527 315,859 17.2 
1925 389,569 321,660 17.4 
1926 392,640 324,913 17.2 
1927 396,960 330,345 16.8 
1928 396,271 331,015 16.5 
192915 510,410 365,208 28.4 
1930 513,099 364,781 28.9 
1931 518,468 367,436 29.1 
1932 520,102 368,768 29.1 
1933 520,316 369,320 29.0 
1934 519,718 368,545 29.1 
1935 519,634 370,568 28.7 
1936 517,695 370,933 28.3 
1937 509,466 368,942 27.6 
1938 504,041 366,980 27.2 
(Davies 1996a, p. 121) 
                                                     
14 Sam Davies notes “The municipal electorate for Croxteth ward, incorporated from 1928, has 
not been included in this table, as, for parliamentary elections, this ward remained in the 
Ormskirk division, rather than being brought in to one of the Liverpool divisions. The total figure 
for municipal electors given here, then, is slightly lower than the full municipal electorate from 
1928.” (Davies, 1996: 121) 
15 After the 1928 Act suffrage was extended to women under the age of 30, hence the sudden rise 
in parliamentary voters (note that this barely affected the number of municipal voters, increasing 
the gap between the two by over 10%).  
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The picture was alarming. However, to put it into perspective, this was 
not unique to Liverpool. In fact, the exclusion rate for England and Wales was 
24.2% for the 1938-1939 period, compared to 27.2% for Liverpool (Davies 
1996a, p. 122). Only London and nearby Preston had higher exclusion rates than 
Liverpool in 1938, with 28.4% and 28.5% respectively (Davies 1996a, p. 122). 
Whilst these exclusion rates are an important issue, which is likely to have 
affected poorer voters to a much higher degree than any other voters, it must be 
treated with caution, as further research would be needed. It is crucial to 
remember that “because a ward was more working class did not automatically 
mean that it should be a Labour ward, or vice versa. In Liverpool, especially, that 
was a dangerous assumption. Nevertheless, any exclusion from the franchise that 
particularly affected the working class was more likely to disadvantage Labour 
than any other party” (Davies 1996a, p. 125-126).  
 Davies’ sophisticated insights and evidence shows that the sectarian 
nature of Liverpool’s politics is unable to provide a satisfactory explanation on 
its own. Instead, a combination of electoral franchise, aldermen and ward 
boundaries go further in providing an argument for the weakness of the Labour 
Party in Liverpool before the 1950s. But there was a further factor, the labour 
market structure of Liverpool as a port city, and the politics that developed from 
the persistence of casualism amongst maritime workers also impacted on the 
chances of the party. In fact, the 
“distrust of authority and leaders, whether industrial or political, was a 
consequence of their everyday experience of insecurity of work and life. The 
explosive nature of their industrial relations pointed them towards direct and 
decentralised action. The ‘inevitability of gradualness’”, the long-term goal of 
evolutionary reform, struck a discordant note in communities used to surviving 
from one day to the next. In Britain, and elsewhere, the dominant political 
strand in the national labour movement was not the intuitive home of waterfront 
workers. The significance of syndicalism, and later communism, to maritime 
workers, even in countries where those tendencies were relatively weak, is 
striking evidence of their potentially radical politics” (Davies 1993, p. 300). 
The effect of a syndicalist mode of trade union action cannot be 
underestimated in Liverpool. During the 1911 Liverpool general transport strike, 
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it became evident that it had proven an attractive option for transport workers in 
the city. Holton, insightfully, highlights how “over the course of the Liverpool 
strikes the impact of syndicalism was certainly significant. For much of the time 
however, the proto-syndicalist mood of direct action and violent social 
confrontation with the legitimate civil power was more evident than any tangible 
syndicalist leadership from above” (emphases added, Holton 1976, p. 101). 
Proto-syndicalism is an apt concept when exploring Liverpool’s trade union 
identities. 
 
Liverpool’s trade union identities  
 
Liverpool’s main source of employment until at least the 1960s was the 
port. The 1901 census reported nearly 40,000 people employed around the port: 
19,594 ‘dock and wharf labourers’ and 17,400 clerks (Waller 1981, p. 4-5). 
Clerks would be primarily employed around port related activities or banking 
and insurance. Both banking and insurance were important financial sectors with 
strong links to the shipping industry. It was, therefore, logical that trade 
unionism in Liverpool was initially marked by the waterfront experience. This, 
however, was not always a united experience. Mass trade unionism was not very 
successful in Liverpool until the creation of the National Union of Dock 
Labourers in Great Britain and Ireland (NUDL) in 1889. Up until then, 
sectarianism had impacted on the development of trade union identities in 
Liverpool, as “the baleful influence of casualism and sectionalism” had acted as 
an inhibitor of “the development of working-class consciousness” and therefore 
encouraged “collective apathy” (Taplin 2000, p. 461). 
Eric Taplin’s work (Taplin 1974; Taplin 1986; Taplin 2000) has 
extensively researched the initial development of trade unionism amongst 
dockworkers in Liverpool. In his argument two issues appear as crucial in the 
development of trade union identities amongst Liverpool dockworkers. First, the 
prevalence of casualism, which was not just linked to the particular organisation 
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of the local labour market, but also to characteristics that were not set by 
employers’ strategies. Second, the seasonal character of trade and the impact it 
had on labour demand. This depended on trade cycles which could be known in 
advance (for example raw cotton used to reach Liverpool in the autumn), or, it 
could depend on “local factors such as bad weather” (Taplin 2000, p. 445) which 
would hold up ships in an unpredictable manner. 
Nevertheless, even though the requirements of the industry were 
favourable towards the development of casualism, Liverpool developed the first 
register for dockworkers in Britain in 1912. Such a development was important 
as it was the first step towards the decasualisation of dock labour that was going 
to be advanced further by the creation of the 1945 National Dock Labour Board 
and the 1967 Devlin recommendations. Taplin’s explanation as to why 
Liverpool’s dockworkers acquired their type of trade union identity, and the 
effectiveness of their actions, emphasised the role of the port in their local 
economy: “The absence of manufacturing industry, the involvement of most of 
the business community with the docks in some form or other made the 
Liverpudlian acutely conscious of the importance of the waterfront worker” 
(Taplin 2000, p. 447). 
A further factor needs to be considered: Phillips and Whiteside’s (1985) 
study on casualism in the British port transport industry points towards the type 
of relationship developed between dockworkers and their employers in Liverpool 
coupled with their impact on trade union organisation. The 1912 registration 
scheme, for example, was possible, they argue, “because of the new-found 
friendship of employers and union leaders there, and secondly because the 
measures adopted manifestly served to strengthen union organization” (Phillips 
and Whiteside 1985, p. 96). 
This last point is of crucial importance. Both capital and labour in 
Liverpool docks were suspicious of state interference. Rather than looking to the 
state as an arbiter, Liverpudlians saw the state as an outsider with interests that 
were different from theirs. Partly, this was shown during the 1911 Liverpool 
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General Transport Strike led by the syndicalist Tom Mann 16 , but also this 
reinforced some of the contradictions to be found within the Liverpool labour 
movement throughout the twentieth century. Syndicalism suited the Liverpool 
dockworkers at times not because of any particular political ideology but because 
of its emphasis on action. In a sense, “the radicalism of dock workers was 
confined to short-term protests against employer exploitation” (Taplin 2000, p. 
465). This led to “a radical mobilisation which articulated anger but which never 
seriously questioned the established order” (Howell 1996, p. 133). It is crucial 
not to over-estimate the impact of syndicalism as a doctrine within the Liverpool 
working class, particularly amongst dockworkers.  
Although some syndicalist leaders, such as Jim Larkin, are held in more 
esteem in Liverpool’s popular historical memory than the Dockers Union leader 
and later MP James Sexton, the appreciation is not necessarily due to ideological 
affinity. Instead, syndicalism appeared, at times, more suited for a workplace 
which required immediate action rather than bureaucratic organisation. Yet, it 
was precisely an awkward combination of Sexton’s autocratic leadership style 
and Larkin’s action-oriented character that would characterise much of 
Liverpool’s waterfront trade unionism throughout the twentieth century. 
 This needs to be elaborated further. The role that memory plays in the 
shaping of trade union identity is crucial. Memory is the current and future 
understanding of past experience in the workplace and the community. Key to 
memory is the fact that, for it to be a powerful factor in the creation of identities, 
it does not need to be based on real events but on constructed experiences. The 
power that the memory of Larkin holds for the 500 Liverpool dockworkers that 
were sacked in September 1995 illustrates this point well. The social centre 
created by the sacked dockers in Liverpool’s Hope Street, ‘The Casa’, contains 
large amounts of memorabilia related to the NUDL, as it could be expected. 
What is perhaps more surprising is that most of that memorabilia pays homage to 
Larkin rather than Sexton. Larkin appears as the dockers’ local historical hero. 
His appeal is due to him having been a man of action who understood the docks 
and had a strong connection with Ireland. 
                                                     
16 Tom Mann was chairman of the strike committee and his syndicalist politics meant that he 
often clashed with James Sexton (the leader of the Dockers Union, who actually became an MP). 
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 It is not just a matter of choice over memorabilia. During the interviews 
conducted for this research, James Larkin was mentioned many times, whilst 
Sexton was never mentioned at all. This shows two crucial aspects of memory. 
On the one hand, memory may be constructed, and this construction would be 
the outcome of a selection process, which must be analytically separated from 
myths and inventions. The selection is made from events and issues which 
actually existed, but the emphasis that these events may be given in the 
formation of memory is what makes them constructed. On the other, there is the 
creation of memories of events that never actually happened. James Larkin was 
not the leader of the NUDL, even if his radical and transgressive leadership 
would make him a more interesting historical character than Sexton, with his 
pragmatic and anti-heroic leadership. Yet these invented memories act as 
important moments of historical experience in so far as they influence future 
historical choices. 
 Whilst it is important to remember that radical mobilisation and 
syndicalism were only present at certain historical moments, such as the 1911 
transport strike in the city, religious sectarianism was  an important characteristic 
in shaping identities in Liverpool (Smith 1980; Smith 1984). Trade union 
identities grew as the contradictory outcomes of radical mobilisation and 
sectarianism, in contradictory similarity with Liverpool’s local politics.   Two 
key explanations attempt to account for these contradictions. First, there are 
explanations which place the existence of ethnic divisions and sectarianism as 
the key to understanding Liverpool’s political culture. Secondly, there are 
explanations which place supremacy on the existence of a strong maritime 
economy and the employment patterns it generated. However, it will become 
evident in the next two sections that these two explanations are not dichotomies 
but rather they acquire particular significance at different historical times, and 
they also co-exist in tension at other times. Hence, as the chapter argues, it is the 
timing, the chronology of when these explanations become relevant that matters. 
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Ethnicity and sectarianism in Liverpool 
 
John Belchem has written extensively about the role of Irish migrants in 
Liverpool (for example, Belchem 2000; Belchem and MacRaild 2006). In his 
essay, Micks on the make on the Mersey (Belchem 2000), Belchem focuses 
particularly on the development of the Irish middle class within Liverpool, rather 
than focusing on an image of the Irish in Liverpool, as famine- escaping poor 
migrants. This Irish middle class was instrumental in shaping associations and 
politics in Liverpool, particularly the development of Irish nationalism in 
Liverpool. For Belchem, there were some similarities between the character of 
Irish immigrants in Liverpool and in the US, since both communities  attempted 
to build an aura of respectability by excluding certain ideologies, such as 
socialist radicalism, and encouraging respectability amongst the poor (Belchem 
2000, p. 151).  
However, the key differences between Irish Americans and the Liverpool 
Irish were in the pattern of their migration. Firstly, “Liverpool was generally 
perceived as a stepwise entrepôt, not as place of destination.” (Belchem 2000, p. 
135). This created very different attitudes, both towards the place but also 
towards the immigrants themselves. Secondly, Irish Americans soon became 
‘Americans’ as there were other groups that migrated there later, making them 
‘natives’ vis-à-vis these other groups. In Liverpool, the Irish kept arriving, 
becoming the permanent outsiders. Additionally, ethnic segregation encouraged 
patronage. The pattern of political participation encountered by Baxter (1972), 
considered earlier in the chapter, could also be explained in terms of the Irish 
middle classes aiming to access some kind of power. Being discriminated 
against, in terms of ethnicity and/or religion, may have encouraged an attitude 
towards building networks based around those concepts. This building of 
networks may be considered patronage or clientelism when it spills over into 
politics. In a sense, some Irish in Liverpool saw political organisation as a means 
of social mobility. 
Furthermore, Liverpool’s population growth was fast-paced during the 
nineteenth century according to census data, as the table below shows, going 
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from 77,653 inhabitants in 1801 to 746,421 in 1901.  This huge population 
growth can help account for the increasing rise between people of different 
backgrounds. In particular, two groups appear to have contributed largely to this 
population growth, the Irish and the Welsh. Additionally, boundary changes in 
Liverpool were also to account for these population changes. In 1835, the 
boundaries were extended to include Kirkdale and parts of Toxteth and West 
Derby. In 1895, Wavertree, Walton and the remainder of Toxteth and West 
Derby were included, and, finally, in this period Fazakerley was attached in 
1904. It was not until 1974, however, that Merseyside was created as a 
metropolitan borough, which included Bootle. 
Table 3.3. The population of Liverpool over the period 1801 to 1911 inclusive 
Year Population 
1801 77,653 
1811 94,376 
1821 118,972 
1831 165,175 
1841 286,656 
1851 375,955 
1861 443,938 
1871 493,405 
1881 552,508 
1891 517,980 
1901 746,421 
(Census, cited in Neal 1987, p. 12) 
 This huge population growth therefore impacted on how the city would 
develop its political culture. Sectarianism was to become a feature of nineteenth 
and early to mid-twentieth century Liverpool, but that “was not just because 
Liverpool had considerably more Irish Catholic residents than elsewhere, but 
also because it was home to an exceptionally vocal Orange movement” (Fielding 
1993, p. 27). So, it appears that the existence of a politically articulated 
opposition to Irish Catholics was a crucial factor in determining the level of 
sectarianism in a city.  
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 Nevertheless, there were further differences to be exploited. In fact, 
Liverpool’s population growth shows that the key dichotomy was not between 
the Irish and the native Liverpudlians, or the English, but rather, between the 
many newcomers. In particular, another group stands out, beyond Irish Catholics 
and Ulster Protestants, the Welsh. 
 Quite a large number of the 17,400 clerks employed in Liverpool in 1901 
which have been mentioned in the previous section, would have been Welsh. 
The Welsh worked primarily in the burgeoning sectors of banking, insurance and 
importantly the building industry in Liverpool (Jones 1981). They arrived in 
large numbers following family connections from rural Wales, and their 
participation in sectors of the labour market that had a higher standing meant that 
they soon became more socially mobile than the Irish who were involved in dock 
work and related activities. This meant that the Welsh saw themselves as 
somewhat superior to the Irish: 
“This high opinion of themselves [the Welsh] was enhanced by the low regard 
in which the Welsh in exile (and the English) regarded the Irish. In the 
poisonous context of Liverpool’s religious sectarianism this, despite the Welsh’s 
liberalism, was a significant consideration” (Jones 1981, p. 40). 
 This was further enhanced on the waterfront. Although the Irish were 
numerous amongst dockworkers, the Welsh were also present in the port, 
particularly working in warehousing related activities, and they appeared to look 
after themselves. According to Waller: “In dockland Welshmen confronted 
Irishmen as immigrant aristocrats. In the 1830s most warehousemen were Welsh, 
because employers thought Irishmen unreliable. Since warehousemen hired 
porters, Welshmen got the best places” (Waller 1981, p. 9-10). However, the 
Welsh do not appear to have created any political organisations along ethnic 
lines, perhaps because their socio-economic position allowed them to prosper 
without the need to promote political networks of patronage, unlike the Irish in 
Liverpool.  Yet the Welsh have a claim to nationalism in Liverpool. For 
example, the founder of modern Welsh nationalism, Saunders Lewis, was born 
in the city (Jones 1992). The lack of a large city in North Wales and the 
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development of Welsh nationalism in the city led many commentators to call 
Liverpool the displaced capital of North Wales.  
 Sectarianism, however, became less relevant in Liverpool’s political 
culture in the second half of the twentieth century. This could well be due to the 
nature of sectarianism itself as “the so-called religious conflict provided a 
framework and legitimacy for indulging in physical violence the motives for 
which lay in the tensions and pressures generated by the brutalised environment 
in which the working class in Liverpool existed” (Neal 1987, p. 448). As the 
twentieth century evolved it gave way to a unifying working class experience in 
Liverpool, which was able to erode certain sectarian aspects. Additionally, the 
rise of secularism everywhere, including Liverpool, should not be 
underestimated. The extent to which this may be the case and how the new 
dynamics emerged will be considered in the next section. 
The reliance of Liverpool on a maritime economy is presented as a 
possible explanation for understanding the exceptional character of Liverpool’s 
political culture. However, many other cities were built on maritime economies 
and yet did not develop a similar political culture. Perhaps the explanation 
should be more to do with the type of relationship Liverpool built with its 
maritime economy. For Liverpool, unlike other major port cities such as 
Barcelona, the maritime economy was not just what provided the economic basis 
of the city, but also it determined, to a certain extent, the urban organisation of 
the city. In Liverpool, the city opened up to the sea, it faced the water. In 
Barcelona, it turned its back to the sea, at least until 1992. A possible explanation 
for this could be that port cities develop, and become important nodes for trade, 
during different historical times. Liverpool’s heyday was always linked to the 
British Empire. In fact, “it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century 
that shipping became of any importance to Liverpool’s economy” (Taplin 2000, 
p. 443). Continuing with the comparative example of Barcelona, the port’s 
heyday was linked to the Middle Ages. Timing matters particularly as it may 
impact on whether the sea (and the port) were seen as friends or foes. The sea 
may have brought trade and work, but it could as easily bring war and invasion. 
Liverpool was able to develop a more friendly relationship with its port, as the 
city did not require to be protected from its consequences. 
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Liverpool’s development of the port after 1950 fits with the pattern of 
development of other port cities, such as Marseilles or Hamburg, themselves to 
be considered fairly exceptional in comparison with other cities in their own 
countries. According to Graeme Milne, these cities had “more in common with 
one another than with industrial cities in their hinterlands” (Milne 2006, p. 257). 
However, this internationalist vision of port cities is not unproblematic. As this 
chapter shows, there is a fine historical line between particular cultural identities 
and certain moments which act as unifying class experiences within local labour 
politics in port cities.  
In Liverpool, the importance of the unifying class experience of maritime 
related employment became important as, paradoxically, employment started to 
decline in the industry as chapters two and five of this thesis consider at length.  
Two explanations have been offered for the decline of religious sectarianism. 
First, Waller considers it has to do with the way in which political parties 
developed in Liverpool as the urban restructuring of the city was initiated 
(Waller 1981, p. 353). In a sense, division may remain but it has been channelled 
into parties and thus monopolised and democratised. A second option is given by 
Pat Ayers’ (2004) research on the development of masculinities in Liverpool. 
Sectarianism was not overcome in the second part of the twentieth century, 
instead the effect of the Second World War in Liverpool acted as a unifying 
experience. 
The latent waterfront working experience acquired importance even in 
new employment sectors, which were being developed by outsiders. Whilst the 
Liverpool port employment experience before the Second World War would 
have been around local stevedoring companies, with local, or at most national, 
employers, after 1945 new employers tended to be large multinational 
companies. They no longer had an ethnic or religious identity as employers, a 
characteristic prevalent in the waterfront, not just in Liverpool but also in places 
such as New York (Nelson 2000; Davies 2000b; Davis 2000b). Additionally, 
work practices, such as ‘welting’, where only a reduced number of the gang 
works, travelled into new employment sectors. For example, Ford employers 
90 
 
found that such waterfront work practices had made their way into their 
Merseyside plant (Ayers 2004, p. 157). 
Furthermore, casualism had now become part of Liverpool’s character 
“as a long history of casual employment practices in a wide range of port-related 
occupations sometimes encouraged a certain adventurousness, and impulsive 
rebelliousness, a disposition to seize the time” (Lane 1997, p. 127). It is precisely 
the relationship between casualism and trade union militancy that develops what 
has been termed ‘dockworkers’ subculture’ (Miller 1969). According to Miller’s 
argument, what accounts for the type of subculture developed in any port city 
amongst dockworkers, is not due to specific cultural, religious or ethnic 
characteristics, but rather it is due to the experience of casualism (Miller 1969, p. 
314). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.1. Dockworkers’ subculture
 The conditions which produce a dockworkers’ subculture according to 
Miller were in existence in Liverpool, and so were the ensuing characteristics. 
However, this would mean that the type of p
dockworkers would be (a) different from the political culture developed in the 
rest of the city, and (b) be equally identifiable across dockworkers 
The first point could arguably be the case in Liverpool to an ex
may want to argue that it is because of their class experience or because of their 
residual Irishness. However, that would fail to explain how it is Liverpool as a 
city that presents a distinctive, exceptional character, not necessarily i
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Characteristics 
of dockworker 
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(Miller 1969, p. 305 and 308)
olitical culture developed within 
tent, whether one 
•The casual nature of employment
•The exceptional arduosness, danger, and 
variability of work
•The lack of an occupationally stratified 
hierarchy and mobility outlets
•Lack of regular association with one 
employer
•Continuous contact with foreign goods, 
seamen, and ideas
•The necessity of living near the docks
•The belief shared by longshoremen that 
others in the society consider them a low
status group
•Extraordinary solidarity and undiffused 
loyalty to fellow dockworkers
•Suspicion of management and outsiders
•Militant unionism
•Appearence of charismatic leaders from the 
ranks
•Liberal political philosophy but 
conservative view of changes in work 
practices
• 'Casual frame of mind' (free men or 
irresponsible opportunists)
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dockworkers. For example, one of the illustrative events of Liverpool’s 
exceptionalism was the coming into power of a Trotskyist tendency within the 
Labour Party to Liverpool’s City Council in 1983. This was certainly against the 
tide of the rest of Britain, where Margaret Thatcher was introducing vast 
neoliberal reforms. However, dockworkers had little to do with these events and 
in fact the unions in Liverpool found the tactics the new council was using were 
opposed to Liverpool’s workers’ material interests (Shaw 1989).   
 Miller’s second assumption, that dockworkers’ subculture would occur 
among dockworkers anywhere with experience of casualism, also suffers 
shortcomings. It is indeed the case that dockworkers in places such as Marseilles, 
Hamburg or even New York and London (Davis 2000a) have been known for 
their militancy. However, other ports have not necessarily produced the same 
type of subculture, for example Hull (Davies 2000a). Therefore, there must be 
other local aspects that help account for similar class experiences leading to 
different types of subculture. In Liverpool, ethnicity, sectarianism and the 
relationship of the city with the sea and its maritime economy are all crucial 
contributory factors. 
 In fact, popular culture in Liverpool considers that the relationship with 
the sea, and with the river Mersey, should not be underestimated. Although the 
scholarly literature remains largely oblivious to such arguments, it is said that 
dockworkers were never ruled by the clock. The clock is seen as the key to 
capitalist discipline (Thompson 1967). Instead, they were ruled by the tide of the 
river Mersey which was both enslaving and liberating at the same time 
(Higginson and Wailey 2006). It was enslaving as it would determine when ships 
had to go in and out, and therefore it would determine when work was available. 
However, it gave power to workers as they were able, through a simple go-slow, 
to hold a ship in port for much longer than the shipowners and the dockers’ 
employers wished.  
Perhaps this explains the pride many dockers maintained in their 
perceived freedom from the clock. This may even bring together the combination 
of Irishness and an anti-capitalist discipline, which answers to work but not to 
time. As E.P. Thompson noted: 
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“By the 1830s and 1840s it was commonly observed that the English industrial 
worker was marked off from his fellow Irish worker, not by greater capacity for 
hard work, but by his regularity, his methodical paying-out of energy, and 
perhaps also by a repression, not of enjoyments, but of the capacity to relax in 
the old, uninhibited ways” (Thompson 1967, p. 91). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the development of Liverpool’s political 
culture during the twentieth century. It has done so by assessing the extent to 
which Liverpool’s politics, specifically labour and working-class politics, have 
been exceptional. It has become evident that in order to understand whether 
Liverpool has a distinctive character or not it must be compared to other British 
cities or to other maritime cities. Crucially, the chapter maintains that 
Liverpool’s distinctiveness appears to be historically contingent, and therefore it 
is subject to change. 
Thus, it has contributed to the third analytical category proposed by the 
thesis, which emphasises the importance of workplace and community 
experience in the construction of popular historical memory. As such this chapter 
has argued that the selection and construction of memory are crucial processes in 
the creation of history. The following chapter turns to the second analytical 
category and considers the trade union strategies of the TGWU. 
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Chapter 4. The Transport and General Workers Union 
since 1979. Strategies of renewal? 
 
This chapter focuses on the renewal strategies pursued by the Transport 
and General Workers Union in response to Margaret Thatcher’s attack on the 
trade unions. To do so, the chapter follows the internal conflicts within the 
TGWU, paying particular attention to the role of dockworkers, as a trade group 
both within the union as a whole, and within the TGWU’s Region 6. This 
chapter contributes, primarily, to elucidation of the second analytical category 
proposed in the thesis – trade union strategies. It does so by showing how the 
specific interaction of economic restructuring, political deregulation – as 
assessed in chapters one and two – and local political cultures – as considered in  
chapter three – contributed to specific choices in terms of trade union strategy. 
Two themes have been prevalent since the amalgamation of unions that 
led to the creation of the TGWU in 1922. Firstly, dockworkers have been at the 
heart of struggles over the nature of union control and democracy which have 
proven to be endemic in a union as heterogeneous as the TGWU. The needs and 
grievances of dockworkers have been at odds with the institutional practices of 
the TGWU’s institutions. Secondly, there has been historical marginalisation of 
dockers within the TGWU’s leadership after Bevin. Ernest Bevin started his 
working life as a van driver, and at the age of 30 became a trade union official in 
the Dockers’ Union (Wrigley 2010). Arthur Deakin’s trade union life also started 
in the Dockers’ Union (Allen 2010), but neither of them had actually been 
dockers. Of the leaders that were to follow, Arthur Tiffin and Frank Cousins had 
no direct relationship with dockers, although Jack Jones had had family 
connections to Garston docks. Moss Evans, Ron Todd and Bill Morris had no 
connections with dock work.  
Whether this general distancing of the TGWU’s leadership from its 
docker members accounts for the way in which the relationship between the 
union and one of its founding trade groups has proven to be so difficult is 
impossible to ascertain. What is clear is that it has at times perhaps accounted for 
the way in which the union leadership has often been unable to understand the 
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dockers’ points of view.  Throughout the history of the TGWU, dockworkers 
have asserted a higher degree of autonomy than that allowed by TGWU 
structures and procedures. 
The second issue to have become prevalent since the TGWU’s 
amalgamation, and which this chapter traces, concerns the struggles over the 
political articulation of solidarity. This focuses on the different ways in which 
the realisation of solidarity is understood politically. This chapter shows that the 
union leadership has preferred pursuing the political articulation of solidarity 
through the framework provided by the Labour Party. This has often been 
presented as the way to achieve the long-term interests of the working class, 
rather than the short-term industrial concerns of everyday grievances. However, 
the relationship between the TGWU and the Labour Party throughout the 
twentieth century points towards more complicated processes. In fact, the 
struggles over the articulation of solidarity have been deeper than the long-term 
versus short-term bread and butter arguments would suggest. In particular, 
dockworkers within the TGWU have presented a constant challenge in the 
struggle towards a political articulation of solidarity rooted in their own workers’ 
experiences, rather than electoral ambitions. This has remained a problem for 
both the TGWU and its dockworkers as, politically, there was a lack of other 
alternatives beyond the Labour Party, and a solidarity based on workers’ 
experience has to deal with diverse experiences and expectations. This was 
precisely what the TGWU was trying to avoid with amalgamation. The challenge 
was to ensure that sectionalism did not erode political unity, and the best way to 
achieve that was to keep a healthy distance between the political and the 
industrial sphere. 
The historical account presented here starts with a brief sketch of Bevin’s 
ambitions to create a general union and extends to the difficulties facing Ron 
Todd’s leadership during the 1980s. The focus, however, is on Bill Morris’ 
leadership and his strategy of union renewal during the 1990s. The chapter is 
organised as follows: firstly, there will be a brief exploration of the history of the 
TGWU, from its creation in 1922 by Bevin, including some of the earlier 
interactions and criticisms of the organisation. There was a high degree of inter-
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union rivalry in British docks from the 1940s to the 1970s, and the way in which 
the TGWU dealt with these issues is important. Additionally, the relationship 
between the TGWU and the Communist Party will also be considered. After this 
brief historical survey, the chapter will concentrate on the period after 1979 and 
in particular on how two17 General Secretaries, Ron Todd and Bill Morris, dealt 
with the changes brought about by neoliberalism and a hostile legislative 
environment for trade unions. In other words, it will consider to what extent 
these two General Secretaries embarked upon ‘strategies of renewal’. Finally, the 
chapter will end with an assessment of Bill Morris’ leadership, including the way 
in which the relationship between the TGWU and the New Labour project 
developed after 1992. 
 
The creation of the TGWU 
 
The TGWU was created from the amalgamation of different unions in 
1922 under the leadership of Ernest Bevin (Coates and Topham 1994). The 
TGWU grew in numbers and political influence in the period leading up to 1945, 
which provided the union with a degree of influence in the shaping of the post 
Second World War welfare state. Prior to that Bevin had joined Churchill’s war-
time coalition government as Minister of Labour. This level of political influence 
also came with a level of political responsibility. This, and the political 
environment characteristic of the post-war period, meant that the TGWU soon 
became entangled in Cold War politics. The union had already assumed an anti-
Communist stance under the leadership of Bevin, which was later reinforced by 
Arthur Deakin (elected in 1946), which stood in sharp contrast to the sentiments 
of some of the membership, particularly dockworkers and London busmen. For 
example, Deakin’s biographer recalls how “dockers and London busmen have 
needed more guidance than other groups on fundamental trade union matters and 
continually they have had to be reminded of the benefits of amalgamation” 
(Allen 1957, p. 57). The TGWU took its anti-Communist stance further than 
                                                     
17 Moss Evans’ leadership will not be considered in detail due to the short length of his secretariat 
due to health reasons. 
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many other unions as it prohibited Communist Party members from holding 
office within the union. Jack Jones recalls Deakin’s leadership in his 
autobiography: 
“He [Deakin] was an awkward, intolerant man. Undoubtedly the pressures upon 
him were heavy and his health was poor. But he did not accept change easily. 
[…]. In running the union Deakin resembled a small businessman in outlook, 
rather than the leader of hundreds of thousands of industrial workers. Yet deep 
down there was a gentleness which occasionally revealed itself. I formed the 
impression that he was a shy man who put on a bluff and bluster as a front, 
although any liberal tendencies he may have had in his early years he brutally 
suppressed” (Jones 1986, p. 132). 
Dockworkers had been a significant sector of the TGWU’s membership 
since its inception, and one which was sometimes influenced by Communist 
Party members who were unofficial ‘agitators’ in the docks. This created a 
situation where unofficial union leaders (usually with strong connections to 
either the Communist Party or the Blue Union18) had often more power on the 
ground than full-time union officials, which exacerbated the gap between 
officials and their members. This was increased by a perceived move to the right 
during Deakin’s unimaginative leadership. He has been characterised as “not a 
man of profound wisdom or pronounced intuitive understanding” (Goodman 
1979, p. 100). This “merely had the effect, […], of strengthening the position of 
the unofficial leaders, and of ensuring them a higher profile and a loyal 
                                                     
18 The Blue Union or NASD (National Association of Stevedores and Dockers) “had developed 
in London after 1945, had Communist members in its leadership, and Communist and Trotskyist 
influences were evident in Liverpool.” Davies, S. (2000a). "The history of Hull dockers, c. 1870-
1960". S. Davies, C. J. Davis, D. De Vrieset al Dock Workers. International Explorations in 
Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970. Aldershot, Ashgate. Volume 1. 
It was only in the Port of London that the Blue Union had official recognition and in fact 
competed directly with the TGWU. In other ports, such as Liverpool, the situation was far more 
complicated and perhaps contradictory. Although the TGWU attempted to create a closed shop 
(with employers being in agreement) dockworkers refused such attempts. In fact, “nearly half the 
members refused either to show their union cards at the check points or to accept employment 
offered when Blue Union men were being discriminated against. After ten days employers 
withdrew their support” Devlin, P. A. L. (1965). Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry under 
the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into certain matters concerning the Port Transport Industry (Port 
Transport Industry). Document type: COMMAND PAPERS; REPORTS OF COMMISSIONERS: 
XXI.827. Furthermore, the Blue Union claimed a membership of 1,565 members, representing 
12% of the labour force (p. 39) For more information on this situation in Liverpool: Hunter, B. 
(1994). They Knew Why They Fought. Unofficial Struggles & Leadership on the Docks 1945-
1989. London, Index Books. 
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following among many dock-workers” (Mankelow 2000, p. 382). Yet it also 
signified an internal division within the TGWU as  “the execution of Union 
policy is in the hands of the professional Union official” (Goldstein 1952, p. 55). 
This increased the perception by some members of a separation between a 
bureaucratic union and the rank-and-file. 
However, the influence of the Blue Union on rank-and-file TGWU 
dockworkers should not be underestimated. The inter-union rivalry which 
existed in some British ports between the 1940s and the 1970s exemplifies some 
of the main challenges the TGWU faced vis-à-vis dockworkers. They presented a 
challenge in four ways. Firstly, the TGWU’s leadership appeared as insulated, 
untouchable, and authoritarian in its nature. Secondly, dock work required that 
grievances had to be dealt with promptly, due to the nature of the work, as the 
‘factory’ (i.e. the ship to be worked) is only a temporary placement. For 
example, if a ship contained a cargo that was dangerous, or particularly 
unpleasant, rates and work conditions had to be negotiated there and then, as the 
ship would only be in port for a few days.  It is easy to see why this created a 
situation where the union official was often far removed from the membership of 
the union. This usually led to the rise and legitimacy of unofficial leaders who 
were able to deal with grievances much quicker. Thirdly,  the partnership created 
by employers and the representatives of dockworkers (particularly the TGWU) in 
the shape of the National Dock Labour Board and its local branches led to the 
TGWU being involved in disciplinary procedures which might have been against 
the direct interests of their members. Finally, all of these issues came together to 
promote a deep rivalry against the Blue Union and against unofficial leaders who 
were often members of the Communist Party. 
This situation was mentioned in all the official reports (Leggett 1950; 
Devlin 1955; Rochdale 1961; Devlin 1964; Devlin 1965) of the period. In fact, 
the Leggett Committee of Inquiry was precisely set up to investigate the matter 
of unofficial leadership in the Port of London. This was prompted by two 
disputes which had baffled the government and employers, and, to a certain 
extent, the TGWU. In fact, both disputes were characterised as ‘political’ 
disputes since they were not over better pay and conditions or other ‘bread and 
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butter’ issues. They were the Canadian seafarers’ dispute of 1949, which was 
stigmatised as linked to international interests of the Communist Party by the 
TGWU’s leadership and the dispute over the expulsion of three of its members 
by the TGWU. What prompted concern was that “the outstanding feature of the 
major strikes is the extraordinary way in which they rapidly spread and assumed 
serious proportions, while at the same time the original issue became confused 
and distorted and was thrust into the background” (Leggett 1950, p. 4). 
The Canadian seafarer’s dispute emerged after the Canadian Seamen’s 
Union, which was a communist-led union, and the Canadian East Coast 
Shipowners failed to sign an agreement. Instead, the shipowners signed an 
agreement with an AFL affiliated union, the Seafarer’s International Union, 
which had had no representation previously on the Eastern Canada seaboard. 
Whilst this could have been a local or regional dispute, it achieved international 
resonance when in April 1949, members of the Canadian Seamen’s Union “tried 
to sit in on two Canadian ships after they docked in London” (Weiler 1988, p. 
231). A court injunction prevented them from doing so, which led to the 
Canadian seafarers setting up picket lines on the London docks. Members of 
NASD in London refused to cross the picket lines.  
The Canadian seafarers’ dispute and the solidarity strike that led to the 
London Dock Strike of 1949 illuminate the relationship between Deakin’s 
TGWU, dockworkers and anti-communism. Communism was blamed for any 
unofficial dispute. Partly, this was due to the separation between Labour Party 
politics and the reality of the everyday experience of working life. It became 
evident that the Labour government was increasingly unable to understand the 
effect of certain government policies on workers, which led them to blame any 
kind of action on Communist agitators. In a sense, “Attlee and his colleagues’ 
appeals to a higher social ethic could be persuasive, but they could ignore the 
discrepancy between Labour aspirations and the facts of working class 
experience. Allegations about Communists simply evaded the problem” (Howell 
2006, p. 101).  
The issue at stake, ultimately, was the creation of the National Dock 
Labour Board, and the way in which that incorporated the TGWU in the 
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management of employment affairs. In a deep sense, “the men still regarded the 
employers as their adversaries, not, as the TGWU leadership put it, as their 
industrial partners” (Weiler 1988, p. 260). This showed a clear lack of 
understanding by both the TGWU, and the Labour government, of the 
experience of dockworkers. Whilst the TGWU and the government considered 
that dockworkers should have felt protected under the umbrella of the TGWU, 
dockworkers were not about to leave behind the traditions of solidarity that a 
casual system of employment had forced them to develop for many years. For 
the TGWU, any opposition to the NDLB, or any attempt at unofficial leadership 
in the docks was seen as a Communist conspiracy, rather than as an indication of 
the role the unofficial movement played “as the expression of the dockers’ 
tradition of class loyalty” (Weiler 1988, p. 260). 
Ultimately “the view of the Labour government and the TGWU that the 
unofficial movement was a conspiracy denied the obvious evidence that it 
existed because the men supported it” (Weiler 1988, p. 264).  Instead, what these 
strikes showed was the uneasy situation that the National Dock Labour Scheme 
had produced for the TGWU. Importantly, “the evidence is thus extensive that 
beneath the 1949 dispute, as well as other disputes after 1945, lay the men’s deep 
dissatisfaction with their union and its corporatist position” (Weiler 1988, p. 
266). If the TGWU was to participate in joint management, it would also 
participate in joint dismissals. As Weiler points out “joint control strengthened 
the employers by removing the union as an active opponent” (1988, p. 251).The 
impossibility of being a representative of the workers and a partner in 
management was exemplified during this period. Being a partner in management 
led to the increasing professionalisation of union officials. From then on, they 
had to demonstrate they were ‘responsible’ and understood ‘industry needs’. For 
example, “Deakin was not willing to support industrial action to force through 
these changes [provisions relating to overtime and disciplinary arrangements] if 
this meant that the employers could call the union’s attachment to the scheme 
into question” (Jackson 1991, p. 92). This added a sense of distrust between the 
TGWU official leadership and rank-and-file dockworkers. Examples such as the 
30 dismissals in the Port of London in 1949 on the grounds of old age, led to 
immense dissatisfaction with the TGWU. In fact, the “workers walked out en 
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masse and this became the first and last time that the T&GWU consented to 
compulsory dismissals on non-disciplinary grounds” (Sapsford and Turnbull 
1990, p. 28). In fact, inter-union rivalry during this period was crucial to how the 
internal politics of the TGWU developed. There was an increasing separation 
between the dockers’ unofficial leaders, based in the workplace, and the 
TGWU’s union officials and leaders who often appeared bewildered by the 
actions of their members (Jackson 1991). 
 
From Deakin to Jones 
 
The sudden deaths in 1955 and 1956 of Arthur Deakin and his successor 
Arthur ‘Jock’ Tiffin respectively brought Frank Cousins to the post of General 
Secretary, who was propelled into complex and crucial changes, particularly in 
relation to democratising the internal structures of the union, as Cousin’s 
biographer notes: “the most significant and far-reaching of all post-war social 
and political developments in Britain: the emergence of an altogether more 
radical force throughout the trade union movement which has since became a 
major power factor in the country” (Goodman 1979, p. xi). But this new radical 
force, whilst acknowledging the previous shortcomings of the TGWU and the 
Labour Party as a representative of working class interests, was still unable to 
understand the experiences of some sections within the union. It was not the 
dockers but the London bus strike of 1958 that posed the largest challenge to 
Cousins’ leadership (Goodman 1979), and it is precisely this challenge that 
prompted the changes to the TGWU that were to move the union towards a new 
path: 
“It was a very special dispute which helped to change, irrevocably, the 
relationship between the leadership and led in the TGWU. The union Cousins 
had inherited was, (…), an organisation with a long tradition of autocratic 
leadership. The strike decisively marked the end of that tradition. It is true that 
tears in the old fabric were already appearing before the bus strike. But it was 
Cousins’s action in leading that strike which saved the TGWU from being 
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weakened still further by internal conflicts and, in the process, also helped to lay 
the foundations for a period of internal repair” (Goodman 1979, p. 193). 
In October 1964, it was the dockers who caused trouble for the TGWU’s 
new leader, with unofficial disputes in London, Liverpool and Hull docks. They 
did not want to accept the pay offer made by employers, but rather to press for 
more. Cousins managed to delay the decision, leaving the door open to doubts 
over whether he had done so to avoid an open confrontation with port employers 
which could have endangered a Labour victory in the forthcoming election on 15 
October (Goodman 1979, p. 391). 
Frank Cousins joined the Wilson government in October 1964, after 
creating the Assistant General Secretary post in the TGWU, which Jack Jones 
obtained. Thirteen years of a Conservative government and a belief that a Labour 
government needed trade union involvement at the top, such as Bevin in 1945, 
led Cousins to join the Labour government: “he clearly saw the possibility of a 
Wilson-Cousins relationship developing into something like the earlier Attlee-
Bevin axis” (Goodman 1979, p. 401). However, this never materialised. It has 
been argued that Wilson lacked an understanding of trade unionism and an 
appreciation, in particular, of the pressures Cousins might have been under: 
“Wilson showed little understanding of the complex pressures on trade union 
officials as they  move into the political arena” (Howell 1993, p. 184). Most 
immediately, the issue of incomes policy was causing further divisions within 
unions and between unions and the Labour government. 
However, in an attempt to sort out the problems within the dock industry, 
the first Devlin inquiry was set up in 1965. But problems remained. Importantly, 
an assessment of the seamen’s strike of May-June 1966 strongly points towards a 
key issue in the political articulation of solidarity, and in the relationship 
between the Labour Party and the unions, as “Wilson demonstrated that when a 
choice had to be made, a conventional view of the national interest would be 
preferred to any attempt to protect or advance the aspirations of trade unionists” 
(Howell 1993, p. 185). In fact, “the aspirations of trade unionists” were often 
marginalised as being “sectional, or unrealistic” (Howell 1993, p. 185). Trade 
unionists were seen not as instruments of change but blockages to modernisation. 
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Returning to the autocratic power of the General Secretary, which many 
commentators have been keen to emphasise, it has been argued (Murray 2008) 
that the union moved away from this situation under the leaderships of Frank 
Cousins (1956-1969)  and Jack Jones (1969-1978) as they both prompted a move 
towards ‘lay’ democracy within the TGWU which increased the role of shop 
stewards as workplace representatives. Within the dock industry this had also 
been identified by Devlin as a way to improve representation and avoid the type 
of unofficial leadership that had developed between 1945 and 1967. 
This type of devolution of power within the union was itself contested 
and slow. It involved, in particular, a move towards providing more power to the 
regions and districts. Changing an institution like the TGWU was not completed 
overnight, and, in fact, many elements remained from the ancien régime. In fact, 
whilst there was a perception that the TGWU’s General Secretary had almost 
unlimited powers, the reality was far more complicated. Minkin points out that 
“the power of a union ‘boss’ became part of the mythology of the Labour 
movement and almost impervious to evidence to the contrary. The fact was that 
in industrial terms, the new General Secretary represented a wave from below 
but in political terms it took four years for the new General Secretary to be able 
to cast a vote at the Labour Party Conference which was out of line with 
previous union policy; a new TGWU General Secretary had to operate within 
many constraints, including incumbent officials and past traditions” (Minkin 
1992, p. 303). Importantly, Minkin’s distinction between what the General 
Secretary represented industrially and his influence politically shows that whilst 
the new leadership represented a more assertive industrial strategy, politically, 
the push for alternatives was weaker and typically seen as secondary. 
Incomes policy and wage restraint proved a particular issue for the new 
TGWU. From the mid-1960s both Cousins and Jones led the TGWU against 
incomes policy, only for this to be reversed by Jones in 1975. He then became 
central to the government policy which introduced a £6 limit. It goes without 
saying that it proved a challenge to Jack Jones’ leadership as this was 
undermined by the lay membership. In the TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference 
(BDC) of 1977, Jack Jones lost a crucial vote. “The delegates rejected Jones’s 
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impassioned advice that their union should continue to support voluntary wage 
restraint. It was unprecedented for a leader to be defeated in this manner and it 
proved to be fateful for the Labour Government as well as for the union” (Torode 
06/10/1988). This instance was to create a precedent, according to TGWU 
national and regional officers interviewed during this research. It subsequently 
became a TGWU tradition that the BDC19 would overturn the executive on at 
least one key issue. It is in this way that many in the TGWU were to analyse the 
1997 BDC vote on the Liverpool dockers’ dispute which will be considered in 
chapter six. This demonstrates a change in the way the membership related to 
their leaders, as Bevin had designed a union in which “the procedures of the 
Conference were very advantageous to the Executive and General Secretary” 
(Minkin 1992, p. 302). Jack Jones briefly recalled the episode in his 
autobiography: 
“Critics have said that I was defeated by the very democratic spirit in the 
TGWU I had sought to create. Well, I am still in favour of democracy. When 
the result of the voting was announced and I rose to comment, the delegates 
showed that they respected my views although so many had voted against them. 
I told them that I believed in the acceptance of conference decisions and would 
do my best to implement this one” (Jones 1986, p. 326). 
 
Ron Todd: dealing with decline 
 
Ron Todd became a contender for the post of General Secretary 
following the leadership of Moss Evans (1978-1985), who had to stand down 
due to ill health. Todd’s election was the first the TGWU had to complete under 
new legislation, the 1984 Trade Union Act, which stipulated elections to 
Executive positions every five years under secret ballot. It stimulated a great deal 
of controversy and media involvement, with continued accusations of vote 
rigging. Todd cleverly re-ran the election in order to silence the accusations. The 
re-run election showed an even clearer majority for him. Todd’s leadership 
                                                     
19 Later in the chapter there is explanation on TGWU structures. 
105 
 
(1985-1992) was clearly shaped by the attack on trade unionism undertaken by 
Thatcher’s government. Additionally, the legislative attack came in tandem with 
a declining membership, increasing levels of unemployment and a media 
campaign against the trade unions. 
Membership within the TGWU was suffering a rapid decline from its 
peak in 1979, as figure 4.1 shows. Membership of the Docks and Waterways 
trade group more than halved between 1968 (after Devlin) and 1985 (before the 
abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme), as is evidenced by figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.1. TGWU membership changes, 1968-1985 
 
Source: TGWU, General Executive Committee Minutes, various years. 
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Figure 4.2. TGWU Docks and Waterways trade group membership changes, 
1968-1985. 
 
Source: TGWU, General Executive Committee Minutes, various years. 
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Scheme in 1989, the TGWU General Secretary was in the line of the 
dockworkers’ fire. The episode presents an early example of the way in which 
the TGWU would deal with the new environment and its membership. 
Dockworkers demonstrated outside the TGWU headquarters when the TGWU 
executive backed Ron Todd’s decision not to continue with a strike ballot to 
defend the Scheme. In fact, a precedent had been set when “the national docks 
and waterways committee, after a day of tense and sometimes ugly scenes 
involving more than 200 dockers who lobbied the meeting, did not agree with 
Mr Todd. […]. Leaders of dock workers were told by Mr Todd that he had to 
take into account the interests of the whole union in the event of a legal 
challenge to strike action” (Rudd and Jones 15/04/1989). This reinforced a 
challenge that ran deep within the TGWU’s organisational structure. How does a 
broadly based union deal with intense sectional demands? 
The idea that the interests of the whole union had to be placed above the 
sectional interests of different trade groups has proved durable. It had been 
endemic since the 1920s, when sectional pressures challenged Bevin’s 
amalgamation dreams. In the 1980s, it was not just the threat of legal action but 
the idea that such action would cost excessive amounts of money for a union 
which was already running at a considerable deficit (estimates for the late 1980s 
account for about a £9 million deficit) which would prove persuasive. In a sense, 
this exemplifies the way in which Ron Todd’s leadership was not concerned with 
renewal, but rather with finding ways of coping with the decline the TGWU was 
facing. There was possibly no other choice. In six years, from 1979 to 1985, the 
TGWU lost a quarter of its members, from just over 2 million, to fewer than 1.5 
million, as shown in figure 4.1. All that Ron Todd could do was to stop, or slow 
down, any further losses, as at this rate the TGWU would have vanished by 
1999. It did not, and by September 1999, the TGWU’s membership stood at 
874,927 members (TGWU data)20.  
 
 
                                                     
20 Appendix 2 offers full membership figures for the TGWU for the period between 1961 to 
1999. 
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The promise of renewal – Bill Morris 
 
If Ron Todd had attempted to cope with decline, in terms of slowing it 
down, Bill Morris’ leadership can be characterised as attempting to manage such 
decline and to then reverse it. The TGWU initiated a period of internal reform in 
order to become better equipped to deal with these challenges. This was initiated 
with the election of Bill Morris as the new General Secretary in 1991. Morris’ 
victory was tainted by a highly divisive and bitter electoral contest against the 
right-wing candidate George Wright, who was also the candidate preferred by 
the Labour Party (Halstead 13/07/1997). According to an unpublished 
manuscript of one national officer at the time, the bitter campaign also had racist 
undertones (Stevenson 2009a). The Broad Left supported Morris. With 
hindsight, many interviewees have now argued that the support may have been 
due more to the idea of having a more socially advanced and ethnically diverse 
union than to any suggestion that Morris had left wing credentials. Morris’ 
victory was clear, with 118,206 votes to 83,059 for Wright (Routledge 
09/06/1991). In a sense, what was to follow appears as logical considering the 
framework of the election and the way in which the TGWU had been dealing 
with decline during the 1980s. The challenge for Morris was two-fold – reuniting 
the union after the legacy of a divisive electoral campaign and ensuring the long-
term financial stability of an organisation operating in a hostile environment and 
with a large financial deficit. Was Bill Morris the General Secretary who was 
going to renew the union? 
The aim of renewal, however, could not operate in a vacuum. The type of 
renewal strategy that was to develop was in line with the impact legislation had 
had on the organisational structures of the union: “in the TGWU, the changes 
imposed by the legislation strengthened the leading national full-time officials’ 
authority, against the trend to greater executive influence which originated in the 
late 1970s” (Undy, Fosh et al. 1996, p. 191). Jones’ moves towards greater lay 
democracy were soon reversed by national legislation. This would explain, to an 
extent, the inability of the GEC to change the TGWU’s strategy on the Liverpool 
dockers’ dispute, as chapter six will consider. 
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The TGWU commissioned a study from a group of US consultants 
(Adam Klein & Co) in 1992, better known as the ‘Klein Report’, which fed back 
into the TGWU’s project named “One Union” (GEC 1992; Klein 1992). In 
addition, there was a move towards mergers of trade groups (which directly 
affected dockworkers), both within the organisation and with other trade unions.  
In order to understand the significance of these two changes a brief 
explanation of the TGWU’s internal organisational structure is needed. The 
TGWU as an organisation is characterised by a “vertical bifurcation” (McIlroy 
1997, p. 115) between regions and trade groups. The highest governing body of 
the union is the General Executive Council (GEC) and “all voting members of 
the union's governing body are lay members who work in industry and services” 
(TGWU website). The members of the GEC are elected from either their region 
or their trade group. Furthermore, “each member belonged not only to a region, 
but to a trade group and had a right to representation on both counts” (Minkin 
1992, p. 301-302). There were eleven TGWU regions in Britain and fourteen 
Trade Groups21. The first level a union member encounters is the Branch.  As 
part of the internal restructuring, trade groups in the 1990s lost importance in 
favour of four broad industrial sectors: food and agriculture, manufacturing, 
services and transport, as well as reducing the regions to eight. The move was 
towards merging trade groups (with historically strong identities) into a looser 
network of industrial sectors. The issues arising from such internal dynamics 
emphasised a division over strategy between the trade groups and the GEC 
(TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee Minutes, 26 October 1995 
Circular No. 950598). Certain trade groups, such as the Docks and Waterways, 
were keen to maintain the trade group structure as it was, for fear of being 
swamped in a larger transport industrial trade group. 
The immediacy for change came from the TGWU’s deficit of £12 million 
in 1991 (Klein 1992, p. 3). The Klein Report’s main outcome was to appoint “a 
highly paid chief executive and sought to encourage full-time officers to perceive 
                                                     
21 The fourteen trade groups were: Administrative, Clerical, Technical and Supervisory; Building 
Construction and Civil Engineering; Civil Air Transport; Chemical, Rubber, Manufacturing and 
Oil refining; Docks and Waterways; Food, Drink and Tobacco; General Workers; Passenger 
Services; Power and Engineering; Public Services; Road Transport Commercial; Rural 
Agriculture and Allied Workers; Textiles; Vehicle Building and Automotive. 
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themselves as managers. The key link here is between full-time staff and 
individual members. The emphasis is on professionalism and passivity. The 
importance of workplace representatives and activism is diminished” (McIlroy 
1995, p. 161). The objective was to develop a ‘service model of unionism’ as 
identified in some of the literature reviewed in chapter one.  
For example, the report emphasises the need to “streamline and 
professionalise the administration of the Union” (Klein 1992, p. 9). This change 
brought some discontent within the Docks and Waterways National Committee, 
particularly the proposal that some trade groups would soon become 
amalgamated. Twelve months on, a Region 8 member considered that “the 
restructuring took place and already, in certain areas, problems have been raised 
because of a loss of identity at grass roots level” (TGWU Docks and Waterways 
National Committee Minutes, 26 January 1995 Circular No. 950091). But these 
two issues left some elected representatives, faced with the added costly move of 
union premises, with a feeling of a democratic deficit: 
“A Region 2 delegate was concerned that the decision to spend this amount of 
money was determined without consultation and said we should not lose 
democratic control to professionals brought in after the Klein Report. […]. He 
asked if we were a lay membership led union or under the control of 
consultants” (TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee Minutes, 26 
January 1995 Circular No. 950091). 
These two aspects of internal restructuring within the TGWU, 
professionalisation of the union and mergers and amalgamations (both internal 
and external22) were the first steps the TGWU took in order to reverse decline. 
The aim of these trends was to centralise power “at the top of the union and 
exercised with the benefit of specialist expertise. It is a trend the state has 
supported and one which has been facilitated in some unions by the weakening 
of shop steward organisation” (McIlroy 1995, p. 169). This was no small 
challenge as there were many internal characteristics of the organisation that 
encouraged a considerable degree of fragmentation, such as the vertical 
bifurcation structure of the TGWU which shielded the union from having to 
                                                     
22 Throughout the 1990s the TGWU attempted to merge with other unions such as the GMB, 
unsuccessfully, until the merger with Amicus in 2007. 
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follow unitary practices. It encouraged further fragmentation between lay 
representatives (present in the Executive and regional committees) and the 
union’s District Officers (who are excluded from the Executive and from the 
BDC) (Kelly and Heery 1989, p. 207). These changes reinforced distrust 
between groups of shop stewards and regional and national leaderships. This was 
to take a particularly bitter form in the TGWU’s Region 6, and particularly in 
Liverpool.  
 
Region 6 
 
These changes should be understood in the specific context of Bill 
Morris’ restructuring of Region 6. If anything Region 6 was the most 
idiosyncratic region of the TGWU and one which was difficult to control for the 
Broad Left machinery23, the Communist Party or the right wing of the union. 
None of the groupings within the TGWU were able to keep the region tamed. 
For example, in 1991, after some documents were leaked to the press, the feeling 
in the national headquarters was that “someone leaked documents, probably from 
the Region 6 Broad Left, since only they would have been stupid enough to put 
the details in writing, sketching out the structure of the Broad Left” (Stevenson 
2009a, no pagination). 
In the early 1990s, Bobby Owens was elected Regional Secretary24. This 
choice showed a strong commitment by the region to lay democracy within the 
union. Conventionally, regional secretaries within the TGWU achieved this post 
as part of their career progression within the union (i.e. generally, they would 
                                                     
23 The Broad Left has been characterised as a “powerful, clandestine, electoral machine with no 
explicit political programme, minimal democracy and little role in industrial disputes. It was 
increasingly driven by rivalries between its two main strongholds: Region 1 (London and the 
South East) and Region 6 (North West). These centred on disputes over the choice of candidates 
for posts, internal electoral strategy and attitudes towards the General Secretary. Complex 
machine politics was overlain by the influence of former Communist Party members in Region 1, 
characterized, in their turn, as adventuristic. By 1993 the Broad Left was fractured by attempts to 
establish an alternative organization.” McIlroy, J. (1998). "The Enduring Alliance? Trade Unions 
and the Making of New Labour 1994-1997." British Journal of Industrial Relations 36(4): 537-
564. 
24 There are no records about the election as, with the restructuring of Region 6 during this 
period, most of the records were destroyed in the process of moving to smaller premises. 
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have been union officials beforehand). Bobby Owens, instead, was a lay 
member. This was an important development, as regional secretaries within the 
TGWU were popularly considered to be ‘union barons’ with a considerable 
amount of power and a responsibility to maintain the structures of the union. It 
was expected that having served as an official was the necessary training for the 
role or a means of allowing the development of resources to win an election. 
This novel development was not the only issue that made Region 6 
distinct. The region had a number of union officials who saw the way towards 
dealing and overcoming union decline rather differently from that of the union 
headquarters in London. A crucial split between the Broad Lefts of Region 1 
(London) and Region 6 became apparent in 1993. In fact, according to a national 
union official “it was no longer possible to work with the Region 6 elements due 
to their inability to adhere to agreements. The result was that most of Region 6 
was effectively expelled from the Left” (Stevenson 2009b, no pagination). By 
1993, the Broad Left and some crucial sections of Region 6 had departed in 
radically different directions. 
Two individuals became important during the period, John Farrell and 
Eddie Roberts. Farrell was a TGWU union official representing general workers 
on Merseyside; however, he had very distinct ways of going about his job, which 
often placed him at odds with employers. Many interviewees have characterised 
Farrell as a union organiser, rather than a traditional TGWU union official. In the 
personal diary of a senior national TGWU official, Farrell is characterised as “a 
hard grafter, but a very rough diamond indeed” (Stevenson 2009a, no 
pagination). For instance, in the early to mid-1990s, Farrell set out to 
successfully organise contract cleaners on Merseyside. This led to the first 
collective agreement for contract cleaners in the region. Although this was 
thoroughly in line with the way in which the TGWU wanted to organise groups 
of workers who had traditionally been left out of the union (such as part-time 
workers, women workers, general workers…), it was Farrell’s tactics that made 
the TGWU uncomfortable. He was a rather direct man, with a manner more 
suited for action than diplomacy.  
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Roberts was Farrell’s boss at the time. As Merseyside’s senior industrial 
organiser, Roberts had the difficult task of organising in a period of decline. 
With people like Farrell, this was not necessarily a problem in Region 6. A 
region which was particularly suffering from the decline in manufacturing and in 
dock work (the region covers the North West of England, not just Merseyside), 
its union officials were very quick to identify new groups of workers to organise. 
It was also a region which had the structures to develop a strong trade unionism 
rooted in the community. For example, in Liverpool, the TGWU headquarters 
were in a large building very close to Liverpool’s main train station, Lime Street; 
less than a mile up the road, by Liverpool’s two cathedrals, the TUC had its 
Merseyside Unemployed Resource Centre in Hardman Street, another rather 
large building in the city centre. The two centres had strong links (personal and 
otherwise) which encouraged the possibility of coordinated action. 
This rose-tinted picture of Liverpool’s trade unionism in the 1990s could 
obscure problems. In an environment clearly marked by legislative hostility, 
unions were swimming in uncharted waters. The way in which Region 6 was 
carrying out its organising was rather unorthodox from the vantage point of 
national union officials based in their London headquarters. From the way in 
which contributions were collected to the way in which the law was interpreted, 
the union started to feel that they were losing control of the region. It definitely 
fitted badly with Morris’ ‘One Union’ strategy. To deal with it, early in 1995, 
Morris suspended both Eddie Roberts and John Farrell under allegations of 
financial mismanagement. The accusations had to do with the way contributions 
had been paid and they were charged with misappropriation of funds (which later 
appeared to be a fabrication, as no money had ever gone missing, it had just been 
accounted in a more ‘traditional’ way than that required by the new reforms). 
The disciplinary hearings were carried out in a rather unorthodox manner, 
leading many within the region to believe that it was a witch-hunt rather than a 
genuine disciplinary issue. Surprisingly, union officials within the TGWU did 
not have clear frameworks on how to deal with disciplinary matters relating to 
their own employment. In this case, the disciplinary hearings took place between 
Bill Morris and the individuals concerned, with min
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their defence. In the case of John Farrell, he was consequently dismissed and this 
caused a certain degree of resentment from many Region 6 members who were 
supportive of him and initiated an unsuccessful campaign for his reinstatement. 
Eddie Roberts, on the other hand, was demoted back to the first job he had held 
with the TGWU 20 years beforehand. Additionally, to take up this new post he 
had to wait until a TGWU district office in the North West region had a vacancy. 
Eventually, he took up his post in Wigan, from where he retired in 2009. It was 
only then that he was vindicated when he won a court case against his unfair 
demotion, and the TGWU had to repay some of his missing pension 
contributions. The region was to have a further loss. In late 1995, the lay member 
who had become Regional Secretary, Bobby Owens, died of a heart attack. 
Owens was to be replaced in the interim period by the TGWU’s Deputy 
General Secretary, Jack Adams, who was also a member of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain at the time, and was to become a leading figure in the 
negotiations during the Liverpool dockers’ dispute. Adams’ job was difficult and 
short-lived in Region 6, as he was soon replaced by Dave McCall, a senior union 
official of the region, who was seen to be Bill Morris’ man. McCall was to 
revive the image of the ‘union baron’, not just by becoming Regional Secretary 
but also through the family connections running through the region’s 
headquarters (Dave McCall’s wife, Ann McCall, was TGWU Director of 
Education for the region in 2009). 
This change coincided with the TGWU election for General Secretary in 
June 1995. This was a year earlier than required and it was seen as a way of 
securing Bill Morris’ authority (McIlroy 1998, p. 556). Whilst Region 6 and the 
Broad Left had supported Morris in 1991, this time around, in one of those rather 
contradictory turns of history, Region 6 supported the Blairite candidate, Jack 
Dromey, better known as MP Harriet Harman’s husband. This meant that the 
Broad Left was divided in their support and therefore, less effective as the 
electoral machine that it had become within the TGWU. The campaign in 1995 
had lost the racist undertones it had in 1991. Instead, it was presented as a fight 
between Old Labour and New Labour. For the media, Old Labour won in the 
TGWU (Halstead 13/07/1997), for TGWU members the picture was rather more 
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complicated as this thesis demonstrates. Although Dromey accused “Morris of 
being ‘out of touch’ and a threat to Labour’s chances of election [success]” 
(Wilby 22/01/1999), history suggests otherwise. 
Bill Morris’ restructuring of Region 6 continued after he won the 1995 
election. No more disciplinary suspensions and redundancies were made. 
Instead, the region was the target of some important cost-saving initiatives. 
Under the Klein recommendations, the TGWU had to work through its deficit by 
cutting its major cost, its properties. Hence, in Region 6, Liverpool’s TGWU 
offices were moved from their large building in the city centre (Islington), to a 
smaller office near the old dock area. The new offices were difficult to reach by 
public transport but they were provided with good road links and a car park. The 
audience they were attempting to reach had changed. The Regional Office 
moved to Salford Quays, in a waterside business development characteristic of 
the speculative urbanism prevalent in Manchester in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.  
The restructuring of Region 6 had national consequences and recent 
historical roots. The protagonists had been involved in the leadership contest 
immediately preceding Bill Morris’ election in 1991. In 1990: 
“There were now strong rumours that Bobby Owens would succeed Bill as 
DGS. Bill even said to me “I know Bobby, he’ll move down” [to London]. In 
this scenario, Eddie Roberts would succeed Owens as Regional Secretary. […] 
this aspect would feature large in subsequent developments. Bobby was a very 
forceful type. He was making a lot of fuss about the inadequacies of Central 
Office and the need for the new Left officers based there to create waves. People 
with strong left-wing views were now filling one after the other National Officer 
and National Secretary vacancies and it did not always go down so well, 
especially when a candidate did not evidence previous experience of the trade 
group concerned” (Stevenson 2009a, no pagination). 
Crucially, the two-fold restructuring of the TGWU, electoral legislative 
changes and internal restructuring, favoured the Broad Left disproportionally. 
Specifically, postal ballots, as introduced by new anti-trade union legislation, 
were beneficial to the Broad Left apparatus. Whilst the centre-right tendencies of 
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the union were influential in some regions and amongst full-time union officials, 
it was the Broad Left that had built a widespread national network of activists 
that were active at the level of the lay membership. Additionally, the internal 
changes brought about by Klein which strengthened the national structures of the 
union were also advantageous to the Broad Left (Undy, Fosh et al. 1996, p. 185). 
Bill Morris’ re-election in 1995 secured his authority within the union 
executive: “he carried around 19 of the 32-person executive on important issues 
and had gone some way to circumscribing the impact of factionalism” (McIlroy 
1998, p. 556). As the following chapters will consider: “the Broad Left 
increasingly accepted his position of distancing the union from the Liverpool 
dockers’ dispute” (McIlroy 1998, p. 556). The issue went beyond the Liverpool 
dockers. It was about a new way of understanding unionism. In a sense, 
“underlying the desire not to upset New Labour a string of assumptions can be 
discerned. For some union leaders, the absence of strikes suggests healthy 
industrial relations and the laying to rest of a disruptive anachronism. Partnership 
casts a long shadow” (McIlroy 1999, p. 535). How this desire not to upset New 
Labour developed is considered in more detail in the next section. 
 
The TGWU and New Labour  
 
It was not just the TGWU that was finding the North West a difficult 
place to manage. Merseyside proved a difficult place for the Labour Party during 
the 1980s. More importantly, it was increasingly seen as a political liability, 
hindering any electoral chances the party was hoping for nationally. Between 
1983 and 1987, a distinctive type of Labour Party was in control of Liverpool’s 
City Council under the leadership of Derek Hatton. A Trotskyist grouping better 
known as the Militant had come to power within the local Labour party and then 
the City Council. Its significance lies in the fact that whilst the rest of the country 
appeared swept by neoliberal reforms, Liverpool was strongly opposing them in 
an unprecedented political fashion. Under Neil Kinnock’s leadership, the Labour 
Party prepared itself to become electable. The chosen strategy arose from a belief 
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that a party with radical links would not appeal to the majority of the electorate, 
even if the evidence, at least in Liverpool, pointed towards a different picture.  
The de-radicalisation, or modernisation as their supporters termed it, of 
the Labour Party in the late 1980s, led by Kinnock, involved a wide range of 
measures, which included removing certain sections of the party. In particular, 
those who might have been involved with the ‘Militant Tendency’. The 1992 
electoral defeat reinforced the strategic decision to remove the image of being 
the unions’ party. What characterised the position of the main unions in the 
debate was a certain degree of ambivalence and passivity. Rather than outright 
support or opposition, the main unions also considered that removing some of 
their political funds from the Labour Party would allow them to lobby other 
political arenas (such as the European Union). 
Even though the TGWU had considerable weight as Labour’s largest 
affiliate (Leopold 1997, p. 34) with a “vote of one and a quarter million at the 
Labour Party Conference” (Minkin 1992, p. 301), it was not necessarily a 
decisive factor in Labour Party decisions (Minkin 1992). The increased 
marginalisation of unions within the Labour Party included the TGWU. 
Renewed efforts by New Labour were made to keep the TGWU’s leadership 
close. This showed excessive anxiety by New Labour. After all, Bill Morris and 
Tony Blair agreed on many more important issues than Blair appeared to realise. 
For example, in 1993, Morris, who was fascinated with US Democratic Party 
Leader and US President Bill Clinton, commissioned several educational 
activities, and a conference, within the TGWU about Clintonite economics. Even 
Bill Morris’ opposition to the removal of Clause 4 was not wholehearted. Rather 
Morris followed what the union wanted, even though he was quite at ease with 
its removal. 
However, there was a further challenge for the unions, particularly the 
TGWU, which had been badly hit by the political and economic reforms initiated 
in 1979.  Early on, it became evident that “after 1983, and especially after 1987, 
solely campaigning for the return of a Labour government and expecting it to 
reverse Tory anti-union laws was no longer viable or credible” (Leopold 1997, p. 
34). More than that, for the New Labour project their relationship with the 
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unions was to be summarised in quite a straightforward slogan: “fairness not 
favours”. It clearly meant “an end to the particular special relationship, with 
unions becoming one of many pressure groups seeking to influence the 
government” (Leopold 1997, p. 35). Yet, the belief that any Labour government 
would be better than the Conservatives for trade unions and workers alike was 
deeply embedded within the British labour movement. The recent experience of 
Thatcherism only reinforced such a belief. 
It was indeed the end of a special relationship: “for New Labour, 
marginalised unions and a lightly regulated labour market would ensure that 
Britain would continue to be an attractive location for inward investment” (Shaw 
2007, p. 123). The special relationship had always been marked by tensions and 
ambiguity. In fact, Jack Jones’ comments on his views of Ted Heath in 
comparison with Labour prime ministers lead us to a more complicated picture 
of the ‘special’ relationship: 
“Those of us who had got to know him well felt keen disappointment when he 
lost the leadership of his party. At the outset I thought he represented the hard 
face of the Tory Party, but over the years he revealed a human face of Toryism, 
at least to the union leaders who met him frequently. […]. Amazingly, he gained 
more personal respect from union leaders that they seemed to have for Harold 
Wilson or even Jim Callaghan” (Jones 1986, p. 261-262). 
Of course, during the 1970s, Callaghan’s government had a difficult time 
in relation to industrial relations. The relationship between trade unions and the 
Labour Party was, to say the least, uneasy, yet “many leaders from large unions 
were unwilling to move into open opposition to the government” (Howell 1980, 
p. 299). The trade union leaders Howell refers to were, above all, Jack Jones 
(TGWU) and Hugh Scanlon (AUEW, Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers), who had developed particularly strong left-wing styles of trade union 
leadership from the late 1960s. Importantly, the reason for avoiding direct 
opposition to the Labour Party “was a product in part of economic constraints 
and fears of a Conservative alternative but it also reflected a positive response to 
the Government” (Howell 1980, p. 299). And this is crucial. Trade union support 
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for the Labour Party cannot be understood just as a way of supporting the ‘lesser 
evil’, but rather a political choice, albeit one with limited alternatives. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the TGWU’s strategies for renewal in 
historical perspective. The TGWU’s historiography places a high degree of 
importance on leadership styles as opposed to organisational structures and the 
way in which political struggles are framed within the union. In fact, this has 
been a stance adopted by senior figures of the TGWU as they have attempted to 
explain these strategies of renewal in terms of Bill Morris’ leadership style: “the 
absence of a close feel for the culture, tone and – above all – history of the 
British working class made Bill a stranger in his adopted country” (Stevenson 
2009a, no pagination).  
Instead, the chapter demonstrates that a more thorough examination of 
politics within trade unions is needed if a conceptualisation of trade union 
renewal is to be developed, which is not based on programmatic attempts, but 
rather based on a concern to understand workers’ organisational capacities. 
Therefore, this chapter concludes that the path of renewal the TGWU took in the 
1990s needs to be understood not just in terms of a hostile political and 
economic environment, but also in terms of two internal struggles within the 
union.  
On the one hand, there was a struggle over the nature of union control 
and democracy, which appeared heightened in a union as large as the TGWU, as 
the restructuring of Region 6 exemplified. This struggle appears to be endemic 
within a union with such a heterogeneous membership. The structures created to 
cope with such a large union are invariably contested, and in fact, act as 
containment, rather than a springboard for solidarity. Whilst it is clear that the 
TGWU had placed prominence on the unity of very different groups of workers, 
that emphasis did not necessarily lead to solidarity, but rather, at times, to the 
erosion of that very solidarity. Indeed, as an organisation, the TGWU offers an 
excellent case of the tension that occurs between solidarity and containment.  
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On the other hand, there were different conceptions of the political 
articulation of solidarity at stake, as illustrated by the events related in this 
chapter. In particular, the constant thread since 1922 that the political articulation 
of solidarity is best expressed by staying close to the Labour Party rather than an 
industrially rooted solidarity based on workers’ experience, for fear that it may 
be a divisive experience and vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Throughout 
there was a sense of inadequacy, as the union attempted to solve problems 
without attempting to solve the political challenges that Thatcherism had 
introduced. The contradictions brought to the fore by these two struggles have 
shaped the path taken by the TGWU and indicate that, for the time being, the 
orthodoxy of building an even larger union (with the merger with Amicus that 
has led to the creation of Unite in 2007) appeared as the chosen strategy of 
renewal. 
The following chapter returns to Liverpool. It does so by exploring the 
workplace relations that developed in the Port of Liverpool after the abolition of 
the National Labour Scheme in 1989. The processes of change that the TGWU 
and in particular Region 6 of the union underwent during this same period, as 
explored in this chapter, had a direct impact in the type of workplace conflict that 
developed during the six years preceding the Liverpool dockers’ dispute.   
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Chapter 5. Workplace conflict in the Port of Liverpool 
1989-1995 
 
This chapter brings together the three analytical categories – (1) 
economic restructuring and political deregulatory processes, (2) trade union 
strategies and (3) workplace and community experience and popular historical 
memories – developed in the previous chapters in order to consider their 
interplay within the Liverpool dockers’ immediate work environment. To do so, 
this chapter considers the relationship that developed in the port of Liverpool 
between managers and dockworkers following the abolition of the National 
Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) in 1989. This analysis is set against the 
background of the type of labour relations experienced in the port during two 
periods, first between 1945 and 1967, and then 1967 and 1989, which have been 
considered extensively at the national level in chapter two.  
The belief that this relationship, and its dynamics, should be considered 
important builds on Phillips’ article (2009) on the way in which workplace 
conflict can help locate the origins of an industrial dispute. Phillips argues that 
evidence found in Scotland suggests a reinterpretation of the origins of the 
Miners’ Strike 1984-5. Whilst established accounts present the strike as a battle 
between the radical leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 
and Margaret Thatcher, Phillips, not disregarding the significance of what he 
terms “high industrial politics” (p. 171) argues that “the strike was not imposed 
on Scottish miners by an ideologically rigid national union leadership, but in fact 
drew much of its energy and impetus from the workforce’s resistance to the 
managerial strategy of cost control through pit closures and the downgrading of 
joint industrial regulation” (Phillips 2009, p. 171). Specifically, “at each pit, 
managers sought to diminish significantly the involvement of workers and their 
union representatives in the planning and organization of production […]. This 
management attack on joint consultation and regulation, embedded features of 
coal’s industrial politics, represented a fundamental breach of trust” (p. 172). To 
a considerable extent this estrangement was also to be found in Liverpool docks 
following the abolition of the NDLS.  
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However, the “fundamental breach of trust” did not just happen between 
workers and managers. There were other dynamics at play, as the previous 
chapter has carefully considered, which concern the relationship between the 
dockers and their union. Fundamental breaches of trust were also developing 
there. The chapter will, therefore, endorse Phillips’ approach, but complements 
this with an analysis of the specific role that the TGWU played in the Port of 
Liverpool.  
 
Labour relations in the Port of Liverpool between 1945 and 1967 
 
The port of Liverpool had its origins under the Act of Parliament of 1709, 
but it was not until 1 January 1858 that the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
was created, which was “an autonomous corporation, designated a public trust, 
governed by a body whose members were predominantly its customers” (Lynch 
1994, p. 3). The port had relatively advanced systems (by dockers’ standards) of 
local industrial relations as early as 1912, when Liverpool introduced the first 
registration system for dockworkers (Jackson 1991, p. 32), ten years before the 
amalgamation of unions that led to the creation of the TGWU in 1922.  
The introduction of the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1945 therefore 
was not such a momentous achievement in Liverpool. In fact, labour relations in 
the port were difficult between 1945 and 1967, which was similar to what was 
happening in other British ports operating under the NDLS. The Scheme led to a 
further separation between the union’s officialdom and direct participation in the 
management of the Scheme, as chapter two has considered in more detail, and 
the perceived daily needs of dockers’ grievances. Inter-union rivalry was a 
constant presence in the port of Liverpool during this period, although the Blue 
Union never had as much an official presence there as it had in London. 
The Devlin Report (1965, p. 79-83) recalled negotiations in Liverpool 
over decasualisation. The Report was critical of the way in which negotiations 
had been carried out as well as of their content. The report identified two main 
factors as the obstacles, at the time, to successful negotiation. On the one hand, 
123 
 
inter-union rivalry between the Blue Union and the TGWU, and particularly the 
strength of the unofficial leadership, was seen as a hindrance. On the other hand, 
the role played by P. J. O’Hare, the TGWU’s District Secretary (who died in 
September 1964, before the compilation of the report) was emphasised within 
the Report. The secrecy that O’Hare maintained throughout the negotiations 
coupled with the managerial style formality with which the outcomes were 
presented led to a deep sense of distrust. The outcomes of the negotiation were 
presented “in an attractively printed pamphlet entitled ‘A New Deal for 
Merseyside Registered Dock Workers’ and with a cover photograph of the port” 
(Devlin 1965, p. 81). In short, the Devlin report maintained that “his [O’Hare’s] 
failure to woo his constituents led to the belief that he was making himself a 
spokesman for authority rather than a representative of the workpeople” (Devlin 
1965, p. 80).  
 This needs to be seen within the context of the TGWU’s relationship with 
its dockworkers. As the previous chapter has extensively considered, there was a 
tension between union officials and workers in an industry where immediate 
action was a necessity. This had led to the growth of the unofficial movement 
which, in Liverpool, was partly the outcome of a workforce that required that 
their grievances were dealt with promptly, or at least before a ship left the port. 
As such, an increasing distance grew between the TGWU’s officials and the 
dockers which all parties involved saw as detrimental to the type of employment 
relations that were developing in the port. The union was often seen as being 
closer to the employer than to the dockers. Particularly, as it has been mentioned 
before, the NDLS involved joint management between the union and the 
employer. 
For example, the account presented by the Devlin Committee regarding 
these negotiations was sourced from records provided by the employers, as there 
were no written records of the negotiations kept by the union. This was blamed 
on O’Hare’s way of doing things, which meant that after his death, what he knew 
went with him. Such secrecy was to prove fatal. The distrust that such events 
generated was further exacerbated by the fact that the negotiations led to a 
division of workers across three different categories of employment conditions 
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related to permanency, a particularly sore issue considering the history of 
employment within the industry. Crucially, this stratification was at odds with 
the drive at the time towards further equality of employment, as it meant some 
dockers were to be placed in different degrees of temporality of employment. 
Thus, the outcome was considered to be unacceptable by the dockers – all of the 
affected union branches voted against the proposals and issued votes of no 
confidence in O’Hare.  
At this stage, it is also worth mentioning that work in ports was often 
organised by local custom and negotiation rather than by national agreements. 
This was primarily due to the different types of cargo each port would normally 
handle.  For example, in the Port of London wages were calculated via a 
combined system of piece-rate and time-rate, which meant that some cargoes 
were automatically more attractive than others. In Liverpool, it was not payments 
that were the key distinguishing factors, but rather the way work was organised. 
The loading or unloading of ships was usually organised around gangs, and this 
led to the development of specific, and fairly widespread, working practices such 
as welting, where only half the gang worked any particular ship. 
Yet the first redundancies that were to affect the port industry, due to the 
implementation of Devlin’s recommendations on decasualisation as well as the 
development of containerisation, left Liverpool untouched. Rather than 
experiencing a constant surplus of labour, Liverpool had been operating below 
the number of dockworkers approved in the register. In 1966, there were 14,500 
places in the register and only 13,000 registered dockworkers (Lynch 1994, p. 
23). However, six months later, there was a surplus of 1,000 dockers. Given that 
this was happening even before the building of Liverpool’s container terminal, it 
is evident how much the availability of work fluctuated in the port.  
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Labour relations 1967-1989 
 
Increasingly, Liverpool dockworkers were blamed for the MDHB’s 
financial mismanagement. They became the scapegoat for the inadequate 
management of the board. For example, when there were labour shortages, they 
were blamed on the backlog of work created by previous strike action (Lynch 
1994, p. 28), rather than on the fact that there were fewer dockers employed in 
Liverpool than places available on the register. However, the financial mess in 
which the MDHB found itself could also be blamed on a very different set of 
problems – the recurring issue already mentioned in chapter two – a lack of 
willingness to invest in a industry accustomed to being labour-intensive, rather 
than capital-intensive: 
“The ports were left in a derelict state. Reinvestment in them was running at a 
low level. The profitable side of the ports, the cargo-handling side, was being 
taken over by private enterprise. Is it any wonder that the ports of this country 
are in such a state that there is a need for massive capital investment to update 
them and make them competitive with countries where this advancement has 
already taken place? 
The managers of the ports—I am thinking particularly of Merseyside—were the 
main customers. Therefore, the customer ran the outfit—for whose benefit? He 
ran it for the benefit of the customer. We have heard of examples of the 1964 
rate for hiring a crane, at 12s. 6d., still prevailing in 1971 and 1972. The people 
who at that time were in charge of the port authorities and the docks boards 
were satisfying their own vested interests in the ports and not the well-being of 
the ports throughout the country” (Loyden 1975). 
  
 But it was not just the employer that was entering a period of major 
change. It was during this period that the shop steward movement in the port 
gained ground. However, there was some suspicion between established shop 
stewards and the younger dockers who started work at the port in the mid 1960s 
to the early 1970s. It is important to note at this stage that the majority of the 
dockworkers sacked in 1995 had started work in the port between 1964 and 1971 
(interview data). For the younger dockers, the older shop stewards had grown too 
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close to the employers, a characteristic the younger dockers often saw as 
problematic. The situation has led sympathetic historians to the MDHB to assess 
the situation by saying that: 
“Whilst the experience of the more established shop steward leaders has so far 
enabled them to remain in control, they are increasingly driven to take up or 
defend extreme positions as the result of irresponsible acts of a number of their 
colleagues, who appear to believe that the principal function of a shop steward 
is to harass management” (Lynch 1994, p. 30). 
Most of Liverpool’s trade was with the East Coast of North America. 
This influenced the technological development of Liverpool’s port required since 
the 1960s, as American ports on the East Coast had started to introduce 
containerisation.  This meant that Liverpool had to adapt their port in order to be 
able to load and unload container vessels. Unfortunately, this was bad timing for 
the MDHB as it coincided with its financial crisis (Lynch 1994), and the Board 
was unable to finance the large level of investment required. Yet doing nothing 
was not a possibility, as that would have meant that Liverpool port would no 
longer be fit for purpose. Therefore, the costly construction of the Royal Seaforth 
Container Terminal was primarily financed by the British Department of 
Environment (Lynch 1994, p. 78).  
By 1980, the MDHB’s financial crisis remained unresolved. Throughout 
the 1970s strike levels in Liverpool had continued to be high and there was little 
incentive left for the Board to adhere to the Aldington-Jones recommendations25, 
arguing that “the 1972 Interim Report imposed no obligations upon them” 
(Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 85). The refusal by the MDHB to reallocate 
178 dockers following the closure of two stevedoring companies, S&T Harrison 
and Bulk Cargo Services, became the first serious breach of trust, as the security 
of employment dockers had fought for appeared to be once again fragile 
(Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 85). For the employers, on the other hand, the 
situation demonstrated what they had been thinking all along, that the system had 
been exhausted:  
                                                     
25 The Aldington-Jones recommendations involved the abolition of the Temporary Unattached 
Register (TUR), as it was seen as a remnant of casualism. 
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“In crisis, and in the absence of any available alternative, the response was to 
throw money at the problem. In 1980 the maximum severance payment was 
increased to £10,500 and, in the following year, the Government topped this up 
with a £5,500 supplement in London and Liverpool” (NAPE 1988). 
The level of distrust was becoming apparent, and it was reinforced by the 
way in which technological change had been managed. Whilst, at the time, other 
ports had set up Port Modernisation committees with workers’ involvement, in 
Liverpool there was little trust between the dockers and their employers and vice 
versa. This meant that during periods of change conflict became more 
prominent: 
“In Liverpool we never trusted our employers, I don't think they trusted us as a 
union, they would label us as 'militants' and that, so we never had the closeness 
as between employer and worker as many of the other ports had” (Interview 
with Terry Teague, January 2009). 
In October 1981, Liverpool went on strike over manning levels, where 
16,950 man/days were lost (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 87). Many of the 
dockers interviewed highlighted how they focused their efforts on manning 
levels because: 
“you knew quite well that the manning levels were never gonna be the same, but 
if you allowed the employer to just go ahead and bring in all the new 
technology, before you knew it, you'd be cutting your own throat” (Interview 
with Terry Teague, January 2009). 
The tone had been set for the following years. In 1984 a series of strikes 
‘coincided’ with the Miners’ Strike, which included attempts to instigate a 
national dock strike as well as boycotts of coal cargoes. By January 1989, some 
dockworkers in Liverpool were beginning to show concern over possible 
changes. In particular, there was a fear that the Temporary Unattached Register 
(TUR) could be brought back in Liverpool following the closure of Liverpool 
Stevedores Limited (TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee 
Minutes, 19 January 1989 Circular No. 890124). 
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This concern was well founded because in April 1989 the government 
announced a proposal for the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme. 
The Docks and Waterways National Committee of the TGWU held a special 
meeting on Monday 10 and Tuesday 11 April in order to coordinate action which 
had already spontaneously started in some ports, including Liverpool. By June, 
action had spread: 
“Information regarding numbers of members involved in walk outs are not 
complete, but it has been indicated that about 1,050 are involved in Liverpool; 
1,000 at PLA [Port of London Authority]; 100 in another London employer; and 
26 at Lowestoft. Information received regarding Bristol indicates that there was 
a split, but other information states only 27 are on strike” (TGWU Docks and 
Waterways National Committee Minutes, 9 June 1989 Circular No. 890867). 
However, it was not until July 1989 that the last national docks strike 
would occur in Britain. The strike was not observed equally by all ports, and 
there was a certain degree of ambivalence by the TGWU (Jackson 1991) as 
chapter two has explored in more detail. By week three of the strike, the MDHC 
had taken action. This response proved far more sinister than it appeared at first 
sight: 
“The following day, Tuesday July 25th, Liverpool dockers were not actually 
dismissed but received an affably toned ‘bulletin’ from the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company, urging the men to ‘decide whether to stay and work… Or 
take the money and go’. The company was seeking 200 volunteers for 
redundancy, and obligingly provided details of release payments to which 
workers were entitled, along with a questionnaire to be returned forthwith. The 
questionnaire sought to elicit at which of the terminals (Container, Timber, 
Ferry, Grain) the workers would prefer to be permanently employed in the 
future. This seemingly innocent survey was to prove a far more sinister purpose 
in the aftermath of the strike” (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 163). 
However, the Liverpool dockers remained confident. Although dockers 
in Tilbury had been sacked, Liverpool became the port that would carry out the 
fight. In fact, there was a certain degree of self-assurance that the MDHC was a 
soft touch. Many Liverpool dockers held a firm belief that their employer was 
not as ‘bad’ as others. However, “the Mersey Docks & Harbour Company, 
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despite its claims to be less hard line, was no less determined than other 
employers” (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 158). In fact, it readily used 
casual non-union labour during the 1989 dispute to unload cargo. The episode 
regarding the Falcon, a ship holding cement and timber, was to act as a stark 
realisation that the MDHC was stepping up to the plate. The vessel was 
offloaded over the sea wall on the Wirral by local young men who lacked the 
essential health and safety equipment, such as adequate footwear rather than 
trainers (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 158). 
These two instances led the Liverpool dockers to step up as well. By 
then, they had considered that if the return to work was to be worthwhile it had 
to be achieved with at least union recognition. Therefore, three days after the 
‘bulletin’ by the MDHC described above, the Liverpool dockers’ representatives 
reported to the TGWU’s Docks and Waterways National Committee: 
“A Region 6 delegate said that this should make us more determined to fight 
harder because we all knew this was coming. He rejected the attempt to move 
an orderly return to work. 
A Region 6 delegate said that only 14 men are working (in Ellesmere Port). The 
whole of Liverpool is in dispute. Vessels that are trying to move are not being 
handled by tugmen, lockagatemen, etc. We have recognised trade union labour 
and they won’t be able to bring other labour into the port. The port authorities 
know that and they will not sack anyone in Liverpool because the men in 
Liverpool are determined to win. The men in Tilbury have been sacked and 
there is a principle involved when activists are selected for dismissal. This is not 
about the Scheme, they are attacking labour organisation and trying to bring this 
union down in London. We have a responsibility to do what we can this 
morning and I hope this National Committee moves to extend this dispute and 
take it into a full trade group issue and encourage members that are prepared to 
stand up. We have to recognise, understand, and stand by each other. Let’s get 
some control back in the industry. The conference delegates are looking for 
leadership from this committee. We have not failed them before and we should 
not fail them now” (TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee 
Minutes, 28 July 1989 Circular No. 891122). 
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No control was gained in the industry. Six weeks into the strike the 
Liverpool dockers went back to work, days and weeks after all the other ports 
had gone back. But they were not going back to work willingly. They knew that 
their return was a return in defeat, which would have damaging consequences for 
the way in which the relationship between managers, workers and union officials 
would develop in the following years. Whilst the Liverpool dockers managed to 
obtain some union recognition, unlike many of the dockers returning to other 
ports in Britain, the new contracts involved some drastic changes. Management 
was reasserting itself, and it was ready to become militant. Yet, even though the 
new contracts “were to be, in the words of port manager Trevor Furlong, ‘non-
negotiable’ and shop stewards’ attempts to open up negotiations on the basis of 
previously existing arrangements at the port” (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 
172) were rapidly turned down, the deal achieved in Liverpool was impressive 
considering the climate at the time and the situation in other ports, such as 
Tilbury. 
Two issues appear as crucial in the new workplace environment that was 
to develop after 1989. Firstly, the relationship between managers and workers 
would change forever. Dockworkers would no longer be protected by the NDLS. 
Previous distinctions between Registered Dock Workers (RDWs) – workers 
performing dockwork as specified by the NDLS – and Association of Clerical 
Technical and Supervisory Staffs (ACTSS)26 – workers performing clerical work 
in the docks – would no longer apply. As the next section will show this meant 
that two very different workforces, with particularly contrasting work and union 
identities, would from then on be employed in the same capacity and expected to 
perform the same type of work.  
However, certain workers were separated on purpose. Shop stewards 
were sent to work in the general cargo area (the one most dockers disliked) and 
fairly early on it was clear why they were sent there.   By October 1990, the 
“Mersey Docks and Harbour Company has stated that 180 men in general cargo 
must complete applications forms for severance by 2nd November 1990 or they 
                                                     
26 This included: timekeepers, counter-offs, wharfingers, wharfingers clerks, ship foremen, quay 
foremen, storekeepers, labour officers and crane foremen.  
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may close down the conventional area” 27  (TGWU Docks and Waterways 
National Committee, 18 October 1990 Circular No. 900951). The tables 
appeared to be turned, and management, convinced that they had been under the 
power of the dockers since 1967, were ready to show ‘who manages’: 
“the place that I worked, the Seaforth Timber Terminal was a very bad place to 
work […] on the first day back we were told in no uncertain terms that 'the past 
is gone now, where you ruled the roost you don't now, and if you so much as 
sneeze we will come down on you like a ton of bricks' and I remember on the 
very first day when we came back, they assigned people tasks and the task for 
some people was to go and clean the toilet, or toilets, and there was a stevedore, 
commonly known as a ship's foreman, and a stevedore's job was handed down 
over the generations, […], and it was an art and Liverpool stevedores were 
respected all over the world, for the way they loaded and discharged ships, […], 
so they had this fantastic reputation, a deserved reputation, and I remember one 
of the stevedores who'd been assigned to the Terminal that I was at and he was 
told to go and clean the toilet and he said 'well, I'm a stevedore, it's an art, it's a 
craft', and so on, and it was 'well, you either go and clean the toilet or the 
severance is still open, take the money and leave' and they humiliated the man 
in front of everyone and he burst into tears, and tears weren't things that you saw 
on the docks, it was a very macho atmosphere, and you didn't show your 
feelings usually, and he left that afternoon, the first day in work after a strike, he 
left the industry and was never seen again, probably dead now” (Interview with 
Bobby Morton, July 2009). 
Secondly, the relationship between the Liverpool dockers and the TGWU 
had become worse as a direct consequence of the 1989 strike. The Liverpool 
dockers felt that “if the GEC had allowed us another week, we might have got 
other ports answering the call. That doubt will last for a long time. A lot of trust 
has gone. We stayed by the policy of the GEC and General Secretary and some 
                                                     
27 The story drew to an end: “200 men applied for compensation payment arising from the 
closure of MDH&Co cargo handling area. There has been a relocation of the Belfast Car to 
general cargo. Central Stevedoring went into liquidation last Friday and the stewards informed 
the company that the 22 men affected must be relocated in the Port of Liverpool if they wish, but 
the men did not wish to go to Merlin. There has been discussion in the area about priorities on the 
use of the pension fund surplus and transfer values.” (TGWU Docks and Waterways National 
Committee, 17 January 1991 Circular No. 910068) 
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people are of the opinion that we lost the strike on the 15th April.” (TGWU 
Docks and Waterways National Committee, 8 August 1989 Circular No. 
891191). The sense of distrust developing between the dockers and the TGWU 
would deepen throughout the mid-1990s. 
 
Changes in the organisation of work 
 
 Before proceeding to explore the dynamics of workplace conflict in the 
port after 1989, it is important to understand the key changes in the organisation 
of work in the port. The changes, besides the abolition of the NDLS, had two 
characteristics. Firstly, the port was restructured following a ‘detachment’ 
process where “some major operators no longer undertake stevedoring 
operations directly, but retain commercial links through licensing arrangements 
with either independent or joint venture companies” (Turnbull and Weston 1991, 
p. 5). The MDHC specifically entered “joint ventures on its container, timber, 
grain and general cargo operations, with the new companies being granted a 
licence to operate specific berths” (Turnbull and Weston 1991, p. 5). This led to 
the establishment of different business units, to which workers were allocated, 
and which led to shop stewards being allocated to general cargo, as mentioned 
previously. 
Secondly, the distinction between Registered Dock Workers (RDW) and 
staff (clerical workers) was abolished. These two groups had been working 
together for many years, yet their relationship had some deep rooted tensions. 
Many of those who joined the clerical side of dock work in the late 1960s and 
1970s were themselves the sons of dockers. For them, and their fathers, this was 
seen as an improvement, not necessarily in security of employment, but in 
having a job that was less physically demanding. They had traditionally been a 
workforce that was not unionised, but achieved “a high level of trade union 
consciousness comparable to that of the more progressive sections of industrial 
workers” (Carden 1983, abstract), as one of the ‘staff’ recalls: 
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“Where I was coming from, staff, hardly any of the staff belonged to a trade 
union. The history of the staff wasn't good, […] they lived off the backs of the 
dockers who were unionised dockers. So, whenever they got a good pay rise, 
they might have had to fight for theirs by going on strike, the staff would get 
theirs, without doing anything. I picked it up at an early age, I'd like to belong to 
a trade union, we started our own off, you know the staff, it was all young lads 
an’all, […], 1968 I got my first union card, 67-68, the oldest one in that branch 
was 25, which was you know quite young” (Interview with Terry Teague, 
January 2009). 
On the other hand, the immediate interests of ‘staff’ and RDWs had 
clashed in the past, when ‘staff’ lacked the security of employment RDWs 
enjoyed. ‘Staff’ often wished the RDWs were willing to back up their pledges to 
support the staff’s campaign for job security, whilst for many RDWs, ‘staff’ 
were just management puppets: 
 “Yeah, historically, going back to when I began, it was a very, a very bad 
relationship, because we were seen as an arm of the management and the 
labourers were out on their own doing the work, and that image was fostered for 
quite a number of years and I think it was again in the 80s, there was a move 
within the union to try and bring us together, because we had to work, although 
we weren't doing the same job, we were working side by side, we were trade 
unionists, and so on  and we came together in late 1980s, whereby anyone who 
worked on the docks in the port of Liverpool was transferred from the clerical 
sector into what we called the docks and waterways sector but even after we 
went over it was, up until the dispute that we are talking about, it was a very 
stormy relationship, both sides didn't get on” (Interview with Bobby Morton, 
July 2009). 
Nevertheless, the new blood that joined the clerical ranks in the late 
1960s and 1970s were often far more politicised than the RDWs. In 1971 Eddie 
Roberts, previously a shop steward at Ford’s Halewood, became their union 
official. He was later to be disciplined by Bill Morris, as the previous chapter has 
explored. However, the RDWs had traditionally taken the lead as “for many of 
the ACTSS stewards the dock stewards are in many ways the ‘elder statesmen’ 
within this relationship – and often at times the dock shop stewards have no 
hesitation in reminding the clerks’ stewards of their own ‘pedigree’ hard won 
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over many years of battle with the evil employer” (Carden 1983, p. 67). 
However, RDWs remained dubious of the clerical workers’ ambitions: 
“From 1972 onwards many of the disputes that ACTSS were to become 
involved in centred around the issue of parity with the dock worker. Although 
many of the dock workers’ agreements were seen as advantageous to the staff 
one must realize that the historic legacy of casual labour still predominates in 
the working agreements of the registered dock worker. Whenever there is no 
work for the docker he still ‘signs on’ at 8am and 1pm with the employer, 
showing him that he is available for work, to receive a relatively low wage in 
comparison to that which he may receive when he is working; for the ACTSS 
worker his wage is guaranteed whether he works or not. It is therefore not 
surprising that whenever ACTSS claimed parity on those parts of the dock 
sections agreement advantageous to themselves the dock shop stewards felt 
aggrieved by the fact that ACTSS were attempting to get the ‘best of both 
worlds’” (Carden 1983, p.88). 
Once the NDLS was abolished, both ACTSS and RDW became Port 
Operations Workers28 (the workers aptly adopting the initials POWs) and started 
working together under the same managerial structures. This meant that the two 
previously separated groups of workers were after 1989, technically, doing the 
same jobs. For example, someone previously employed as a clerk could now 
become a fork-lift truck driver, after the appropriate training, and an ex-RDW 
could become a clerk. In reality, this high level of flexibility was a managerial 
mirage and a workers’ nightmare. With very few exceptions, workers viewed the 
change with deep suspicion and were reluctant to change ‘to the other side’. 
Perhaps in contradiction to expectations, it was not those with the hardest 
physical jobs that saw this as an opportunity to do a less physically demanding 
job. Instead, it was some of the clerks that trained to do some of the work 
                                                     
28 This was possibly not as innocent as it may sound, as “the attitude of extreme anti-unionism 
was best exemplified by ABP managers. Statements by witnesses on this were legion. One 
described attempts to eradicate the very word ‘docker’. The ABP port manager in Southampton 
was reported as saying publicly that the word ‘docker’ would cease to exist in the English 
language within five years. Most port employers (not only ABP) now describe dockers as ‘port 
operatives’ or ‘terminal operators’ or such like. The witness understood this as an attempt to 
eradicate what the dockers had stood for over the years.” Southwood, P. (1992). British Dockers. 
A survey of human rights in the former Scheme ports. London, Transport and General Workers' 
Union. 
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dockers had traditionally carried out. Two factors may help explain why some 
clerical workers took up this option and dockers did not. Firstly, the last intake of 
labour in the port of Liverpool had been clerical workers, and, generally, they 
were a younger workforce than the ex-RDWs. Secondly, clerical workers in the 
port had become fairly militant over the previous years and there was a higher 
inclination by them to experience a different type of work experience, and one 
which had been, at times, romanticised by a militant popular culture. The 
opposite was not necessarily the case: dockworkers had a pride in their work and 
did not feel the inclination to change. 
 
Workplace conflict in the port of Liverpool 1990-1995 
 
Two issues are key to understanding the way workplace conflict 
developed in the port prior to September 1995. First, the introduction of Torside, 
which introduced working practices from a bygone era. Second, the 
derecognition of shop stewards after 1992, which demonstrated a change in  the 
relationship between managers and workers, as the shop stewards were no longer 
permitted to express the grievances of workers, rather if the union was to be 
involved it had to be via the union official. Derecognition also decisively 
attempted to deal with workers individually, following the national mood as 
precipitated by the defeat of the miners, in order to break down the collective 
bargaining structures. 
Torside 
 
In 1991, a new company employing dockworkers was created by James 
Bradley, “former Liverpool docker and TGWU Regional Committee” (Carden 
1993, p. 422). The company, Torside Ltd., which was to be at the centre of the 
dispute in 1995, caused concern to the ex-registered dockers in its early stages: 
“Regarding a company called Torside, 30 new employees work alongside us but 
their wages and conditions are worse so we are seeking to improve their 
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standards. We have suggested that they should be employed directly and we will 
train them” (TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee Minutes, 18 
July 1991 Circular No. 910651). 
Torside was created by recruiting 15 dockers’, shop stewards’ and union 
officials’ sons as well as 15 workers picked by Torside themselves. For the union 
and the shop stewards, this was seen as a way of keeping some control over the 
changes. Torside dockers received lower pay and far worse conditions of 
employment, particularly in relation to holiday and sickness pay. However, the 
creation of Torside was presented as a lesser evil by both the MDHC and the 
local TGWU. For the MDHC it was an opportunity to bring in some flexibility, 
to ensure a relatively peaceful transition towards new working practices and to 
reduce labour costs by bringing in a cheaper and – as they characterised younger 
workers – a more willing labour force. For the TGWU, its involvement in the 
creation of Torside ensured that they were part of the ‘new deal’. All the Torside 
dockers soon became members of the union, thereby guaranteeing membership 
levels in an otherwise declining industry. 
However, not everyone saw the creation of Torside so positively. For 
many other dockers, particularly those who did not stand to gain from it, the 
initiative caused resentment, as not only was casual labour introduced in the port, 
but some dockers’ sons, those of shop stewards primarily, had managed to get 
priority in the recruitment process. In fact, many rank-and-file dockers brought 
up the issue during my interviews. They felt they wanted their sons to have been 
considered, but the deal appeared to have been made behind closed doors. Other 
shop stewards saw the creation of Torside as dangerous, as a carrot that would at 
some point be used as a stick. From then on, it was just a waiting game. 
The derecognition of port shop stewards in 1992 
 
Until 1992, the Liverpool dockers still enjoyed a relative strength, against 
all odds if what was happening elsewhere in Britain was anything to go by. For 
example the dockers achieved an excellent result in their 1991 pay negotiations, 
when the MDHC offered a 5.8% pay rise and the dockers continued to negotiate 
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until they reached an impressive 6.4% (TGWU Docks and Waterways National 
Committee Minutes, 18 July and 17 October 1991 Circular No. 910651-910886). 
But the honeymoon was soon over. Threats over job losses were constantly 
present and shop stewards remained peripheral in the general cargo area. The 
division into six business units created the desired fragmentation. Each unit 
started looking after its own, leading to many instances where grievances were 
dealt with individually or at most within the same business unit, but never 
achieving port-wide resonance. 
Tension culminated in 1992 with the derecognition of the shop stewards 
by the MDHC: 
“In 1992, following a port dispute over job losses, the Dock Company withdrew 
its recognition of all dock shop stewards accusing them of being in conflict with 
both the company and their union, the TGWU” (Carden 1993, p. 339).  
The 1992 dispute has been repeatedly mentioned during my research 
interviews. In the dockers’ minds, it was clear that it became the prelude to the 
1995-98 dispute. In 1992, the union also failed to recognise the strike. The union 
did not feel it had that much to lose from derecognition. MDHC was just 
derecognising the shop stewards, not the union. In fact, the company was quite 
happy maintaining negotiations with the union and its officials. For the union, 
removing a group of unruly shop stewards did not appear as being such a bad 
thing after all.  
However, the dispute was not a complete failure for the Liverpool 
dockers and their shop stewards. Whilst the shop stewards lost their recognition, 
the jobs under threat were actually saved. It was also the first real training in 
union militancy that the young Torside dockers received, and it was 
accompanied by a rather ambivalent lesson about their relationship with their 
union. Some of the dockers interviewed pinpointed this strike as the main 
learning curve for the Torside dockers. 
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Origin of the 1995 dispute 
 
A combination of factors appears to have culminated in the events that 
unfolded in 1995. Trust was non-existent between management and workers and 
Torside had failed to become the panacea management hoped for: it had failed to 
realise its objectives. Management’s ambition to create a more flexible 
workforce had not materialised and the young dockers were as militant, if not 
more so, as their elders. The dockers’ ambition had also failed to materialise. 
Equal conditions for equal work were no longer the norm, as Torside’s dockers 
still had worse pay and conditions. But these were only the tip of the iceberg. 
Three core issues with varying degrees of complexity were emerging at the same 
time. 
Firstly, following the creation of Torside as an agreed venture between 
the MDHC and the TGWU, relations between the employer and the union had 
started to become too friendly. The regional union official, Jack Dempsey, was 
perceived by the dockers to feel more at ease with management than with the 
shop stewards. But, it was not just the local union official that was producing 
suspicion, as a shop steward recalls: 
“the relationship between the local union and the national union and the 
employer, and the employers and the port authority was unhealthy, in my 
opinion, far too close, and to a certain degree, a bit sycophantic, it was like, 
whatever the employer wants, so the union were being used to pursue the 
employers’ agenda” (Interview with Mike Carden, March 2009). 
Pursuing the employers’ agenda led to further changes that were 
antagonistic to the dockers’ interests. For example, in 1994 a change aimed at 
bringing casualism back was introduced without any complaints from the union. 
The change brought in annualised hours, which meant that dockers would not 
have a normal working week. Rather, their hours of work would be organised 
according to the number of ships in port at any one time. This meant they had to 
be available for work, and could be called in at little notice, but also, it meant 
that they could go for days without work. The impact of this was that dockers 
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could end up owing the employer hours if they had not been called to work 
sufficient times in any given year: 
“It was like a slave contract, you end up owing the employer hours because in a 
potentially casual industry where you weren't guaranteed five days work, 
Monday to Friday, where like a ship would come in for like a couple of days 
and then you may not get another ship for three or four days, five, a week or a 
fortnight, then obviously with a situation like annualised hours you were always 
gonna owe the employer hours, and even the most moderate dockworker was 
damaged by that, there was no, you couldn't avoid it, everyone was affected by 
it, and I think that had a big impact on, on the militancy of the workforce” 
(Interview with Mike Carden, March 2009). 
Finally, severance payments after 1989 had continued and as working 
conditions deteriorated they became a more attractive option, mainly because 
they were very generous. Considering that a Port Operations Worker in 1994 
earned £24,728 gross pay, a severance pay of £35,000 was certainly attractive. 
The effect of these large severance payments was that: 
“people were selling their jobs effectively, for what then was a large amount of 
money, and so you were down to sort of a hardcore of 5-600 workers, who had 
sort of made the decision that they were staying in the industry, and some felt 
that the industry owed them something, you know, I felt that way, you know, we 
all could have left, we all could have sold our jobs, in a sense, and we didn't, so 
then, to not do that and then being met with constantly low wages, longer shifts, 
you know, there is 12-hour shift, 16-hour shifts, it was dreadful, it was 
absolutely dreadful” (Interview with Mike Carden, March 2009). 
All these issues, therefore, contributed to a heightened sense of 
workplace conflict. Crucially, the loss of trust between the union and the workers 
grew as working conditions worsened. And the union was often seen as a willing 
participant in the worsening of conditions. The relationships became increasingly 
bitter. In a further dispute in the container area in 1994 over the introduction of 
the annualised rota system, the Liverpool dockers’ representatives complained of 
“alleged interference by regional officials, against the wishes of the membership, 
in disputes and other matters” (TGWU Docks and Waterways National 
Committee, 25 July 1994 Circular No. 940593). As events produced further 
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interference, the dockers’ representatives attended a union Docks and Waterways 
National Committee meeting in October with a more direct request: 
“Concern was expressed about the resolution sent to the General Secretary from 
the July Regional Trade Group meeting regarding the alleged interference of the 
Regional Officers. We are completely opposed to them negotiating on our 
behalf without being asked. The resolution indicated that the General Secretary 
should not be involved but that wasn’t the resolution that should have been sent 
down. Regarding the LCH dispute, the resolution that should have been sent 
down was about the Regional Secretary and leading officers – but not the 
General Secretary. […] 
A Region 6 delegate said the request was for a delegation meeting with the 
General Secretary about the interference of the Regional Secretary in Trade 
Group matters” (TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee, 27 
October 1994 Circular No. 940778). 
In fact, the regional union official knew that he had lost credibility 
amongst the dockers. But in a final attempt to try and appease them, he sent the 
following letter two months before the 1995-1998 dispute started, warning that 
the dockers’ jobs were at risk: 
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Figure 5.1 Letter from Jack Dempsey, 18 July 1995 
T&G North West (letter headed paper) 
18 July 1995 
TO THE MEMBERS OF:- 
6/601, 6/602, 6/603, 6/605, 6/606 and 6/610 BRANCHES 
Dear Brother, 
 
I am writing to you today to explain the very serious situation in the Port of Liverpool at this 
moment in time, which carries a very realistic threat to people’s jobs. 
 
This has been brought about because of a number of instances of late that have convinced the 
employer and his customers that we do not have the will or ability to abide by any agreements we 
reach and while you may feel the situation is mutual, they are determined that they will no longer 
accept people taking unofficial action of any description. 
 
The M.D.H.C. have advised members at Seaforth Container Terminal by letter that they will be 
dismissing people who take part in any unofficial action. They have further advised that they will 
be setting an agenda which includes dealing with sixty people who they say cannot or will not 
train to be used in the manner they require. 
 
Nelson Stevedores have insisted that we put in writing to them confirmation that we will abide by 
the agreements, in particular the Grievance Procedure and they are disciplining members who 
took part in an overtime ban. 
 
Torside have declared a redundancy of twenty full-time employees and while this is still being 
discussed, again reference has been made to a lack of customer confidence due to unofficial 
actions. 
 
The Shop Stewards are aware of these positions in each of the companies. 
 
The M.D.H.C. and L.C.H. are also asking searching questions as to our ability to conclude a deal 
in view of the impending Industrial Tribunal cases being brought privately against these 
companies by our members. 
 
We have, I believe, reached a crisis of confidence position, in that the employer no longer 
believes that the Union has any control over its members and therefore, they are questioning why 
they should recognise the Union. 
 
Any unofficial action may well cost you your job, as the employers are adamant that they will 
sack people who take part in any such action and have stressed this clearly to your Stewards and 
myself. 
 
We must avoid giving any of these positions to any of the employers and I am appealing to you 
all as individuals whose jobs are dependent upon our negotiating our way through these difficult 
problems to abide by agreements and maintain a collective discipline which allows this to happen 
to all of our mutual satisfaction with the dignity of all being retained. 
 
Yours fraternally, 
 
J. DEMPSEY 
REGIONAL TRADE SECRETARY, 
DOCKS & WATERWAYS SECTION. 
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The letter had the opposite effect from that which the writer possibly 
intended. For the majority of dockworkers, this letter demonstrated their betrayal 
by their full-time official. It made the dockers become even more distrustful of 
the relationship between their union and the employers, a relationship that had 
become far too comfortable, in the dockers’ minds, since the abolition of the 
NDLS. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has traced workplace relations in the port of Liverpool 
following the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1989. It has done 
so by following Phillips’ (2009) idea of workplace conflict as the fundamental 
break-up of trust, which may lead to an industrial dispute. In the case of 
Liverpool, this chapter has shown that these characteristics were certainly found 
in the type of workplace relations that developed in the port between 1989 and 
September 1995. Additionally, in Liverpool, the break-up of trust also occurred 
between the workers and their union, the TGWU, which was not helped by the 
regional developments that were simultaneously occurring, and which the 
previous chapter has explored.  
 Crucially, three key developments in workplace relations between 1989 
and 1995 have been identified by this chapter as the direct precursors to the 
events that unfolded on 25 September 1995, and which the following two 
chapters consider extensively. Firstly, the creation of Torside and, with it, the 
introduction of flexible working practices in the port with the agreement of the 
employer, the union, and to a certain extent, the shop stewards.  Secondly, the 
derecognition of shop stewards in the port in 1992 following a dispute over job 
losses, breaking up any communication channels between the shop stewards and 
the employer. Finally, the introduction of annualised hours, bringing in a system 
more in line with earlier periods of casualism in port employment. The way in 
which these three episodes shaped the relationship between the Liverpool 
dockers, their union and the MDHC would have deep consequences.  
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Chapter 6. The Liverpool dockers’ dispute 1995-98: the 
local dynamics 
 
This chapter focuses on the local political dynamics that developed 
throughout the 28 months of the Liverpool dockers’ dispute. It does so by 
developing a chronological account of the main struggles arising from within 
two separate, locally-grounded developments: on the one hand, the increasingly 
difficult relationship between the Liverpool dockers and the TGWU’s leadership 
and, on the other, the links developed by the Liverpool dockers outside the 
formal structures of the TGWU. This chapter mentions some relevant 
developments in the dockers’ international campaign but it does not analyse 
them, as the international campaign is considered at length in the following 
chapter. 
 
The start of the dispute – September-November 1995 
 
Although the dispute started on Monday 25 September 1995, there are no 
documentary records of the first few days. It was not until 30 September that the 
first press article was published in the specialist maritime industry paper Lloyd’s 
List. However, there are four valuable sources of information regarding the 
initial stages of the dispute. The port shop stewards compiled a chronology in 
1996, which they submitted to the Education and Employment Committee at the 
House of Commons, and which was published in the report The Employment 
Implications of the Industrial Dispute in the Port of Liverpool. Also Michael 
Lavalette and Colin Barker, two academics from Liverpool and Manchester 
Metropolitan Universities respectively, both active members of the Socialist 
Workers’ Party (SWP), published a book chapter reflecting on the first two 
weeks of the dispute (Barker and Lavalette 2001). There were two unpublished 
manuscripts produced by members of the Merseyside support group, Bill Hunter 
(1998), a long-standing Trotskyist based in Liverpool, and Dave Cotterill (1997) 
at the time a well known member of the ‘Militant Tendency’. Drawing from 
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these four sources, together with my own interviews, archival records and news 
sources, I will trace, chronologically, the unfolding of the local and national 
dynamics of the dispute.  
The dispute started when five young dockworkers employed by Torside 
were sacked after they refused to complete overtime under different conditions 
from those established by custom or negotiation. Overtime on the docks used to 
be paid in two-hour blocks (a customary practice), which meant that if the ship 
was unloaded sooner, the dockworkers earned more than they had worked. If it 
took the full two hours they would get paid the same as if it took half an hour. 
This was an important arrangement since ships would have to be unloaded often 
before the tide of the river Mersey changed, otherwise they would have to pay 
for another 24 hours in the port (and port fees are expensive). This meant that 
dockworkers were used to doing overtime at the end of their shift if there was 
little left to unload in order to allow ships to leave on time. 
On 25 September 1995, the employment conditions changed. The young 
unionised Torside dockers were not given the usual notice to do overtime, 
thereby breaking a customary practice, and they were told they would just 
receive payment for one hour’s work (Barker and Lavalette 2001, p. 140). When 
they refused to accept this, their employment was terminated. The next day, the 
Torside shop stewards committee called a meeting of the entire Torside 
workforce; the meeting was interrupted by Bernard Bradley (Torside’s managing 
director). Bradley sacked the 80 Torside workers (Barker and Lavalette 2001). 
The workers then had to decide what to do. Amongst the five originally sacked, 
one was the son of the Merseyside Port Shop Stewards treasurer, Jim Davies, 
another three were nephews of another MDHC shop steward, Billy Jenkins. 
A family affair was becoming evident. This was to prove decisive, 
because it meant that MDHC workforce was, by default, already involved in the 
dispute. It was clear for many of the dockers that crossing your own son’s picket 
line was certainly not a possibility. Therefore, even if there had just been family 
ties as a reason, the MDHC permanent workforce had already become involved. 
This did not mean that the MDHC dockers felt that the stoppage was the right 
thing to do. For example, Jim Davies, reflecting on the advice he offered to his 
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son, stressed the importance of negotiation rather than picketing (interview with 
Jim Davies). It remains unclear to this day the extent to which negotiation was 
possible at this stage, considering the motives behind Torside’s move. The key 
motive Torside had for risking the development of this dispute was to reduce 
their workforce. Torside had been attempting, throughout the summer, to reduce 
the number of jobs in the port as well as reducing the contractual hours of most 
of its workforce (Davies 1996b). This would mean that those who remained 
employed would only be guaranteed 20-hours work per week, with the rest being 
paid as overtime if work was available. This was considered to be unacceptable 
by the dockers, who saw it as a return to casualism. 
However, it is clear from the evidence submitted to the Commons 
Committee mentioned earlier, that Torside was going through a difficult time. It 
had not achieved the main purpose behind its creation. The sacked dockworkers 
maintained that Torside was under the direct control of the MDHC, as a way of 
introducing casual work practices through the back door. On the other hand, ex-
registered dockworkers, through family ties and trade union education, had 
managed to hand down their historical experience to the young Torside dockers. 
The inter-generational link between dockers is crucial, and something dockers 
considered important to fight for as will be explored later in the chapter.  
Additionally, there was a breakdown in communication between the 
TGWU official responsible for Liverpool dockworkers and the dockworkers 
themselves. Torside’s managing director’s submission to the Education and 
Employment Committee states how Jack Dempsey (TGWU official) “came into 
my office and he seemed to know what had happened as regards the five men but 
when he arrived he was faced with a total unofficial dispute. He had not spoken 
to the men on the site that day when he came to my office” (The Education and 
Employment Committee 1996, p. 19). This type of situation was repeatedly 
mentioned by shop stewards and rank-and-file dockers during my interviews. 
The TGWU official would talk first to the employer, and then to the workers.  
This epitomises what this thesis has already considered in the previous 
two chapters. On the one hand, there was a feeling that the TGWU had failed to 
represent them adequately since the abolition of the NDLS, a belief which was at 
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one with the dockers’ historical relationship with the union. On the other hand, 
the environment in which the dockers found themselves after 1989 was one in 
which workplace conflict was characterised by a ‘militant management’, a 
particularly different environment to the one dockers who started work in the 
mid-1960s or early 1970s had been used to. 
On the Wednesday, two days after the original five sackings, the Torside 
workers set up a picket line, which 11 workers from another stevedoring 
company (Nelson) decided not to cross. This meant they were also sacked 
(Barker and Lavalette 2001, p. 147). On the next day, Thursday 28 September, a 
picket line was set up at the main entrance where the MDHC workers were due 
to go into work. The large majority of MDHC dockworkers and a large 
proportion of clerical and ancillary staff did not cross the picket line; just thirty 
workers crossed the picket line (Barker and Lavalette 2001, p. 148). The 
majority had their reservations. They did not think that the Torside men were 
doing the right thing, they felt they ought to negotiate: however, they felt that 
they “wouldn’t know how to cross a picket line” (Tighe 20/11/1995). Whether 
there was any real possibility of negotiation at this stage remains uncertain. Any 
assessment would depend on understanding the employer’s motivations behind 
their actions. In interviews, management clearly emphasised that they wanted to 
show ‘who was the boss’, but they did not expect that rank-and-file dockers 
would follow their shop stewards to such an extent. 
The workers who refused to cross the picket line were instantly dismissed 
by the MDHC for exercising secondary action, something which was, and still is, 
illegal in Britain (1980 Employment Act). There were two main issues arising 
from the dispute. On the one hand, the dispute itself arose from the articulation 
of solidarity amongst contractually fragmented workers: three different 
companies, three different types of contracts, and two different employment 
groups; dockworkers and white collar workers. On the other hand, all these 
groups of workers were unionised, and belonged to the same union, the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). Therefore, a contradictory 
situation, with both fragmentation and unity being present, developed. Yet, the 
union “urged workers not to take collective action, dissociating itself from them 
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when they did. Initially, the union denied the dockers the use of union premises, 
only allowing them the use of office facilities after securing a statement from 
MDHC that it would not sue the TGWU for supporting illegal strike activity” 
(Barker and Lavalette 2001p. 150). 
At this point, the dispute remained localised, with only the specialist 
maritime press starting to report what was happening from 30 September. It was 
not until 11 October that the British national  press first reported the  dispute, in 
The Guardian (Halsall 11/10/1995). The reason for the dispute reaching the 
national press was that the port was forced to close down, at least for a few days, 
due to the workers’ actions (Rooney 02/10/1995). However, the employer, 
MDHC, was very quick to react to the situation. By the weekend, they had sent 
out new contracts to around 200 of the dockworkers (Guest 30/09/1995) as well 
as starting an advertising campaign in the local press “looking for men or women 
willing to work a seven-day, three-shift pattern” (Guest 03/10/1995). By then, 
the workers’ action was no longer a matter to be ignored by the national press, or 
by the employer.   
For the dockers, the first few weeks of the dispute were successful in 
maintaining unity and local solidarity. Although unrecorded, a considerable 
number of tugboat operatives (who are crucial in guiding vessels in and out of 
the port) did not cross the picket line for at least the first two weeks (interview 
data). This would have surely made a contribution to the £4.5 million the Mersey 
Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC) lost in 1995 including the first three 
months of the dispute (Mortished 22/08/1996). Crucially, however, the attempt 
by the MDHC to fragment the strikers by offering new contracts to about half of 
them, was ultimately unsuccessful. Some of the dockers who received such 
contracts felt ashamed at first (interview with Sue Mitchell, January 2009) as if it 
meant they were seen as “good workers”, rather than “militant” by the employer. 
The workers who received them, publicly rejected the contracts in a mass 
meeting.   
 The TGWU at this point still remained uncertain. The national 
leadership had not become involved, and there were deep suspicions between the 
regional officials and the shop stewards. The docks official, Jack Dempsey, 
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made it very clear to the dockers that the dispute was not official as there had not 
been a secret ballot. The relationship between Dempsey and the dockers was one 
of complete mistrust. The trade union, facing sequestration of funds if they 
supported illegal industrial action under the 1982 Employment Act (Visser and 
Van Ruysseveldt 1996), remained silent. Furthermore, there was a concern from 
the TGWU to ensure they represented all of their members effectively (see table 
below), including those non-dockworkers employed by MDHC who had crossed 
the picket line. This was not a response to fragmentation specific to the 1990s, it 
was deeply rooted in the historical experience of the TGWU: “the leaders of the 
union were not simply concerned, when framing policy or taking action, with the 
reaction of dock workers but also were concerned with the reaction of the whole 
body of the membership, even when the issue was solely of immediate concern 
to dock workers” (Jackson 1991, p. 39). 
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Table 6.1. TGWU non-striking members employed by the MDHC, by 
occupation 
TGWU Regional Secretary’s figures Port shop stewards’ comments and 
figures 
Polsa (ACTS) 134 Mersey Docks office staff 100 (max) 
Pilots (Mersey) 50 All self employed  
Tugs 139 Employed by 
Cory/Alexandra 
 
Dock Gatemen 42 Mersey Docks 42 
Boatmen 78 Mersey Docks  78 
Pandoro 28 P&O, not Mersey Docks  
Floating Plant Ratings 82 Mersey Docks 50 
Stevedores (Container Terminal) 36 Mersey Docks: dockworkers 20 
Stevedores (Grain Terminal) 40 Mersey Docks: dockworkers 23 
Securicor (Ex-Neptune) 60 Not Mersey Docks 
employees 
 
Stevedores (Birkenhead) 16 Not Mersey Docks 
employees 
 
Maintenance and Warehousing 51 Mersey Docks 51 
Floating Plant Officers, 
Dockmasters 
53 Mersey Docks  53 
Total 809  417 
(Davies 1997) 
 As the above table shows, even though there was major disagreement in 
terms of how many TGWU members were actually employed in the Port, it was 
clear that the TGWU had a large number of non-striking members, including 
between 43 and 76 strikebreakers. This division was used by the TGWU 
throughout the dispute as one of the reasons for their ambivalence in supporting 
the sacked dockers.  However, the dockers argued that they were not asking the 
TGWU to place some members before others; rather they had been dismissed, 
whilst the others had not. Therefore, they needed the support of their union. 
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First offer – October 1995 
 
The first ‘final offer’ was put on the table by the MDHC on 18 October 
1995. This offer was applicable only to employees of MDHC and Coastal 
Containers Ltd and not to Torside. It had three elements: 
1. “150 jobs would be contracted to Drake Port Services. Sacked dock workers 
could apply for these posts, but ‘no guarantee can be given that Drake will 
recruit former dockers only’. 
2. The establishment of a co-operative composed of sacked Liverpool dockers 
but with ‘no exclusive right being given to such an organisation’. 
3. A lump sum ex-gratia payment of £10,000.”  (Education and Employment 
Committee, HC 413, p. 30) 
The offer had not been the product of any negotiation. It carried several 
implications for the way in which the dispute would develop. Firstly, it was an 
offer designed to test the ground, nearly a month after the dispute had started and 
when solidarity in the port, beyond those already dismissed, was diminishing. 
Secondly, the dockers had stated clearly from the beginning that they wanted 
their jobs back, yet the offer involved possible jobs with subcontractors, 
including Drake Port Distribution Services. ‘Drake’s’ was already well known 
by British dockers. It had established itself as a reliable strike breaking port 
employment agency based in Kent. In 1993, Southampton dockers had also faced 
the threat of Drake’s, and the Liverpool dockers were familiar with this earlier 
situation: 
“Unbeknown to the Union or the negotiators, management had been preparing a 
plan since Christmas on how to run the Berth with a greatly reduced labour 
force, changed working practices and the use of sub contract labour. 
Furthermore, they had engaged an agency (Drake International) to secretly 
recruit and train a number of people at Tilbury and Barking to drive the cranes 
and straddle carriers at Southampton Container Terminal. When management 
was confronted with this fact, they said they needed insurance in case the talks 
ended in dispute. 
[…] 
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We are very concerned that an employment agency, registered as being 
recognised by the TGWU is being used by SCT to undermine the efforts of 
TGWU members in their fight to maintain jobs. We would like something to be 
done about it” (TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee, 29 April 
1993 Circular No. 930317). 
Finally, for those who wanted to accept severance payment, £10,000 was 
almost an insult, when in 1989 they could have left the industry with £35,000. 
Unsurprisingly, the offer was rejected at the following mass meeting by the 
dockers via a public ballot (show of hands29). The dockers wanted a guarantee 
that they would all be reinstated. In response, the company proceeded to recruit 
Drake Port Distribution Services to supply labour in the port of Liverpool.  
 
WoW – from the washing line to the picket line – November 1995 
 
 The dispute was shaping up to be a rather different type of conflict. New 
workers were being recruited to work in the port and solidarity from other 
unionised workers was not as forthcoming as the dockers had hoped for. It was 
within this context that the Women of the Waterfront (WoW) was created. This 
added a new, and much needed, dimension of solidarity.  The Women of the 
Waterfront would provide direct support to the dockers by involving the women 
in the dispute, ensuring that the women understood why the dockers were in 
dispute, and strengthening the dockers’ determination as they would feel that 
their families were behind them.  
 In a lengthy article in The Mirror, Doreen McNally is quoted as saying 
that the women “were just housewives catapulted from the washing line to the 
picket line” (Doreen McNally quoted in Reade 26/09/1997). The women were 
catapulted onto the picket line in November 1995. This was the first time that 
                                                     
29 This was seen as problematic by the MDHC as the mass meetings were fairly open and it 
remains unclear as to who had the right to vote in them. “Votes about the dispute are taken by 
show of hands inside the TGWU’s Merseyside headquarters at mass meetings attended by the 
Torside men and – the company claims after viewing TV pictures – former dockers who took 
redundancy years ago.” Fazey, I. H. (03/04/1997). New-look docks sail to records. Financial 
Times. London.  
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women had been asked to be involved in a dockers’ dispute. However, it was not 
the first time that women had been involved in a dispute as wives, rather than as 
workers themselves. What prompted the creation of WoW was the recent 
experience of the miners’ strike. 
Initially, the shop stewards asked Doreen McNally to coordinate a 
women’s support group. A meeting was organised with a few shop stewards 
(two, Bobby Morton and Kevin Roberts) and Sylvia Pye, a woman representing 
the Miners’ Women Support Group (Doreen McNally in Hunter 1998, p. 15), 
who had been involved during the miners’ strike in 1984-85 and during the 
Parkside closure campaign in 1992-93. The meeting was designed to answer 
questions from dockers’ wives as well as offering a way to support the dispute. 
Many women attended the meeting wanting to know: “Why did my husband 
follow what the shop stewards say?!” (data from own interviews). “Are they just 
sheep? Following what they are told…” The shop stewards had to answer some 
difficult questions from the wives, who at the same time were advised by Sylvia 
Pye on their important role. If there was to be any chance of winning the dispute, 
the women had to stand by the dockers. 
However, this meeting was also organised with the participation of some 
of the women. From my interview data, it becomes evident that some of the 
women had already begun to get involved. The struggle was no longer over work 
conditions, as in the past; this struggle had gone further. All women interviewed, 
agreed on how they were used to seeing their husbands involved in strikes 
before, and they had not felt the need to become involved. Yet, in this case, they 
had been involved as the struggle became not just part of their husbands’ work 
life, but part of their family life. The length of the dispute and the memories of 
both the miners’ strike and the 1989 dock strike made the women think that this 
was going to be a dispute like no other. If nothing else, they understood the 
dockers’ isolation. The restructuring of the industry and the severance payments 
following from the abolition of the NDLS ensured that this time, the Liverpool 
dockers were walking alone. 
The women’s involvement provided the dispute with a new lease of life. 
The determination to show that the dockers were not about to give up became 
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stronger with them. The employers were probably hoping that through the 
traditional family structures characteristic of most dockers’ families, the wives 
would ‘put some sense’ into the men, particularly with Christmas approaching. It 
is important to understand that the dockers’ income was reduced from over 
£20,000 a year to a handout of around £60 a week in the mass meetings. 
From my interview data, it emerges that there was a core group of around 
40 women meeting regularly, with up to 60 women committed to the Women of 
the Waterfront, which usually met every Wednesday. This represents quite a 
high level of involvement, since there were between 350 to 500 dockers involved 
in the dispute, and not all of them were married or in relationships. The 
significance of the women’s group was three-fold. Firstly, the women were 
entering “the men’s world”. Secondly, they provided the backbone to the 
dispute; they were the most crucial support the dockers needed in order to 
continue with the dispute. Thirdly, the women were central to campaigning. 
Dockworkers were a traditionally male section of the working class. In 
Liverpool this was definitely the case. Although containerisation and 
technological advances meant that many jobs in the docks were no longer as 
physically demanding, the traditional handing down of jobs from father to sons 
ensured a male and white (mainly of Irish origin) workforce. The experience of 
working in the docks was then one of inter-generational male bonding with a 
strong dose of dockworkers’ consciousness, pride and education along the way. 
Most of the ex-dockers interviewed stated that their father had been a docker, 
and how working at the docks meant that this was "when I really got to know my 
dad" (interview with Billy Jenkins, January 2009). This came with a sense of 
historical experience, of inheriting past struggles. Billy Jenkins talked to me 
about the 1967 strike (a year before he started working in the docks): “My dad 
and all the older dockers won the conditions, like pay, cleaner atmosphere, health 
and safety...” (interview with Billy Jenkins, January 2009). This meant, for many 
of the dockers, that in 1995 they were not just fighting for their jobs, rather they 
were fighting to maintain the heritage their ancestors had fought so hard for, as 
figure 6.1 conveys. 
 
154 
 
Figure 6.1. Banner on the picket line, 1995 
 
©John Farrell 
 
 The women encountered some hostility. Often, the dockers would want 
to keep their work life separate from their family life. Paradoxically, perhaps, the 
most active women involved in the WoW were not shop stewards’ wives; rather 
they were the wives or partners of rank-and-file dockers. The idea that shop 
stewards, and by extension their families, may be more politicised did not appear 
to be accurate.  Similarly, it was not a matter of women who worked outside the 
home versus those who worked as housewives. In fact, many dockers’ wives 
were in full-time employment, and many of those who were not had to look for 
full-time employment within a few weeks of the dispute starting due to the 
financial strain that came with the dispute. Some of the shop stewards argued 
that the lack of involvement of their wives was due to families having to ensure 
their survival, and, therefore the need to decide which of the two would become 
more active in the dispute, whilst the other one focused on the family. 
The second way in which the WoW was significant was in their role as 
the dispute’s backbone. WoW represented the closest level of solidarity possible, 
that of the family. It could be argued that without the women’s support the 
dispute would not have lasted as long as it did. There are several reasons for this. 
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The women’s support injected a sense of morality into the dispute, of justice, a 
perspective on what was right and wrong. This meant the dispute created more 
sympathy amongst audiences. Additionally, most of the families went through 
considerable financial hardship throughout the dispute, and the women publicly 
understood the dockers’ collective plight, rather than individually defending their 
families (as neoliberal constructions of economic actors assumed). 
Finally, the women were very creative in their campaigning. They were 
very successful at fundraising (for example, they were awarded a controversial 
Human Rights Prize of £30,000 from Colonel Gaddaffi in September 1997). 
Fundraising was crucial in keeping the dispute going. According to Jim Davies 
(the port shop stewards treasurer) they needed around £35,000 per week to keep 
the dispute going. The women were also very active in different types of support. 
They would design banners for the picket line or demonstrations, organise 
catering for social events and clothes swapping days. Most importantly, they 
became engaged politically in two main ways. The women would go and sing 
outside the strikebreakers and company executives’ homes in an effort to shame 
them in front of their neighbours:  
“These Scab-a-Night activities involved mainly the women and children visiting 
their homes, marching around  in a circle, holding candles and singing Xmas 
carols to let the neighbours know what was going on”(Cotterill 1997). 
The women also became particularly involved in delegation work. These 
latter activities, in particular, played a fundamental role in the politicisation of 
the women. As this involved speaking in public, often in meetings of people used 
to hearing politically trained speakers, such as national and international trade 
union meetings, the women started to become highly articulate public speakers. 
This demonstrates how the women’s group was more than a defensive resource, 
and in fact, quickly established itself as a crucial organisation for the 
maintenance, and the possibility of winning the dispute. Furthermore, there was 
a shift towards new and politicised forms of activity, in unfamiliar locations. For 
many women this was a huge learning curve. 
However, by December 1995 there was a sense of exhaustion and the 
support received locally was insufficient. Without national trade union backing 
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the dockers would remain isolated in Liverpool. This posed a serious strategic 
challenge for the dockers. Their leadership were becoming increasingly aware 
that they were on the wrong side of the port gates, and many within the left 
increasingly considered that occupation of the Port was the only strategic path 
towards successfully winning the dispute. This was to become a criticism by 
many left groupings of the dockers’ leadership. However, as one of the shop 
stewards pointed out during an interview, it was not a credible strategic choice, 
not because of unwillingness, but because it simply became an impossible path 
to follow: 
“We should have occupied, and the plan, the people I mix with in work was that 
we knew a dispute was gonna happen, so when it happened, the plan was that 
we occupied, but the reality was that never took place, not because there was a 
strategic decision not to occupy, it was because we were outside the gates. And 
it was difficult to get in then, once you are out, you know. And we discussed it 
endlessly, not to be left outside the gates, you know, so that when the dispute 
began we would occupy. But the reality just didn’t materialise” (interview with 
shop steward). 
Occupation was not an option. A different reality had to materialise. 
Local solidarity was important to maintain strength and morale but it was not 
proving effective at putting pressure on the MDHC. If the picket line was unable 
to stop work in the port, something else had to. The dockers initiated an 
international solidarity campaign in December 1995, the immediate effects of 
which were evident in the offer that was to follow. 
 
Second offer – January 1996 
 
The second offer followed a period of negotiation and it was presented on 
Thursday 25 January 1996. The main negotiators were Bernard Cliff (MDHC), 
Jack Adams (TGWU) and Mike Carden (Port Shop Stewards). The dockers’ 
demands were fairly straightforward. They wanted their jobs reinstated and a 
solution to the plight of the Torside dockers. Torside was no longer a player as it 
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had stopped providing employment services to the port (although according to 
Companies House records it did not cease to exist until 2003). However, the 
dockers wanted the MDHC to re-employ the young dockers. There were two 
reasons for this demand. First, this would have been the procedure to be followed 
under the NDLS. Second, they felt that since the creation of Torside had been 
made by an agreement between the MDHC and the TGWU and that Torside had 
carried out all of its recruitment and training on MDHC’s premises, and with the 
direct assistance of MDHC’s managers, that the MDHC had a direct 
responsibility for the fate of Torside’s workers. Yet the MDHC had made it clear 
from the beginning of the dispute that the reinstatement of Torside dockers was 
not negotiable. They were not going to be held responsible for what they 
presented as another company’s troubles. 
Whilst the offer differed significantly from the previous one, and was an 
improvement, it was a far cry from what the dockers were hoping for, 
particularly after the international show of strength (which will be dealt with in 
the next chapter). This second offer consisted of a £25,000 payment to 319 
workers previously directly employed by the MDHC, and the remaining would 
receive £1,000. There would also be 40 jobs available. Torside offered an 
additional 30 jobs to their own sacked workers. It would also have involved the 
removal of Drake Ports Distribution Services as a labour supply agency in the 
port (The Education and Employment Committee, 1996 p. 30). However, the 
company imposed the condition that it had to be submitted to a secret ballot. 
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Table 6.2. Comparison of the first and second offers  
Offer 1 (October 1995) Offer 2 (January 1996) 
150 jobs to Drake Port Services 
(open for former dockers to apply) 
Removal of Drake Port Services 
Establishing a co-operative of 
sacked dockers (but with no 
exclusive rights) 
40 jobs available from the MDHC 
30 jobs available from Torside (as 
it had not officially ceased to 
trade) 
£10,000 to those dockers with more 
than 15 years of service 
£25,000 for 319 MDHC workers 
£1,000 for the remaining 
No negotiation Negotiated by Mr Bernard Cliff 
(MDHC), Jack Adams (TGWU), 
Mike Carden (Port Shop 
Stewards). 
Voted by public show of hands Ballot carried out by Electoral 
Reform Society 
 
The offer was not accepted. 271 sacked MDHC workers voted against the 
offer, with 50 voting to accept it in a secret ballot organised by the Electoral 
Reform Society (see breakdown of votes in table 6.3). Further meetings in the 
spring of 1996 proved unsuccessful in negotiating an agreement. Both the 
dockers and the MDHC maintained their respective positions. The key issue that 
proved impossible to negotiate was the reinstatement of Torside dockers. By 
then, it had become clear that many of the other dockers may not have returned 
to work even if reinstated and that they would have taken early retirement.  It 
was the position of Torside that had to be secured. 
Table 6.3. Vote result 
MDHC Employees 271 against 
50 for 
8 spoiled papers 
Torside employees 56 against 
6 for 
14 not returned 
Nelson Freight employees 10 against 
0 for 
(Labournet 1996) 
 The offer had been considerably more generous than the previous one. 
Importantly, it was to be the only offer which provided any solution for Torside 
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dockers (and which included them in the secret ballot). Additionally, it would 
have agreed to remove Drake’s from providing employment in the port. At this 
stage, this was probably an easier option for the MDHC, as the new workforce 
was fully established. In the MDHC’s Port of Liverpool 1997 Annual Report, 
Drake’s received a glowing mention, alongside a full-page advert which is quite 
stark, shown in figure 6. 2, this demonstrated that the more time passed, the more 
difficult it would be to remove Drake’s (and hence get the dockers’ jobs back): 
“The Port of Liverpool’s Royal Seaforth Container Terminal workforce is now 
one of the best in Britain. ‘They are highly qualified, highly motivated and well-
trained,’ said Les Heather, the Liverpool-based Operations Manager for Drake 
Ports Distribution Services. 
Drake Ports Distribution Services, a division of Drake International which also 
operates in other UK ports, has been retained by the Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Company to provide a permanent workforce to handle Container Terminal 
cargo. 
DPDS, a company of the highest standing with a reputation for providing a 
totally professional workforce trained to the most exacting standards, works in 
close co-operation with Mersey Docks’ established management team and 24 
port workers already at the Container Terminal. 
In October 1995, Mr Heather began recruiting 150 employees, including 18 
women, for the Terminal’s new labour force with selection based entirely on 
suitability for the vacant positions” (MDHC 1997, p. 37). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
Figure 6.2. Drake Ports Distribution Services advert in the Port of Liverpool’s 
Annual Report 1997 
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By this stage the international campaign had proven useful in securing a 
much better second offer. Whether that was a direct result of the international 
campaign, or of the dockers’ show of endurance is hard to discern. However, it 
meant that for the time being the dockers focused their efforts on strengthening 
the international contacts they had started to build up. This led to the 
organisation of the First International Dockers’ Conference in February 1996 in 
Liverpool City Hall, which is considered in chapter seven. 
The improved offer and support received by the dockers so far meant that 
they were feeling strong. And they were not alone. In March 1996, two crucial 
trade union leaders visited Liverpool to address the weekly dockers’ mass 
meeting. John Bowers, President of the International Longshoremen’s 
Association (ILA) and the dockers’ own General Secretary, Bill Morris. 
 
Bill Morris’ grandchildren – March 1996 
 
Bill Morris addressed a dockers’ mass meeting on March 13 1996: 
 
“It’s one of those situations which passes in time but when you look back you 
have to justify where you were and what contribution you made. It’s one of 
those situations where as you age and your grandchildren say to you ‘where 
were you at the great moment?’ you either stand up with pride and say ‘I was 
there’ or you hung your head in shame, without an answer (‘hear hear’ 
applause). 
And I tell you this, when my grandchildren say to me, in 15, 20, 25 years from 
now, ‘where were you when the Liverpool dockworkers were fighting for their 
jobs, their community, their dignity and their pride?’ I want to be able to say: ‘I 
was marching with them side by side (cheers, applause). I’m here this morning, 
I’m here this morning full of that pride, and feel almost privileged to be part of 
this history in its making. 
[…] 
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The great victory, as far as I’m concerned, is to force them [the company] to 
recognise that it’s not the bureaucracy that’s gonna lead the working class and 
the dockers to victory, it is the leadership which you elect, it’s the Jimmy 
Nolans and the Davieses and the Cardens and all the other leadership that you 
elect that will in fact lead this dispute to victory, and they better understand that 
because nothing less than a recognition of that is going to bring about the sort of 
solution that is required (‘hear hear’)” (Tape no. 13, Mass meeting 13March 
1996, with John Bowers and Bill Morris (speaking) at Transport House, 
Liverpool). 
There is still some time left for the then TGWU General Secretary’s 
grandchildren to ask him for an explanation about his role in the dispute. What 
was important, however, in light of this speech by Bill Morris, was how, from 
March until August-September 1996, the relationship between the union and the 
dockers appeared to be good, even after the initial frictions in 1995 between the 
TGWU official in the Port of Liverpool, Jack Dempsey, and the Torside 
picketers over the use of TGWU material in an unofficial dispute. As the dispute 
started, Torside dockers had picked up TGWU’s placards and banners from 
Transport House and used them in their picket line. This led to a scuffle between 
the pickets and Jack Dempsey as he forcefully took the materials back; as he felt 
that union material should not have been used in disputes of an unofficial nature. 
Bill Morris’ speech highlighted the importance of the local shop 
stewards’ leadership in the dispute, something the MDHC appeared to be 
particularly concerned about. This was linked with some of the concerns for 
trade union renewal that become evident within the TGWU after 1992, as 
chapter four has considered at length. Morris’ last paragraph is of crucial 
importance. Throughout the negotiations between the company and the union, 
there remained the sticking point of the shop stewards. The dockers were 
suspicious of union officials, yet they trusted their shop stewards 
wholeheartedly. The company preferred to deal with the union officials and saw 
the shop stewards as a problem rather than a possible solution. The union 
officials often felt more at ease with the company than the shop stewards. 
However, for Morris to have said these words in a dockers’ mass meetings meant 
that he had realised the importance of the dockers’ local leadership.  
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In fact, the problems between the local shop stewards and their full-time 
official had already been made known to Bill Morris in 1994. In a fax responding 
to Morris the Merseyside Port Shop Stewards stated that: 
“Between 1989 and 1995 the Liverpool Dockers, through their Docks and 
Waterways Regional Trade Group, requested on four occasions, an official 
ballot relating to job losses, privatisation and centralisation. These requests 
were refused by the Union for various reasons; ongoing negotiations, 
companies no longer trading, the illegality of holding ballots amongst different 
companies albeit direct subsidiaries of Mersey Docks etc. The complaints and 
concerns of the Liverpool Dockers are adequately recorded in the Minutes of 
the Region 6 Committee over a long period of time. Indeed, at least two 
meetings took place in London with Bill Morris. 
Identifying these various concerns at the last meeting which took place in 1994 
with Bill Morris, the Dock Stewards spoke of the increasing chaos in the Port 
that could result in the Dockers’ dismissal if the Union continued to fail to act. 
Three formal complaints were made about the local Docks officer and a 
Regional Inquiry again failed to respond fully to the concerns of the Dockers in 
1993” (Emphasis added, fax to Bill Morris 09/04/1997). 
The issue of union representation and democratic accountability within 
the union came to the fore. As the speech quoted earlier shows, Bill Morris 
appeared committed to the leadership style of the dockers’ shop stewards. How 
long this commitment was to last is a matter the chapter will deal with in the 
forthcoming sections. Similarly, the TGWU’s local docks official had been more 
of a problem than a help, yet here it was, the TGWU’s General Secretary 
offering full support. 
Once again, the sense of strategic exhaustion returned during the summer 
of 1996. It was evident that the dockers never expected the dispute to last so 
long, and even though they had shown a high level of organisational creativity, 
nothing appeared to be putting sufficient pressure on the MDHC. Most 
importantly, international support was not enough to bring the dispute to an end. 
The strategy turned efforts back towards building local and national alliances. 
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Red and Green should never be seen – September 1996 
 
 Meanwhile, the first anniversary of the dispute was commemorated with 
a rally in Liverpool with massive participation of the environmentalist, direct 
action group ‘Reclaim the Streets’. This represented a clash of left-wing cultures. 
‘Reclaim the Streets’ were well known ‘ravers’ who had a very different lifestyle 
from that of the traditionally working-class dockers. In addition, the agreed 
politeness with which dockers had carried out their picketing, was about to be 
shaken by the direct action activists within ‘Reclaim the Streets’. This coalition 
was to have two effects. On the one hand, it linked green and red issues in an 
almost unprecedented manner (Penman 29/09/1996) in Britain; on the other, it 
antagonised the TGWU further. 
In response to the direct action that occurred as part of the first 
anniversary, when Custom House, the MDHC’s headquarters, was squatted, Bill 
Morris stated his dissatisfaction at the Labour Party conference in Blackpool. 
Morris said: “We deplore the violence and unlawful action that has taken place. 
The dockers must disassociate themselves from those who have become 
involved in the dispute” (Osler 02/10/1996). The relevance or not of such a 
coalition, and the reaction from the trade union movement, went beyond red and 
green issues. What it demonstrated was a clear and unexpected alliance between 
the working class and groups outside the traditional political left, remarkable 
particularly as the dockers had been surrounded throughout the initial stages of 
the dispute by small groups from the British left (such as the Socialist Workers’ 
Party, some Communist Parties, etc…). The move was not towards the 
traditional left, whether moderate or radical. The move was towards a new way 
of understanding organisation and action.  
In Britain, issues of representation with the dockers’ union were coming 
back to the fore. Following the Education and Employment Committee’s 
investigation into the Liverpool dockers’ dispute during the summer, new 
evidence against Jack Dempsey, the docks official, was made public. Torside’s 
evidence, presented to the committee, pointed towards the possibility of 
reinstatement having been relayed to Dempsey within the first few hours of the 
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dispute. If this was true, Dempsey had failed to communicate this to the Torside 
dockers. This led the dockers to present a formal complaint of Gross Misconduct 
to the TGWU’s General Secretary Bill Morris for the action (or inaction) of their 
full-time union official at the start of the dispute. The complaint focused on two 
crucial aspects: Dempsey’s failure to inform the Torside dockers of their offer of 
reinstatement and the consequences of him not doing so creating a situation 
where “he has left the Union open to legal redress” (letter from Branch 6/610 
dated 6 September 1996 to Bill Morris). For Branch 6/606 the damage was more 
extreme: “It is our members’ considered view that Brother Dempsey has been 
totally negligent on this issue resulting in the dismissal of 500 Transport and 
General Members laying our Union open to possible claims of Non-
Representation” (undated letter from Jim Davies, Branch Secretary, emphasis 
added). 
This forced the TGWU to make a response. Bill Morris asked David 
McCall (Region 6’s Regional Secretary and Dempsey’s boss) to conduct a 
regional investigation. McCall did so and submitted a report with his 
recommendations to Morris in November 1996. Some relevant issues were 
disclosed in the report. Family connections appeared to be widespread, in fact, 
Dempsey’s son was also employed (and sacked) by Torside (McCall 1996, p. 
15). More important, however, was the different leadership style of Dempsey, as 
a full-time union official, and the port shop stewards, as dockers’ elected 
representatives. In his statement to the regional investigation, Dempsey 
maintained: 
“At that point [Wednesday 27 September 1995], I was still hopeful that, if I 
could get the cooperation of the Shop Stewards, we might get some resolution 
from the employer. At the end of the meeting, I asked whether I had authority to 
speak for them. They replied that they’d have to go back to the lads and seek 
permission for the negotiations” (Dempsey quoted in McCall 1996, p. 16-17). 
The issue of how union democracy was understood will be considered 
further in the next two sections. The report shed no light on Dempsey’s 
withholding, or not, of crucial information: 
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“Full-Time Officials have to ‘walk on eggshells’ in such situations, knowing the 
legal and financial implications for the Union from possible challenges by the 
employers. Jack Dempsey was subsequently involved in meetings with other 
senior officials, and appraised them of the situation as he saw it. It is therefore 
preposterous to imply that Jack Dempsey, as an experienced FTO, would have 
wilfully withheld a critical piece of information (about Bradley’s offer) from his 
colleagues. We should conclude, rather, that the ‘offer’ was not genuine, or that 
Jack Dempsey certainly had not seen it as ‘critical’” (McNulty, Dempsey's 
representative, quoted in McCall 1996p. 21). 
Therefore, it appeared that Bradley (Torside’s managing director) might 
have indeed presented an offer to Dempsey, yet the latter might have felt that the 
offer was not worthy of being communicated to the dockers. McCall’s 
recommendations, in light of this statement, were surprising: 
“1  that Brother Jack Dempsey conducted himself properly throughout 
these events; and 
2 that there should be formal repudiation of Bernard Bradley’s statement 
to the Select Committee” (Letter from David McCall to Bill Morris, 14 
November 1996, ref DMcC/SW). 
 Bill Morris took his time to carry out the second recommendation, and it 
was not until nearly a year later that Morris wrote to the Chair of the Education 
& Employment Committee repudiating Bradley’s statement (Morris 1997). The 
TGWU, or at least Region 6’s Secretary, appeared to be confident about the 
validity of the first recommendation. Dempsey was promoted to Regional Trade 
Group Secretary in April 1998 (Dempsey 1998).  
 
John Pilger – November 1996 
 
 In Britain, the first critical response to the role of the TGWU to become 
public, and probably the best known one, was John Pilger’s eight page special 
article in The Guardian (23 November 1996). Pilger’s article was a strong 
critique of Bill Morris and the TGWU over their role in the dispute. Most 
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importantly, it appeared at a time when the TGWU were calling for support to 
the Labour Party in their internal and external communications for the 
forthcoming 1997 general election. The dockers felt that finally the media would 
be on their side. They were particularly optimistic as they felt that The 
Guardian’s readership who were probably eager to have a change from the 
Conservative government would have been particularly concerned with how a 
trade union leadership close to the Labour Party was behaving towards their own 
members.  
With few exceptions, the mainstream press had been generally oblivious 
to what was happening in Liverpool. With the general election fast approaching 
and the fact that many of The Guardian’s readers would be sympathetic to the 
Labour Party, the TGWU claimed that Pilger’s article damaged Labour’s 
electoral chances. Bill Morris rejected the article as an unfounded attack and 
John Pilger as an ‘ultra-left’ journalist (Setting the record straight, TGWU The 
Record, February/March 1997, p. 5). The TGWU had indeed been contributing 
financially to the dockers’ hardship fund 30  as well as maintaining the 
negotiations with the MDHC. However, The Guardian did not publish Bill 
Morris’ reply in full (just a short letter). The complete reply had to be published 
in the TGWU’s own publication, The Record, in the February/March 1997 issue. 
There, the position of the TGWU was made clear: 
“The union’s biennial delegate conference has made it clear that while we 
operate under draconian Tory legislation designed to weaken legitimate trade 
union activity, the leadership of the union has an obligation to preserve the 
fabric of the T&G and not engage in activities for which it has no immunity or 
legal protection” (Bill Morris, The Record, February/March 1997). 
In the letter from Bill Morris to The Guardian a crucial issue was pointed 
out: the difficulty in reaching a negotiated end to the dispute. This was not 
presented as an obstacle because of the MDHC, but rather because of the 
dockworkers’ demands. In Morris’ words: “One of the difficulties in resolving 
this dispute, which John Pilger seems to ignore, is the demand by the Shop 
                                                     
30  Although there is evidence that the contributions lacked regularity. In the Docks and 
Waterways National Committee on Thursday 25 July 1996, it was reported that the union had not 
contributed for 10 weeks (TGWU Docks and Waterways National Committee Minutes, 25 July 
1996 Circular No. 961372). 
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Stewards that eighty men, who never worked for the company in the first place, 
must be employed by Mersey Docks and Harbour Company as part of the 
settlement” (letter sent for publication to The Guardian’s Editor from Bill 
Morris, 29 November 1996). What Bill Morris did not mention was that those 
eighty dockers were also members of the TGWU. The way in which the young 
Torside dockers were forgotten by the TGWU appears as a barrier to efforts to 
find a negotiated settlement that was acceptable to all TGWU members. 
 
Third ‘final’ offer – November 1996 
 
Meanwhile, negotiations were taking place between the MDHC and the 
TGWU, including members of the port shop stewards committee, and through 
the machinery at ACAS (Advisory and Conciliation Service) (Dropkin 1996). 
The negotiations were difficult as there was little room for manoeuvre by either 
side. MDHC had grabbed their chance and had followed the strategy of many 
port authorities around the world (Meyer 1999). They would no longer be 
employers of dockworkers; in other words, they would no longer provide 
stevedoring services to vessels. Their business would focus on property 
management and development, a more lucrative sector. MDHC were now 
landlords: stevedoring services would be contracted out and direct employment 
would be limited31 (Dropkin 1996). 
This third offer was no better than the previous one. In fact, little had 
changed (see table 6.4), and, crucially, Torside dockers were for the first time 
fully removed from a negotiated solution. The offer was once again rejected in a 
mass meeting. However, divisions began to appear in regard to future negotiating 
strategies: “a few expressed the view that reinstatement was now unattainable 
and talks should focus on increasing the severance payout beyond the £25,000 
offered in June (which was subsequently withdrawn when ACL [Atlantic 
                                                     
31 In February 2009 I was able to attend meetings between Peel Ports (current owners of the Port 
of Liverpool) and the few remaining dockworkers employed by them and by Coastal Containers. 
The message to them was clear. They could either take statutory redundancy or be re-employed 
by Drake’s. 
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Container Line] left the port). But the strong majority remain committed to fight 
on despite the personal hardship, and know that the company will treat beggars 
without mercy. Ancillary jobs are decidedly unpopular” (Dropkin 1996). 
Table 6.4. A summary of offers made by MDHC up to November 1996 
Offer 1 (October 
1995) 
Offer 2 (January 
1996) 
Offer 3 (November 1996) 
150 jobs to Drake Port 
Services (open for 
former dockers to 
apply) 
Removal of Drake 
Port Services 
Drake Port Services to 
remain in the port 
Establishing a co-
operative of sacked 
dockers (but with no 
exclusive rights) 
40 jobs available from 
the MDHC 
30 jobs available from 
Torside 
41 jobs (all ancillary) 
No jobs available for 
Torside or Nelson 
dockworkers 
£10,000 to those 
dockers with more 
than 15 years of 
service 
£25,000 for 319 
workers 
£1,000 for the 
remaining 
£25,000 for MDHC 
employees with more than 
15 years service 
£1,000 for Nelson 
employees 
  A joint company-union 
approach to the Pension 
Fund Trustees to request 
continuity be restored for 
all former workers in the 
scheme. 
No negotiation Negotiated by Mr 
Bernard Cliff 
(MDHC), Jack 
Adams (TGWU), 
Mike Carden (MPSS) 
Negotiated by Mr Bernard 
Cliff (MDHC), Jack 
Adams (TGWU), Graham 
Stevenson (TGWU) Mike 
Carden (MPSS) 
Voted by public show 
of hands 
Ballot carried out by 
Electoral Reform 
Society 
Voted by public show of 
hands 
 
This offer, its rejection, and the shift of the dockers’ campaign for 
reinstatement towards the international level provided a turning point in the 
relationship between the dockers, the TGWU and the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF). On the side of the company, things were also turning 
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bleak32. The dockers’ mass meeting mandated the shop stewards to write to Bill 
Morris and David Cockroft immediately requesting a meeting with “Morris, ITF 
General Secretary David Cockcroft, Jack Adams, and Docks & Waterways 
National Officer Graham Stevenson, who attended the talks and also has 
international responsibilities within the union. […] Should Bill Morris and David 
Cockcroft agree to meet in front of witnesses, it might narrow the room for each 
to blame the other for the ongoing debacle in which ITF-affiliated dockers 
unions are still being told to refrain from industrial action: Antwerp and Cyprus 
being the most recent examples cited in the mass meeting” (Labournet 1996). By 
now, things were becoming harder to manage both nationally and internationally. 
Whilst this meeting does not appear to have taken place, there was an 
informal meeting just after Christmas 1996 between the TGWU and the ITF, 
which highlights key issues for the dockers and the TGWU’s negotiating 
strategies with the MDHC. Graham Stevenson from the TGWU considered that 
the dockers’ achievement in raising £1 million by Christmas 1996 had made 
them “very arrogant” (9 January Minutes 1997). Even though the dockers were 
not present at this meeting, the ITF appeared to have taken into consideration the 
dockers’ demands and maintained that:  
“In the view of the negotiators from the TGWU, the key issue which still 
remains to be resolved is the creation, either through direct employment or, if 
necessary, through the granting of appropriate contracts to other companies, of 
sufficient decent permanent dockworkers jobs to ensure the continued 
employment in the industry of all workers involved in the dispute who do not 
wish to take advantage of the severance package” (Cockroft and Marges 
10/01/1997).  
If job creation, or reinstatement, was the aim, then the TGWU and the 
dockers may have been closer in their positions that they thought. If the ITF was 
right in the way it understood the TGWU’s position it suggests that the TGWU 
and the dockers were having some serious communication problems. This would 
impact on the 1997 negotiations which will be considered in the latter part of this 
chapter. 
                                                     
32 The leading negotiator from the MDHC Mr Bernard Cliff suffered a car crash in November 
1996, resulting in his death a few days later on 1st December 1996. 
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The British left, the unions and the dockers – December 1996 
 
Meanwhile, many groups within the British left (Socialist Workers’ 
Party, Militant, International Communist Party (ICP), Communist Party of Great 
Britain, etc…) had accepted the open door invitation of the dockers’ meetings. 
The dockers’ leadership was proving quite independent and resilient, whilst at 
the same time allowing others to participate. This proved to be a challenge. From 
many groups within the left, criticism of the dockers’ leadership became more 
frequent. In particular, their perceived ambivalence towards the TGWU was seen 
as a matter to be contested. Their relationship with the TGWU had reached 
breaking point, yet the dockers remained part of the union (albeit a very critical 
part of it). This caused frictions within the left alliances that the dockers had 
been building. 
Firstly, the ICP offered to take over the shop stewards’ leadership as they 
argued the shop stewards had proved to be ineffective: in a leaflet distributed in 
the dockers’ mass meeting, the ICP argued: 
“the fundamental lesson of this experience is that genuine internationalism 
cannot be organised by the existing trade unions. The role of the stewards 
throughout has been to direct that action into bureaucratic channels, effectively 
stifling it and using it not to strengthen the working class, but to build 
relationships with transnational companies” (available from 
http://libcom.org/book/export/html/965). 
This led the dockers’ mass meeting to expel the ICP and ban it from 
attending any further meetings. If there was anything clear throughout the 
dispute, it was the embedded trust the dockers had in their shop stewards. This 
issue had already been brought up by the Socialist Workers’ Party a year earlier: 
“some on the left would much preferred the dockers to have denounced the union 
leaders as bureaucrats and betrayers of the struggle, but this was completely 
foreign to the traditions and methods of the shop stewards. When it was 
necessary to criticise the union leaders the dockers would do so but in a skilful 
way” (Cotterill 1997).  
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This was echoed by two members of the Socialist Workers’ Party, 
Michael Lavalette and Jane Kennedy, lecturers at Liverpool University, who 
were given full and open access by the shop stewards to all their meetings in 
order for them to compile a book on the dispute. The book has been the source of 
heavy criticism by the dockers. It was published quickly (only a year after the 
dispute started), and was seen as a political attempt by the authors to be the first 
to be associated with the dispute. More importantly, the book included a strong 
critique of the strategy of the dockers’ leadership which, it argued, had pursued a 
strategy of international action at the expense of building a rank-and-file 
movement in Britain and presenting a real challenge to the TGWU (Lavalette 
and Kennedy 1996). In the view of many left groupings the dockers should have 
attempted to organise a rank-and-file takeover of the union, rather than working 
within the union structures and procedures. 
However, the relationship between the dockers’ leadership and the union 
leadership was not as ‘nice’ as some within the left were trying to imply: the 
world of the Liverpool dockers’ dispute was not easily dichotomised into 
bureaucracy and rank-and-file unionism. By the end of 1996, rumours were rife 
that the TGWU were going to refuse the use of its buildings in Liverpool to the 
dockers. The move did not materialise until the end of the dispute; if it had done 
so earlier it would have caused deep divisions within the TGWU. The discourse 
within the TGWU was that divisions could have even affected Labour’s electoral 
chances in May 1997. Whilst that was hardly the case, the dockers certainly did 
not want to be blamed for a further five years of Conservatism.  It was precisely 
the prospect of a Labour government that held great expectations both for the 
TGWU leadership and the dockers alike. Surely, a Labour government would not 
allow this situation to continue, considering they would be part owners of the 
MDHC. 
Great expectations – April/May 1997 
  
 The year 1997 was starting to look like the year when a possible 
resolution could develop. The government held “13.9 percent of the issued share 
capital in the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company. The current market value of 
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this stake is approximately £53.4 million” (Waldegrave 21/03/1997). The 
dockers were still hoping that New Labour would feel under pressure to find a 
settlement. There were three main reasons to hope for intervention. Firstly, Tony 
Blair’s father-in-law was from Liverpool and publicly supported the dockers, 
sending T-shirts with slogans of support for the dockers to his grandchildren 
when they moved to Downing Street. Secondly, John Prescott, about to become 
deputy Prime Minister, was a former seafarer and trade unionist and had shown 
interest in 1995 in the dockers’ situation. Finally, the party-union relationship 
could work to their advantage as Bill Morris had, at this stage, a relatively good 
personal and political relationship with Tony Blair. 
It seems the T-shirts did not make a big impression on Blair’s children. 
John Prescott’s inaction was to follow him to the Brit Awards in 1998, when 
‘Chumbawamba’ singer Donbert Nobacon threw a bucket of iced water over him 
in protest at his doing nothing to help the dockers (Ball 05/07/2006). Expecting 
Bill Morris to influence Blair was not on the cards either. David Cockroft 
informed the dockers: 
 “I’ve spoken to Bill Morris about this, and we both think at this stage that your 
best bet of influencing Tony Blair rests with him. In any case, I have a feeling 
that Tony has other things on his mind at the moment!” (Cockroft 20/03/1997) 
The issue was difficult. New Labour had spent the previous years trying 
to remove their links to the allegedly militant trade union past of the 1970s that, 
arguably, had provoked Thatcher’s electoral victory in 1979. Engagement, in any 
form, with the dockers’ dispute would have jeopardised their image, particularly 
when considering the ‘illegality’ of the dispute. Regarding this issue, one of the 
shop stewards reflected on how the illegal status of the dispute was used to the 
TGWU’s advantage, in order to avoid having to act: 
“We've broke the law for two years and four months, no-one's come and 
arrested us have they? When people say ‘you can't do it because it's illegal’, 
well why hasn't anything happened? Right from Day One why didn't they 
sequestrate? Bill Morris was giving us money, he's let us use the office. Why 
haven't they sequestrated? Because they don't want to do it!” (Billy Jenkins, 
http://www.labournet.net/docks2/9807/kilculgp.htm) 
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 The dockers’ expectations were soon removed. The dispute continued. 
The change in government did not bring a change in the negotiating terms. What 
the dockers had really expected was government intervention, at least in the 
negotiations. It was not an eccentric idea, but the logical conclusion from the 
dockers’ standpoint considering that the government was a large shareholder in 
MDHC. Although the new government appeared as far from finding a solution as 
the previous one, negotiations were about to take a new turn. 
 
Labour Supply Organisation – 1997 negotiations 
 
 The dockers’ main aim in their attempts to solve the dispute was to gain 
reinstatement of all sacked dockers, regardless of whoever was the employer 
who dismissed them (whether MDHC, Torside, Coastal Containers or Nelson 
Stevedoring). Negotiations in early 1997 focused on the creation of a Labour 
Supply Organisation (LSO) in the port. These negotiations appeared as a 
response to an idea which had first appeared in the initial offer by MDHC and 
had been an idea mentioned time and time again in mass meetings and shop 
stewards’ discussions. The idea was to provide a source of employment for those 
sacked dockers who wished to remain working in the docks.  
The shop stewards had compiled a proposal for this co-operative in the 
form of a business plan. The TGWU and MDHC decided to use external 
expertise in order to compile a viability report and a business plan. They chose 
KPMG as the external consultants. This antagonised the dockers straight away. 
KPMG had been involved in the sale of Medway Ports, which had ended in a 
large loss to the ex-Medway dockers who held shares, yet it managed to make a 
good profit for MDHC, as chapter two has explored in detail. Additionally, there 
was some crossover between KPMG employees and MDHC senior management. 
KPMG consulted only three members of the TGWU for their reports: Graham 
Stevenson, Jack Adams and David McCall (KPMG 1997). In an Inter-
Departmental Memo from Graham Stevenson to Jack Adams (the leading 
TGWU negotiator throughout the dispute), Stevenson pointed out: 
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“I have today had a call from Jimmy Davies of the Liverpool Shop Stewards 
asking why they have not been invited to the talks on Thursday. Apparently, the 
AGM of the MDHC was held today and Mr Wardell, who chaired the meeting, 
announced that talks were taking place. I intimated to Jimmy Davies that the 
meeting was between ourselves and KPMG and perhaps MDHC have a similar 
commitment. As you know the shop stewards insist on being present at all 
meetings. I am not sure this would be helpful at this juncture, especially since 
the General Secretary is strongly of the view that the final report should be kept 
confidential to senior officers until we have had a chance to discuss it. Such a 
breach of confidence as this announcement could be greatly prejudicial to such a 
step. I inferred that the meeting was to receive an update on KPMG’s work. 
Finally, Jack Dempsey has heard of the meeting and asked via the Regional 
Secretary to be in attendance. I am not sure this is wise in the circumstances, but 
am raising the matter with you for your judgement and decision on the matter” 
(Stevenson, 22 April 1997). 
 
The idea of creating a labour supply company was doomed to fail from 
the start. Even though it had the full backing of both the employer and the union, 
it had failed to bring on board the sacked dockworkers. According to KPMG: 
“We have also held an initial, brief, meeting with representatives of the 
dismissed dockers. However, the meeting, and any further discussion, was 
curtailed when it was appreciated that our terms of reference specifically 
excluded any consideration of the LSO providing stevedores in the container 
and grain terminals in Royal Seaforth Docks” (KPMG 1997, p. 2). 
 Additionally, the possibility of re-employment was increasingly 
becoming a difficult prospect. Liverpool, the port which had been lagging behind 
in bringing in ‘flexible’ working practices since 1989 had now exploited its 
window of opportunity. The PR damage had already occurred and the larger 
financial losses had happened during the first few months of the dispute. It was 
clear among many operators within the port that “they would not consider using 
the services of a new LSO comprising dismissed dockers under any 
circumstances in the foreseeable future” (KPMG 1997, p. 7). Even in the areas of 
the port where re-employment (albeit in a casual fashion) was possible, 
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challenges would be great, particularly in regard to scab labour: “the difficulty of 
mixing staff from a new LSO and existing dockers within the port was seen as 
presenting a significant problem. In order to avoid such problems, some 
operators would wish to segregate the two workforces, at least for a number of 
months once the dispute had been concluded” (KPMG 1997, p. 12). 
The Port was boasting in their Annual Report that “performance too, has 
reached new heights which are putting a smile on the faces of shipowners, 
shippers and hauliers alike. Since reshaping its workforce and injecting largely 
new blood into the container terminal team, the Port has seen productivity levels 
soar by 50 per cent plus in less than 12 months” (MDHC 1997, p. 8-9). The 
compilation of a viability report for a Labour Supply Company failed to produce 
a new proposal on the negotiating table. 
The Liverpool dockers were once again feeling strong in light of their 
international support. They were being highly successful at maintaining an 
expensive international campaign and building an alternative dockers’ network. 
In Britain their chance to influence the TGWU nationally approached. The 
TGWU held its Biennial Delegate Conference (BDC) in Brighton, in July 1997. 
In a lengthy afternoon session on the first day, delegates presented motion after 
motion critical of the TGWU’s leadership role in the Liverpool dockers’ dispute. 
Finally, delegates voted 283-182 against the TGWU leadership’s strategy in the 
dispute, but failed to propose an alternative. 
Speaker after speaker showed their dissatisfaction at Deputy General 
Secretary Jack Adams’ presentation of the Executive view which stated that their 
responsibility was to “preserve the fabric of the Union and to operate within the 
constraints of the law” (TGWU 1997). Adams also emphasised the TGWU’s role 
in negotiating with the employer. However, the BDC’s floor was unimpressed, 
as the result of the vote shows.  
It was clear what the dockers wanted. A motion presented by the docks 
branch 6/605 stated that they wished their Executive to “call upon the 
Government to intervene in the long running Liverpool Docks Dispute in order 
to return the sacked dockworkers to their rightful place of work in the Port of 
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Liverpool” (MPSS 1997) as well as to “commend the sacked Liverpool 
dockworkers for their heroic and inspirational struggle against an unscrupulous 
employer” (MPSS 1997). A further emergency resolution was presented calling 
on the TGWU to put pressure on the ITF to support international action in 
solidarity with the Liverpool dockers. 
Yet the events at this session of the 1997 BDC would not represent a 
turnaround in the union’s strategy in the dockers’ dispute. For Morris, unity was 
a priority over the concerns of the Liverpool dockers even if it meant going 
against the BDC’s decision. This was made easier because the motion was 
sufficiently vague to allow the Executive to continue pursuing the strategy they 
had followed all along. However, although it did not bring any internal changes 
within the TGWU, the debate had been opened nationally. There was increasing 
dissatisfaction from all parts.  
 
Drake’s workforce – summer 1997 
 
A new development occurred in the summer of 1997. So far, Drake’s 
workforce had only appeared in the picture as strikebreakers, but after nearly two 
years of working in the port, they were also growing unhappy at the situation 
they faced. This led some of them to publish their own newsletter33:  
“Here we are, nearly two years after the old workforce walked out of the gate, 
and still we are having to put up with practices such as sixteen hour shifts; odd 
shifts, i.e. 0300 until 0700, with the threat of the sack if workers do not comply. 
All this is on top of the anxiety caused by not knowing what shift one will be 
required to work the following day, and no regular shift pattern. Does the 
management realise that we too have families and home lives? If one cannot 
feel settled and secure then this, inevitably, must have a direct effect on the 
quality and quantity of the work output. 
                                                     
33 Rather than a ‘newsletter’ it was an A4 black and white photocopied sheet, entitled The Dart. I 
do not know how many were published as I have only been able to obtain issue 1 (undated) and 
issue 3 (dated 01/02/98). Due to the nature of these documents, they were obtained by an ex-
dockworker’s friend employed in the MDHC canteen during the dispute. The sheet was 
distributed inside the port. 
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[…] 
The gravity and seriousness of the situation is appreciated by the authors of this 
newsletter and this publication was printed with reluctance, but as the 
employees are not allowed any real representation it can be looked upon as a 
means to display the current feelings of the workforce” (Drakes Workforce 
1997). 
The TGWU was avoiding having to provide union membership to the 
Drake’s workforce. Transport House in Liverpool, the TGWU’s headquarters in 
the city, was the dispute’s headquarters too: it is easy to guess the difficulties it 
would have caused to have also housed Drake’s workers. Yet the TGWU 
continued accepting as members the MDHC strikebreakers (the 43 or so 
dockworkers who continued working in the port during the dispute): 
“Mr. Jack Dempsey of the T.G.W.U. has recently paid us a visit. This was not to 
talk with employees of D.P.D.S. but to talk with the M.D.H.C. workers who 
have managed to held [sic] on to their jobs throughout this dispute. Mr. 
Dempsey was asked by drakes [sic] employees, when would he be able to 
represent the main body of the workforce? His reply was that he will get around 
it in a couple of weeks. It seems that Drakes workers are taking second place 
once again, and we would like to take this opportunity to send a message to the 
management. This message is that everyone is entitled to be a member or not a 
member of a trade union. These words were spoken to us by the operations 
manager on joining D.P.D.S., and rightly so, as he is required to do so by law. 
We can be 99% certain that these words do not reflect the true wishes of the 
management. The majority of the workers are now free to join a trade union and 
will do so at the first opportunity. This is not a return to militancy, but this is 
brought about by the realisation that, in a situation such as ours the need for 
representation is very obvious” (Drakes Workforce 1998). 
It was not until 2001 that two Drake’s workers took the TGWU to an 
industrial tribunal in Liverpool. They had been battling since 1997 to obtain 
union recognition (Herbert 16/06/2001). What this issue highlighted was the 
contradictory manner in which workers’ consciousness develops and takes 
shape. There was a sense of disbelief amongst the dockers regarding Drake’s 
workers’ complaints. They considered them strikebreakers and, as such, not 
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entitled to trade union rights. However, the sacked dockers had other things in 
their mind. 
 
The beginning of the end – how many Christmases can families 
survive in struggle? 
 
Maintaining the campaign for reinstatement was proving increasingly 
difficult, funds were running dry and so was any kind of support from the 
unions. A ‘final’ offer was put on the table, from a fed-up employer and a 
damaged and tired TGWU. The final ‘final offer’ was offered in a very different 
manner from previous initiatives. Negotiation was rather closed and information 
about the offer was sent to dockers individually with personalised letters from 
Trevor Furlong, Chief Executive of the MDHC, advising them that a postal 
ballot had to take place, or the offer would be withdrawn forever. This meant that 
they should either vote yes or lose any chance of a further offer. The offer 
showed minimal differences from the previous one (see table 6.5) adding the 
creation of a possible Labour Supply Organisation. 
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Table 6.5. A comparison of the four offers during the dispute 
Offer 1 
(October 1995) 
Offer 2 
(January 1996) 
Offer 3 
(November 1996) 
Offer 4 (October 
1997) 
150 jobs to 
Drake Port 
Services (open 
for former 
dockers to 
apply) 
Removal of 
Drake Port 
Services 
Drake Port 
Services to 
remain in the port 
 
Establishing a 
co-operative of 
sacked dockers 
(but with no 
exclusive 
rights) 
40 jobs 
available from 
the MDHC 
30 jobs 
available from 
Torside 
41 jobs (all 
ancillary) 
No jobs available 
for Torside or 
Nelson 
dockworkers 
The formation of a 
Labour Supply Unit 
to employ 28 men. 
Torside dockers not 
included and not 
balloted. 
The offer of an 
interview for up to 
41 ancillary jobs 
plus a register for 
future vacancies 
£10,000 to 
those dockers 
with more than 
15 years of 
service 
£25,000 for 319 
workers 
£1,000 for the 
remaining 
£25,000 for 
MDHC 
employees with 
more than 15 
years service 
£1,000 for 
Nelson 
employees 
£28,000 severance 
(inclusive of £3,000 
in regards of a 
temporary 
reinstatement) 
£1,000 for Nelson 
employees 
  A joint company-
union approach to 
the Pension Fund 
Trustees to 
request continuity 
be restored for all 
former workers in 
the scheme. 
The temporary 
reinstatement is to 
ensure continuity of 
employment to 
maintain their 
pension rights, the 
dockers were not 
required to go back 
to work for the 3 
months. 
No negotiation Negotiated by 
Mr Bernard 
Cliff (MDHC), 
Jack Adams 
(TGWU), Mike 
Carden (MPSS) 
Negotiated by Mr 
Bernard Cliff 
(MDHC), Jack 
Adams (TGWU), 
Graham 
Stevenson 
(TGWU) Mike 
Carden (MPSS). 
Negotiated by Mr 
Peter Jones 
(MDHC), Jack 
Adams (TGWU) 
and Bill Morris 
(TGWU) 
Voted by 
public show of 
hands 
Ballot carried 
out by Electoral 
Reform Society 
Voted by public 
show of hands 
Secret Ballot 
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The ballot was designed in a way that it would avoid the dockers’ mass 
meeting. These meetings were usually held on Fridays. The ballot forms were 
received on a Saturday morning and they had to returned by the following 
Wednesday (22 October). This meant that a joint agreement by the dockers 
would be difficult to obtain. This prompted the shop stewards to pass an 
emergency resolution, which went to the heart of union democracy and the 
methods employed by Bill Morris, bypassing the General Executive Council. 
The resolution can be read below: 
Figure 6.3. Emergency resolution 20.10.97/ Region 6 Committee 
Emergency Resolution 20.10.97 
Region Six Committee 
On Saturday 18th October ballot papers, issued by the ERS, were sent to the 
houses of 329 sacked Liverpool dockers. The "ballot" involves an "offer" 
made by Mersey Docks in November 1996. 
This "action" was invoked by our General Secretary without the authority of 
the General Executive Council. Throughout the Liverpool docks dispute the 
General Secretary has consistently stated that the union's policy relating to 
this dispute rests solely with the GEC. Indeed, the GEC decided that no 
actions be taken by either the General Secretary or the F&GP without the 
authority of the GEC. 
Therefore: 
"We call upon this Regional Committee to condemn the action of the 
General Secretary who has clearly failed to obtain the authority of the GEC 
in this matter under Rule 6 (13) and Rule 16 (3). 
Furthermore, that this Region Six Committee call for an emergency meeting 
of the GEC to be called immediately to discuss this action of the General 
Secretary and all other matters relating to the Liverpool Docks Dispute." 
(Resolution 1997) 
 The ballot papers were completed and returned, and most of the dockers 
voted against the offer (see table 6.6). However, around sixty dockers took the 
cash pay-off (Ward 29/10/1997) and the TGWU fully removed its support for the 
dispute. 
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Table 6.6. Results of the final ballot (which only included MDHC and Coastal 
Containers employees) 
Number of ballot papers distributed 329 
Number of duplicate ballot papers 
distributed 
11 
Number of ballot papers returned 316 
Number of invalid ballot papers 
(blank/spoilt/unsigned declaration) 
6 
Total number of valid ballot papers to 
be counted 
310 
  
Participation rate 91% 
  
The question put to the membership 
was as follows: 
DO YOU ACCEPT THE 
COMPANY’S OFFER? 
 
Number voting YES 97   (31% of valid vote) 
Number voting NO 213 (69% of valid vote) 
(Murphy 1997) 
 
Finally, the shop stewards recommended that the dispute should be 
ended. By this point, there was a sense of exhaustion. This was further 
exacerbated by the continuing difficulty in raising £35,000 every week. From the 
end of the summer of 1997, it had been increasingly challenging to constantly 
raise such large amounts of money. This was crucial. The money was not just 
maintaining their campaign for reinstatement; it was also providing a lifeline to 
the dockers and their families. 
The shop stewards’ recommendation that the dispute should be drawn to 
a close was put forward at the dockers’ mass meeting on 27 January 1998. Many 
of the dockers interviewed, particularly the younger MDHC dockers, were 
unhappy with this decision and voted against it. The dispute had started 
supporting the Torside dockers, yet they were receiving nothing from this 
settlement. For the younger MDHC dockers (in their 40s and early 50s) the 
thought of being so far from retirement and not being able to work in the docks 
again was unbearable. The dispute itself had provided many dockers with a new 
lease of life, and the thought of losing the friendship and sense of loyalty 
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developed over the previous 28 months was seen with sadness by many. In a 
sense the dispute had become a way of life, beyond any kind of specific purpose. 
Additionally, one of the main conditions stipulated by both the MDHC 
and the TGWU was that the dockers would cease to use the TGWU’s Liverpool 
office as soon as possible, except to contact members regarding the severance 
payments and wind down their campaign. Importantly, although the dockers 
would still be allowed to carry out these two activities, “the ‘Women of the 
Waterfront’ should not operate from the building at all” (David McNall, T&G 
North West Regional Secretary, letter to Bill Morris dated 29 January 1998). The 
TGWU had managed to remove the Liverpool dockers from its structures and 
buildings. This side of the story ends the history of British dockworkers since the 
Great Dock Strike of 1889. Their legacy however may not be all lost as the 
following chapter shows. 
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Chapter 7. Competing solidarities: the ITF, the TGWU 
and the Liverpool Dockers 
 
This chapter focuses on the international character of the Liverpool 
Dockers’ Dispute. As the previous chapter has shown, the dispute was caused by 
the sacking of 500 Liverpool Dockworkers in September 1995 and it became one 
of the longest and least researched industrial disputes (with few exceptions such 
as Lavalette and Kennedy 1996; Saundry and Turnbull 1996; Davies 1996b; 
Castree 2000; Gentile and Tarrow 2009) in contemporary Britain. What is 
ultimately important about the dispute, however, is not its duration. Rather, what 
the dispute exemplifies is a case of competing visions over trade union politics 
and action, with one dimension of this occurring at the international level. The 
international campaign had two aims. On the one hand, it hoped to put pressure 
on the MDHC via industrial action in other ports. On the other hand, it would 
collect financial assistance for a dispute that was not officially recognised by the 
TGWU.  
This chapter considers the Liverpool dockers’ internationalism. It does so 
by addressing the following questions: what were the factors which prompted the 
need for international action? Also, what were the characteristics of the 
Liverpool dockers’ internationalism?  The chapter follows an analytical 
chronology. Firstly, the analytical framework is defined, outlining the key actors. 
Secondly, the chapter considers how the international campaign took off and 
proposes the idea that, in the dockers’ minds, there was a need for 
internationalism if they were going to be successful. Thirdly, the way in which 
internationalism started to take shape needs to be considered. Two issues became 
evident at this stage: the dockers’ direct communication styles with other dockers 
and the relationship between the dockers and the ITF. Finally, as the campaign 
was taking shape, complications between different understandings of 
international trade union action developed and became bitter. 
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The ITF, the TGWU and the Liverpool Dockers – understanding 
the relationship 
 
Before considering the development of the Liverpool dockers’ 
international campaign, it is important to understand the historical character of 
dockworkers’ internationalism. The ITF was created by dockworkers in 1896 
“born out of the urgent and very practical need for international solidarity when 
port employers and shipowners in northern Europe set out to break a series of 
dockers’ and seamen’s strikes and to crush the unions which had organized 
them”  (Lewis 2003, p. 2). The ITF was to develop as a federation of social 
democratic unions which were not always the majority unions in European ports. 
 
In Europe, trade unions representing dockworkers are divided between 
transport unions and dockworkers’ unions. It is important to bear in mind that the 
labelling of them refers less to political ideology than to the way in which their 
organisations operate. On the one hand, transport unions are particularly strong 
in the ports of Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, although some 
breakaway unions are also in existence. In France, Spain and Sweden the picture 
offered is more complicated. In France, the major union representing 
dockworkers is the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). Although the 
CGT was an ITF affiliate, the dockworkers’ section was not. This comes from 
deep historical divisions and the role of the ITF during the Marseilles dock strike 
at the height of the Cold War. In Spain, La Coordinadora is the main 
dockworkers’ union, with representation of around 80% of dockworkers, but it 
shares its space with Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) and Comisiones 
Obreras (CCOO), both ITF affiliates. Spain has had a history of inter-union 
rivalry on the docks throughout the twentieth century (particularly during the 
1930s and then, after the 1970s). In Sweden, the space is shared by the Swedish 
Transport Workers Union (ITF affiliated) and the Swedish Dockworkers Union 
(non-ITF affiliated), a breakaway organisation created in the 1970s. They are 
both very strong in Swedish ports, and a considerable degree of inter-union 
rivalry is present, with certain ideological distinctions.  This was not the first 
time that non-ITF affiliated unions had attempted to create a dockworkers’ 
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international organisation.  In the 1980s, the Spanish dockers’ Coordinadora 
attempted to create a European-wide dockers network (Coll Botella, Pérez 
Martín et al. 1988), which included dockers in Liverpool and Sweden. The 
efforts at that time were short-lived and contacts were lost, only to be reignited 
with the Liverpool dispute. 
In the rest of the world, the divisions the Liverpool dockers encountered 
were not as deep as in Europe. In North America, two main unions represent 
dockworkers. The West Coast of America (including US and Canada) is 
represented by the ILWU (International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s 
Union). The ILA (International Longshoremen’s Association), on the East Coast 
(which also represents dockers in the US and Canada) has a rank-and-file rival in 
Montreal, Quebec. These two unions had originally been one organisation which 
split during the 1930s and “by the early 1950s, then, both longshore unions had 
been expelled from their respective labor federations: the ILWU for following 
the Communist Party; the ILA for collaborating with the shipowners. It would be 
difficult to imagine a sharper political contrast, particularly within the same 
industry, or one that more clearly demonstrates there is no necessary connection 
between the structural characteristics of certain industries and the political 
orientations of their workers” (Kimeldorf 1992, p. 15). Besides clear ideological 
differences, they also differ in the way they engage in trade union action and 
politics. While the ILWU is usually considered a more militant union, the ILA 
appears as a union slower to react (Erem and Durrenberger 2008). Partly, the 
difference lies in the way the employment relationship works in American ports. 
On the East Coast, the relationship between the ILA and employers is considered 
to be close (Erem and Durrenberger 2008). Crucially, the Liverpool dockers 
managed to obtain support sooner from the ILA than from the ILWU. This could 
be attributed to a number of reasons. Liverpool’s trade routes are primarily with 
Ireland and the East Coast of America. Many American dockworkers in the 
northern US ports, within the east coast, are of Irish descent34, as are many 
Liverpool dockers. Gaining support from the ILWU, which has a far more 
ethnically diverse membership, involved persuading sceptics of the anti-racist 
                                                     
34 Although some Liverpool dockers are keen to emphasise their Irishness, it is unclear to what 
extent this played a significant role in achieving the support of the ILA. 
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credentials of the Liverpool dockers35, since the lack of ethnic diversity within 
their ranks caused suspicion amongst the ILWU rank-and-file.  
Understanding the special relationship between the ITF and maritime and 
dockworkers is crucial to this case. The reason why such a relationship is 
‘special’ is due to the differences between the ITF and other international 
federations. Generally, international trade union federations are removed from 
the daily concerns of the workplace, as they tend to operate at a more remote 
level. The ITF operates very differently in ports. It has a large group of Port 
Inspectors, paid for by local unions, but employed by the ITF. Their role is to 
ensure that work conditions in vessels are within established agreements between 
the ITF and the ship owners. In order to achieve this, port inspectors liaise 
regularly with port workers, as they are usually the ones who have first hand 
access to the inside of a vessel. Therefore, the ITF maintains a closer relationship 
with port workers in their workplace than other international trade union 
federations.  
Port Inspectors are crucial to the international activities that the ITF may 
be involved in. They were central in initiating an unprecedented move from 
within the ITF to support the Liverpool dockers at the port inspectors’ autumn 
1995 meeting. They knew that the ITF was organised in a way which meant the 
Liverpool dockers would not have had direct access, but they felt that they could 
force something from within by using other ITF structures, those of the port 
inspectors. The ITF is organised around affiliated unions. This means that the 
ITF works under the instructions given by their affiliates, in reality, the 
leadership of their affiliates. Under normal circumstances, the ITF would have 
been asked to engage in solidarity action by the national leadership of the 
TGWU, and then the ITF would send a request to all their other affiliates to do 
so. The circumstances here were very different; the TGWU had not asked the 
ITF to do anything.  
 
 
                                                     
35 The dockers and their supporters emphasised the Liverpool dockers’ solidarity actions with 
South Africa, when, in the 1980s, they regularly boycotted South African ships as an anti-
apartheid protest. 
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The need for internationalism 
 
The first international action by the Liverpool dockers as part of their 
campaign for reinstatement can be traced back to December 1995. The decision 
to extend their campaign internationally was based upon two crucial aspects of 
their struggle. Firstly, the dockers already had some international connections 
and experience of international action, as it has been outlined. Secondly, the 
dispute was quickly becoming the one, the dispute that would determine their 
future as dockworkers in the Port of Liverpool. What propelled Liverpool 
dockworkers into the international arena, were the characteristics of their own 
local struggle. There appeared to be confidence during the first ninety days of the 
dispute. This emanated from a generalised feeling that we have been here 
before.  Long-running disputes in the Port of Liverpool had not been a frequent 
occurrence, but they were not a new event either, as previous chapters have 
shown. In fact, considering that most of the dockworkers working in the Port in 
1995 (with the exception of the Torside dockers) had started employment 
between the mid-1960s and 1972, they had strong memories of two previous 
bitter disputes – the 1967 strike (in relation to Devlin’s recommendations) and 
the 1989 strike (during the abolition of the NDLS) which had lasted 6 weeks in 
Liverpool. 36 
Six weeks became the magic number and the realisation that this was a 
different dispute hit the dockers clearly by November 1995. From late October, 
the Port had managed to work with a certain degree of normality; the picket line 
outside Seaforth Container Terminal was not really affecting MDHC’s daily 
business37. The dockers realised this lack of impact and although the picket line 
was to be continued for many other reasons, such as ensuring that the men were 
kept in solidarity by being involved in the everyday struggle, they had to re-think 
their overall strategy. This prompted them into thinking how to stop work in the 
Port. As their picket line was unable to achieve that, they had to try and stop 
work on vessels loaded in Liverpool but going elsewhere in the world. 
                                                     
36 In fact, they had lasted longer in Liverpool than anywhere else in the country and the outcomes 
had maintained the union’s influence in the port. 
37 Although it was affecting MDHC’s share prices. 
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The need for internationalism grew from the stark realisation that the way 
in which dockworkers in Liverpool had fought previous struggles was no longer 
going to be effective. The world in which they operated had changed radically. 
In 1967 and 1989, they were not alone and they were not just fighting their 
employer. Their struggle was not localised, but rather part of the struggle of 
many other British dockers against both their employers and the regulatory (or 
deregulatory) changes initiated by the government. This time it was just them 
and the employer and they were only a few. It was in this sense, that shop 
stewards’ chairman Jimmy Nolan, recollecting his previous international 
experience, launched the idea of an international initiative in a pub conversation 
amongst the shop stewards.  
Nolan’s idea got the ball rolling. The dockworkers already had contacts, 
and the support groups that had started to be formed in Britain, particularly the 
Merseyside support group and some of the initiators of the London support 
groups, had contacts in the international Trotskyist movement. The international 
campaign was based upon three pillars38 : the dormant international contacts 
amongst dockworkers, the international Trotskyist movement and the Liverpool 
dockworkers themselves creating ‘flying pickets’. At the same time, a fourth 
factor started to become prominent, the use of the Internet. At this stage the 
coordination of these four factors was not necessarily a coherent strategy, but 
rather the attempt to utilise everything available. In fact, it was the need for 
internationalism that led to the pursuing of all these four paths, rather than a 
strategy which attempted to make them work together. This was to become a 
double-edged sword for the dockers, as their international scope would be 
increased beyond any possible previous projections, yet their strategy would 
suffer from some unintended contradictions. In a sense, what was to develop 
highlighted the limited extent to which this coordination was feasible. 
Surprisingly perhaps, the first international action did not come from 
existing international contacts in Europe or from Trotskyist networks. Instead the 
ILA in the US and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) were the quickest to 
react. Labournet reported on 20 November how MDHC’s main customer, the 
                                                     
38 It is important to note that the ITF had not been brought in at this stage, and it had shown 
minimal interest in the situation. 
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Atlantic Container Line (ACL) was re routing its flagship Atlantic Conveyor 
after action by the ILA in the US (Labournet 20/11/1995). Meanwhile, 
Australian dockworkers also reacted to the call for solidarity, and in December 
1995 the Liverpool dockers received a fax from dockers in Sydney stating that 
they would hold the ship in the port for at least 24 hours (Coomber and Donovan 
December 1995). 
So far, faxing was proving a useful method for communicating with other 
dockworkers around the world, and some results were being delivered, including 
both industrial action and financial help. Nolan’s idea was starting to provide the 
dockworkers with a much needed boost to their campaign and more importantly, 
it was bringing pressure on the MDHC. But the Liverpool dockers had to step up 
the international campaign if their initiative was to be effective. It was becoming 
clear that, although the dockers believed that international solidarity action was 
possible, it was not going to be easily achieved. Sending a fax was never going 
to be as powerful as going there. This initiated a strategy based around a 
combination of communications and methods – which included the use of fax, 
the internet, telephone and the production of their own newspaper, the Dockers 
Charter. As the campaign developed, it became clearer how these different types 
of communications and methods were going to enhance each other. 
 
The Flying Pickets 
  
It was within these multi-faceted communications that the idea of ‘flying 
pickets’ developed. Britain was not the only place suffering from anti-trade 
union laws and therefore secondary action was going to be difficult to achieve in 
other countries as well. A fax was not going to convince sufficient numbers of 
workers to engage in such action. This meant that if the Liverpool dockers 
wanted other dockers to engage in solidarity they had to go there and explain 
their situation. The east coast of the United States was a great place to start. 
There were many reasons for this. Firstly, the Port of Liverpool’s main trade 
routes were with Ireland and the east coast of the US. Secondly, the US dockers’ 
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unions, particularly the ILA, had already expressed an interest in the situation. 
Finally, by this stage, one of Liverpool’s main shipping lines, ACL, was the only 
shipping line reacting to the pressure of the dockers’ dispute. ACL’s route 
followed the east coast. 
Three Liverpool dockers brought their picket line to other ports. The idea 
was to get around many of the legal problems associated with secondary action. 
Therefore, the Liverpool dockers would set up a picket line and other 
dockworkers could then choose not to cross it due to issues independent of 
secondary action, such as Health & Safety or individual conscience. On Friday 
15 December 1995, three Liverpool dockers set up a picket line in the Port of 
Baltimore as the ACL vessel was arriving there. This was an important date and 
event, as it provided the Liverpool dockers with renewed strength, and, most 
crucially, it meant that the turn in their strategy had been effective, at least for 
the time being. 
For the next few days, these three dockers developed a very credible type 
of international action. They followed the ACL vessel port by port. By Monday, 
they were in Newark, New Jersey, having spent the weekend in Norfolk, 
Virginia. The pressure on the MDHC was no longer just outside its own gates. 
The action led to “ACL offer[ing] to make a statement that the Mersey Docks & 
Harbour Company (MDHC) should sit down with the TGWU in an attempt to 
find an immediate solution to the problem and, if it is not settled by 15 January 
1996, the ACL would switch to discharging and loading its vessels in another 
UK port” (Morton December 1995).  
The New Year was going to be crucial for the way in which the dockers’ 
internationalism would be shaped. In fact, it was rapidly successful as ACL 
pulled out of the Port (albeit temporarily for six weeks) in January 1996. Losing 
their main transatlantic customer put serious pressure on the MDHC. Throughout 
December 1995 and January 1996, Lloyds’ List published almost daily news 
stories related to the dispute, increasing the sense that the dispute was a concern 
for the shipping industry. This in turn had a direct effect on profits and it led 
MDHC to announce that further job cuts could become inevitable. 
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The ITF inevitably became aware of the dispute at an early date. But it 
was not until January 1996 that the Federation began to show an interest in the 
situation. The ITF Inspectors pressured the ITF to be proactive about the 
Liverpool dockers. This was supplemented by the pressure that some affiliates 
were placing on the ITF, as they were receiving updates from the Liverpool shop 
stewards but there was no mention of extending the dispute via official means. In 
fact, according to a circular to all its dock workers’ affiliates dated 16 January 
1996, Marges39 pointed out that “The ITF Executive Board at its meeting in 
October 1995 expressed sympathy for the aims of the strikers, namely avoiding 
casualisation of work in the port of Liverpool” (16/01/1996). The circular was 
primarily aimed at informing affiliate unions of the ways in which they could 
support the hardship fund set by the Liverpool dockers. However, it caused 
friction with the TGWU’s General Secretary. Marges reported in an email to 
Cockroft (ITF’s General Secretary) that: 
“Today, Tuesday, I handled a phone call which was originally for you. It was 
Bill Morris who wanted to discuss my circular to all dockers and seafarers’ 
affiliates. The draft for this circular you and I discussed before we left office on 
Friday. He told me that T&G did not founded [sic] the Hardship Fund. He also 
wished to refer to the established practice that only union officials communicate 
about matters of support. He was worried about the direct contacts we had/have 
with the shop stewards and other people in Liverpool. He also suggested an 
amendment which I asked him not to include to avoid any misunderstanding 
about their (non)involvement in this kind of circulars and our requests to 
affiliates. I explained the situation and gave him some background information 
about my involvement and experience in the past with Miners’, Seafarers’, and 
Dockers’ strikes in the UK. At the end he was satisfied” (Marges 23/01/1996). 
The dynamics that were to unfold over the following months were 
already taking shape at this early stage. The ILA had already initiated a strong 
involvement with the Liverpool dockers. The ILWU followed quickly. Jack 
Heyman was the ITF Port Inspector in the Port of San Francisco and a member 
of the ILWU. The ILWU were a fairly new ITF affiliate, but quite a powerful 
one. Heyman took an early interest in the situation in Liverpool and he travelled 
                                                     
39 Kees Marges was at the time the ITF’s Dockers Section Secretary. 
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there in January as an individual, rather than an ITF representative. His role 
would become increasingly important as the relationship between the Liverpool 
dockers and the ITF developed40.  
The struggle in Liverpool was not unique. The situation had many local 
specificities but the threat, and the reality, the dockers were facing were well 
known elsewhere. Casualisation and hostility towards unionised port workers 
were being felt by workers in many other ports in the world.  Meanwhile, 
Liverpool’s international campaign was becoming increasingly successful at 
putting pressure on MDHC. In February 1996, MDHC threatened the ILA with 
legal action for their role in boycotting ACL (Labournet February 1996). It was 
in light of this success that the dockers tried to ensure their international strength 
was brought home. 
 
The first International Dockers’ Conference 
 
The first International Dockers’ Conference organised by the Liverpool 
dockers took place at Liverpool City Council in February 1996. The conference 
was funded by the 47 ‘victimised’ Liverpool Labour ex-Councillors (from the 
Militant Tendency) who donated £20,000 from their defence fund. (Labournet 
February 1996). The dockers’ conference was significant on at least two counts. 
It managed to secure representation from over 20 different countries (Aitkenhead 
23/02/1996) and to obtain a considerable amount of media interest. Furthermore, 
it also aimed to have an internal impact. It was bringing ‘home’ their 
international strength. This was crucial both for the dockworkers and MDHC. 
For the dockworkers, it meant that they could all experience internationalism. 
For MDHC, it showed the possible international strength of the dockers. 
By this stage, the ITF was (at least in their discourse) supportive of the 
dockers’ efforts, although the ITF’s archive on the Liverpool dispute contains no 
                                                     
40 Heyman became instrumental in mobilising the West Coast dockers. He also became one of 
the most outspoken critics of ITF’s ambivalent reactions to the Liverpool situation. 
194 
 
information about this dockers’ conference41. The absence of ITF officials at the 
international conference gave rise to speculation that they had been discouraged 
from attending, though there is no evidence to support this. Many representatives 
of ITF affiliated unions attended, yet neither the ITF nor the TGWU gave official 
support to the event. The show of strength by the dockers was the first 
international challenge they were presenting to these organisations. The reaction 
of the ITF and the TGWU was to be developed in the following months. 
By July 1996, the ITF had increased their involvement with the dockers’ 
dispute. Following communications between the ITF and the Presidents of both 
the ILA and the ILWU (John Bowers and Brian McWilliams respectively) in 
May 1996, the ITF was being propelled towards taking a more direct stance. By 
June 1996, the matter was no longer in the TGWU’s territory. In fact, the MDHC 
had initiated their threatened legal proceedings against the ILA in the US due to 
their involvement in the boycott of ACL. The ITF had an affiliate to support.  
Meanwhile, in July 1996, representatives from the Liverpool dockers 
were allowed to address the Fair Practices Committee Meeting of the ITF held in 
London between 3 and 5 July. A resolution was passed and sent to all affiliates 
calling for solidarity action: “we urge you to take appropriate action to show 
solidarity with the Liverpool dockers and their families.” (Marges and Dickinson 
11/07/1996). Additionally, financial support was also forthcoming: “The FPC 
delegates demonstrated their support by collecting over £2,000 for the Liverpool 
Dockers’ Hardship Fund and the General Secretary of the ITF, David Cockroft, 
announced that a further contribution would be made from the ITF’s 
International Solidarity Fund, amounting to £5,000” (Marges and Dickinson 
11/07/1996). 
The ITF’s involvement in coordinating solidarity action during this 
period should not be underestimated. In fact, the ITF was instrumental in 
arranging a crucial meeting with the BTB (Belgische TransportbeidersBond, the 
Belgian transport workers’ union). ACL had decided to return to Liverpool, as 
another container line, CAST, were taking their business. Overall, this prompted 
                                                     
41 This point illustrates how at this stage the ITF were not actually unsupportive of the dockers’ 
international efforts, but ignorant of them. Later sections of their archives contain a wealth of 
material, even when they had withdrawn their support. 
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a confidential letter from Mark Dickinson to Fons Geeraets (President of the 
BTB), which state: 
“From Jimmy [Nolan]’s fax you will see that at this stage they only want to 
meet and discuss with local port representatives in Zeebrugge about CAST but 
in the end I expect they will be hoping that the BTB will assist them in 
organising protests and demonstrations in solidarity/sympathy with the 
Liverpool dockers. I hope this will be possible. The Merseyside Port Shop 
Stewards will doubtless also want similar assistance in Antwerp in respect of 
ACL” (Dickinson 24/07/1996). 
 The coordination of solidarity action highlighted some of the difficulties 
for the ITF in dealing with this type of situation. As mentioned before, the ITF 
operated strictly under instructions from its affiliates. The model was no longer 
suited to the situation at hand. For the dockers, the point of international action 
was to overcome the hostile national political framework represented by anti-
trade union legislation. Hence, whilst the TGWU may have been unable to 
support the dockers officially, the ITF should then be able to step in. Yet that 
was not the case. In fact, the TGWU leadership were concerned that the 
framework upon which the ITF was organised was being eroded by having direct 
contacts between shop stewards and other affiliates. This was seen as a challenge 
to the TGWU leadership. Furthermore, since the ITF were part of this 
communication network (between the shop stewards and other affiliates) they 
were also in effect challenging the TGWU leadership.  
Meanwhile, it was not just the TGWU’s leadership that felt their 
authority was being eroded in the international arena. The ITF were becoming 
wary of the Liverpool dockers’ international activities, particularly since the 
dockers were not just engaging with ITF affiliates using the ITF as an 
intermediary, as in they did in Belgium. A letter from Cockroft to Morris showed 
that the ITF’s patience had been exhausted by calls from the Liverpool dockers 
to create an International Steering Committee: 
“The organisation of international solidarity by the ITF for the dispute has, 
however, been seriously hampered by separate contacts undertaken by 
representatives of the shop stewards with non-ITF affiliated bodies, several of 
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which are either unrepresentative breakaway factions from the relevant ITF 
transport workers’ union, or political groups with little or no real trade union 
function. Although we have made clear that these contacts are not made via the 
ITF and are not officially supported by the TGWU, they do cause confusion and 
could, potentially, have a negative impact on the TGWU’s international 
reputation. The establishment of a semi permanent ‘international steering 
committee’ in parallel with the ITF will, of course, not make things any easier” 
(Cockroft 01/08/1996). 
Thus, the ITF requested Morris to keep a tighter rein on his members. 
The tables had turned. Throughout the first half of 1996, Morris was attempting 
to keep control of communications between the ITF and its affiliates regarding 
the Liverpool dispute. By the summer of 1996, it was the ITF asking the TGWU 
to control its own members. At the end of August, Morris received a further 
letter from Cockroft (28/08/1996), this time with concrete examples drawn from 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and Germany. The main problems reported 
had been the contacts that the Liverpool dockers had made with left-wing 
political parties and social movements (such as squatters in the Netherlands) as 
well as breakaway unions (such as in Sweden). At this point the ITF was 
seriously concerned at the Liverpool dockers’ reactivation of certain European 
unions, many of them involved in episodes of inter-union rivalry in their 
respective ports with ITF-affiliates. 
 
Second International Dockers’ Conference 
 
A second International Dockers’ Conference was organised from 31 
August to 1 September 1996. There was a sense that international support was 
proving the best strategy to put pressure on the MDHC. If what had happened so 
far was a taste of what was to come, the second offer the dockers received (in 
January 1996) was far better than the first (October 1995) 42 . Hence, the 
international actions that started in December 1995 seemed to be successful. This 
                                                     
42 Although neither of the two offers offered their reinstatement. This was a problem for the 
dockers as they had agreed that their jobs were not for sale. 
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time, however, they also wanted some media spotlight in Britain. The media had 
remained fairly silent over the past few months. The Conference was to provide 
the background for a BBC TV documentary directed by Ken Loach, ‘The 
Flickering Flame’,  which was  broadcast at prime time (Labournet 1996). 
The conference’s timing was everything. Negotiations were forthcoming 
with the MDHC and the honeymoon period between the dockers and the unions 
seemed to be cooling down. Once again, delegates from all over the world, but 
primarily from Australia, Canada, US, Denmark, Sweden and Spain, 
congregated in Liverpool to pledge their support, both financial and in 
boycotting vessels loaded in Liverpool. The fact that this international support 
was brought home and broadcast was designed to offer a demonstration of 
strength by the dockers, both towards the MDHC but also towards the 500 
sacked dockers, in order to ensure they knew they were not alone.  
Nevertheless, not everyone was impressed. Some ITF-controlled 
European ports “have pulled out of this weekend’s conference in Liverpool at the 
last minute after receiving faxes from ITF General Secretary David Cockroft. 
Apparently Cockroft is upset that direct links, international picketing, 
occupations of gantry cranes in Montreal etc. are taking place without his 
advance knowledge” (Labournet 1996). This brought back some painful 
memories to some ITF controlled European ports, and particularly to the Dutch 
ITF Dockers’ Secretary, Marges. During the 1989 strike in Britain, when the 
National Dock Labour Scheme was abolished, many British dockers (including 
Liverpool dockers) crossed the channel to obtain support in Antwerp, Rotterdam, 
etc (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992). This created discontent within some union 
officials in those ports, one of them being Marges, in the port of Rotterdam. At 
the time Marges had been the docks secretary of the FNV, the Dutch Transport 
Workers Federation. The current situation in 1996 reminded the ITF of what the 
FNV called in 1989 “strike tourism” (Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 156). 
The problem was that “the ITF leadership is deeply hostile to the style of 
independent international rank and file direct contacts pursued by the Liverpool 
dockers” (Labournet 1996). ITF affiliate FNV had already made it clear in 1989 
that: 
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“In order to ensure that so-called strike tourism does not show its face again (see 
the experiences with the [British] miners’ and seamen’s strike), and that, in this 
manner uncoordinated actions take place that could bring both the T&GWU and 
the continental unions in legal difficulties, the T&GWU will, in a letter to all… 
shop stewards… urgently request that no visits to European ports be carried out 
on their own initiatives. If and when possible, an attempt will be made to enable 
such visits to take place in an organised manner” (FNV union bulletin, 1989, 
quoted in Turnbull, Woolfson et al. 1992, p. 156). 
Meanwhile, the ITF quickly responded to the critics by sending out a 
circular, signed by Cockroft, to all its affiliates on 10 September 1996. It 
reported on a resolution agreed by the European Dockers Regional Committee of 
the ITF on 5 September. The resolution and, in particular, Cockroft’s circular 
were carefully worded: 
“After a detailed discussion, the meeting adopted a resolution [...] expressing 
full support for the efforts of the TGWU to find a negotiated settlement to the 
dispute and pledging full support of all European dockworkers’ unions to this 
end. I am sure that these sentiments will be echoed by all ITF affiliates, 
including those in other industries who have had occasion to appreciate the long 
tradition of international solidarity shown by Liverpool dockworkers over the 
years” (Cockroft 10/11/1996).  
This resolution emphasised the appropriate means and channels for the 
communication of international solidarity, where union rules and governing 
bodies were to be placed above all else. It also tried to ensure that there were no 
further reasons for friction between the TGWU and the ITF. So far, the ITF had 
been relatively successful at juggling a very difficult situation. On the one hand, 
their affiliate with a direct relationship with the dispute (the TGWU) was not 
asking them to do anything. On the other hand, other affiliates (some of them 
quite powerful within the ITF) were putting increasing pressure on the ITF to 
coordinate solidarity action. The ITF had to be seen to be doing something in 
front of affiliates such as MUA, ILA and ILWU, but it could not be seen to go 
against another affiliate, the TGWU. Such juggling was not easy. This second 
conference provided the ITF with an opportunity to drop one of the balls it was 
juggling, the Liverpool dockers. The opportunity was provided by the dockers’ 
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proposal of creating an ‘international steering committee’, composed of those 
who had shown their support with the Liverpool dockers internationally. This 
gave the ITF a reason to cool down their support. 
 
The European withdrawal 
 
 Some European ITF affiliates were growing increasingly concerned 
about the ‘international steering committee’. This needs to be understood within 
the historical division in the trade unions of many European ports, which has 
been explained earlier. However, the initial point of friction between the 
Liverpool dockers and the ITF affiliated dockers’ unions was one of 
communication. Some union officials felt uneasy being contacted directly, rather 
than via the channels set up by the ITF. The following excerpt from an email 
from Marges exemplifies some of the issues: 
“Bob Baete rang me. I tried to ring him several times, including this morning. 
Last Sunday night (!) he was contacted by the shop stewards at home! Their 
request was the same as it was in their letter of which Bob sent us a copy. They 
wanted to visit him. Bob agreed at the end and met them on Monday night. 
They arrived together with a BBC crew (4) and a group of dock workers from 
different countries including Quebec (!), Gothenburg and France, many of them 
member of non-affiliates. The Canadian was very critical about the ITF which 
Bob did not accept. A typical action of these kind of people. They haven’t 
changed since I left Rotterdam. Bob accused the Liverpool shop stewards for 
starting the action wrong footed without contacting T&G and he also accused 
them for not informing the ITF in the first half year, while they wanted support 
from the ITF at the same time. Etc. etc. 
But at the end Bob promised them to try to delay an ACL ship if a ship of that 
company would be in Antwerp before or during the Liverpool conference 
celebrating the one year action. Bob received my fax advising him to stick with 
the Euro Dockers resolution before he met them but he read it after their 
meeting. He already made the appointment on Sunday. After some discussion I 
advised Bob to contact T&G, Bill Morris or Graham Stevenson, to ask T&G’s 
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opinion about a delay action in Antwerp. If it is also supportive for their 
position and they agree Bob’s problem is solved. If they are against an action in 
Antwerp Bob intends to cancel the intended delay and will stick to the Euro 
resolution” (Marges 25/09/1996). 
 
In Europe such a mixture of syndicalist practices and embeddedness in an 
ITF affiliated union was not easy to understand. Therefore, when a delegation of 
dockers travelled to Antwerp on 23 September 1996 (nearly a year after the 
dispute had started), Baete, the National Secretary of Ports of the Belgian trade 
union BTB, promised the dockers solidarity action. However, his promise went 
against what the European Regional Dockers’ Meeting of the ITF had agreed on 
5 September 1996. In an apologetic fax sent to Morris on 4 October 1996, Baete 
stressed that he would stand by the agreement that “we only undertake actions on 
request of the T&GWU, we have to support as much as possible our affiliate 
T&GWU” (Baete in a fax to Morris, reference BB/MV/N.1341). This raised the 
complex question of who exactly was the TGWU? The dockers on delegation to 
Antwerp were members of the TGWU, and they may have even been members 
of one of the TGWU’s executive or national committees. 
The European withdrawal did not just come from Baete. From the 
Netherlands, the Vervoers Bond FNV (an ITF affiliate union) sent the Liverpool 
shop stewards a letter explaining unequivocally why they would not offer 
financial support: 
“We would like to inform you that at this moment we won’t give any financial 
support to your organization. 
We think it is more advisable to come to a full solution for the Liverpool dispute 
by means of negotiations. 
[…] 
We haven’t yet observed any movement from your side which lead to short term 
negotiations by the TGWU. 
However, we do observe that you are busy with the organization of international 
industrial action such as soon will take place in Le Havre. 
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Finally we want to let you know that we will only reconsider a request for 
financial support when negotiations fail because of the employer” (Waleson 
15/10/1996). 
 
When a relationship breaks down 
 
By October 1996, it was becoming apparent that the relationship between 
the Liverpool dockers and the ITF had broken down. There are several possible 
reasons. Firstly, the ITF could have been feeling not only threatened by attempts 
to build an international movement but also used, in terms of its infrastructure or 
funds. Secondly, the Liverpool dockers’ European counterparts misunderstood 
their motives. The dockers themselves may not necessarily have been aiming to 
build an international movement outside the ITF, but rather to transfer their 
national experience (in terms of the shop stewards’ movement) to the 
international arena – the experience of a rank-and-file movement working 
within and alongside a bureaucratised union, the model they knew best. 
Thirdly, there may have been several agendas (those of the ITF, the TGWU, the 
affiliates, the non-affiliates, political groups) at stake, and perhaps the dockers 
were not always aware of them.  In a sense, all three factors contributed to the 
breakdown. 
It is important to understand politically motivated cultural differences 
here. The Liverpool dockers had a very particular organisational style rooted in 
their own historical experience. The European division, between social 
democratic transport unions and syndicalist-influenced dockers’ unions, was 
rather unfortunate and rather unintelligible for the Liverpool dockers43. And they 
were well aware of the problem:  
                                                     
43  Jimmy Nolan, chairman of the Liverpool shop stewards, was characterised by a French 
anarcho-syndicalist as the only Stalinist with anarcho-syndicalist strategies she had ever met. For 
the Liverpool dockers an ideological stew of Stalinism, Trotskyism and social democracy had 
never presented them with difficulties. They were all united in the way industrial action was 
understood, and this was far closer to anarcho-syndicalism, than to any other ideological brand. 
202 
 
“I just got a phone call from Jim Nolan. He asked me to participate in his 
meeting with John Coombs44. I told him that I was very busy with meetings and 
other urgent activities, but that the most important reason for not accepting his 
invitation was the decision taken by the European Dockers’ meeting limiting 
our support for the Liverpool case to support only for the T&G, if requested by 
the T&G. I explained that decision did not allow me to accept his invitation. If 
he really appreciates my participation he should contact the GS of the ITF, I 
advised him. Not by phone, because of all meetings, but by fax. He again 
referred to the ‘misunderstanding’ about setting up an international committee. 
He repeated that this committee was not set up as a competitor of ITF. He got 
the impression that some of our affiliates thought it was set up as an 
alternative to the ITF. I confirmed that affiliates indeed have that opinion and 
that it was one of the arguments for them to take the decision as it has been 
taken by the European Dockers’ Committee. Shouldn’t we raise this issue 
tonight when we meet John Bowers? Kees” (emphasis added, Marges 
22/10/1996). 
By November, the international steering committee was no longer an 
international version of the port shop stewards’ movement to which the 
Liverpool dockers had been accustomed. It was now organised and appealing to 
particular unions engaged with dockworkers. The first document signed by the 
‘International Dockworkers Committee’ was produced in Le Havre and 
addressed to Morris. It requested: 
“Following a meeting of this International Committee held in Paris in October, 
it is urgent that a small delegation from this International Committee meet with 
you as the General Secretary of the TGWU, to firstly give you the opportunity 
to know who we are, and secondly to receive the position of the TGWU in this 
dramatic struggle” (Minot 20/11/1996). 
Importantly, the message was signed by a group of unions that were not 
ITF affiliates (except for the ILWU). 45  By now, the ITF would have quite 
                                                     
44 John Coombs in representation of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) 
45 The unions signing the message were (in the same order): Dockworkers Union, Le Havre; 
Merseyside Port Shop Stewards, Liverpool; Dockworkers Union, Montreal; Swedish 
Dockworkers Union; Port of Aarhus Dockworkers; CULMV, Genoa; Coordinadora, Tarragona; 
Port of Copenhagen Dockworkers; ILWU, San Francisco; and, Port of Hamburg Dockworkers. 
Many of these unions were groups of rank-and-file dockers within mainstream unions, such as 
the Hamburg dockers. 
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happily left Liverpool behind as a nightmare to be dealt with by the TGWU. The 
ITF’s problem was that there were still some ITF affiliates whose imaginations 
had been captured by Liverpool. It was not just imagination, as some unions 
wanted to see a clearer stance by the ITF. Tom Dufresne, President of the 
Canadian Area of the ILWU, wrote to Cockroft on 20 November 1996 
demanding information: 
“I am writing to inquire as to the status of the ITF’s support for the Merseyside 
Dockworkers in Liverpool. As the International Longshoremen’s and 
Warehousemen’s Union and the ITF have enjoyed a longstanding relationship 
on Canada’s west coast, I am distressed to hear that these longshoremen in 
Liverpool may not be receiving the full support of the ITF. 
When the ITF requested support in its campaign against FOCs46 and support in 
the campaign to organize the cruise ship industry, the longshore unions were 
there to aid the ITF. Could you possibly clarify the current state of the 
relationship between the ITF and the Merseyside Dockers?” (Dufresne 
20/11/1996)  
Cockroft’s response was quick and to the point: 
“I very much regret having to answer a letter like this, because it should be 
obvious that the ITF continues to provide all maximum support for all 
dockworkers’ unions in struggle, and the Liverpool dockers are no exception. I 
know, however, that Jack Heyman from San Francisco has been busily 
spreading information to the contrary around the world, and this has already had 
a very negative impact on how some of our affiliates view us. 
[…] 
The current situation is that the union, in the form of its General Executive 
Council, has called for the reopening, without preconditions, of negotiations 
between the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company and union leaders. The 
company has accepted the invitation to talks and, as far as I know, these are 
proceeding. The shop stewards, on behalf of the members concerned, do not 
                                                     
46  FOC: Flags Of Convenience. This had been a crucial ITF campaign against some states 
providing their flags to vessels that were then able to sail under no regulatory terms. This usually 
affected the conditions in which seafarers worked. The campaign had been very successful for 
the ITF, not just in terms of improving the working conditions of seafarers but also in generating 
revenue from ship owners. 
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appear to be happy about the ‘no pre-conditions’ part of the decision, and they 
are maintaining their original demand for full reinstatement of all dismissed 
dockworkers as a basis for any settlement. 
[…] 
A further complicating factor has been the tendency of some of the shop 
stewards to make contact with minority political factions inside some of our 
European dockworker affiliates, a fact which has on several occasions caused 
embarrassment. This is nothing to do with the ITF Secretariat, but it happens to 
be a simple fact and it is one which our affiliates have indicated to the TGWU 
on a number of occasions” (Cockroft 22/11/1996). 
The really complicating factor was the position in which the ITF was 
being placed. As preparations for a day of action in December 1996 were taking 
place, the ITF had only met with silence from the TGWU. The issue was clear. 
In a fax sent to Cockroft by an ITF senior official on 4 December 1996, the ITF 
were willing to support the day of action but the TGWU had not provided the 
ITF with a clear position. The ITF confirmed their support with a press release 
on 5 December 1996, which had been cleared by Graham Stevenson. The haste 
was unnecessary, as the day of action was moved to 20 January 1997. This 
allowed the TGWU to react. And by 9 December Morris and Cockroft had had a 
chat, and it was made clear that “Bill wants everything connected with the 
dispute cleared with him personally (i.e. clearing it with Graham is not enough)” 
(Cockroft 09/12/1996). 
 
International Day of Action – 20 January 1997 
 
 ITF affiliates, particularly European ones, were worried about the 
Liverpool situation, as the TGWU appeared not to be producing any 
communication in regard to the International Day of Action. After clearing it 
with Morris, the ITF’s leadership sent out some basic points, outlining their 
position: “(1) It is a day of action called by the Liverpool dockers and supported 
by the ITF. (2) The TGWU has not asked us to do this. They have no position on 
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the day of action. (3) We are supporting primarily because we are asked to do so 
by dockers’ unions in other countries. […]” (Cockroft 15/01/1997). This final 
point shows a legitimising emphasis in Cockroft’s position. 
The day of action proved successful in terms of showing solidarity action 
across the world. Yet it increased the TGWU and the ITF’s concerns. There was 
a feeling that the dockers were no longer organising solidarity actions in order to 
pressure MDHC in their negotiations. Rather, they “have moved on and they are 
no longer running an industrial dispute but a political movement” (Morris 1997). 
The extent to which this was a political movement is questionable. However, for 
Morris it needed to be contained for two reasons; firstly, the TGWU was 
publicly supporting the Labour Party for the forthcoming general election and 
they had to be careful how they dealt with the situation. Therefore, “given the 
anti-union laws we are of course unable to state publicly the level of assistance 
we have given to the dockers in the dispute” (Morris 1997). Secondly, Morris 
wanted to see the offers submitted to secret ballots, rather than being voted in 
mass meetings. Once again, different understandings of democratic practices 
collided with each other. 
 
Conference season 
 
Internationalist dockers had a busy two weeks on the other side of the 
Atlantic. A further International Dockers Conference organised around the 
international support network that the Liverpool dockers had activated was held 
in Montreal (Canada) at the end of May. Two weeks later (9-10 June) the ITF’s 
Dockers’ Section held its conference in Miami (US). What these two dockers’ 
conferences represented was a clearer breakthrough towards an international 
bifurcation of dockers’ organisations. Marges pointed out to Cockroft and Flint 
that “my impression I got previously that Liverpool would be set up [sic] an 
alternative for the ITF is becoming true more and more. […]. There is no reason 
for panic of course, but we have to be alert. T&G should be more active to avoid 
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that the Liverpool case could become a starting point for this kind of 
developments” (Marges 1997). 
The Liverpool dockers were once again feeling strong in light of their 
international support. They were highly successful at maintaining an expensive 
international campaign and by now building an international dockers’ network 
that was soon rivalling the ITF. In Britain their chance approached to influence 
the TGWU nationally, in the July 1997 Biennial Delegate Conference, as the 
previous chapter has considered in detail. There was increasing dissatisfaction 
within and outside the TGWU. Even the ITF was starting to be annoyed by the 
TGWU. For example, when Cockroft came back from a trip to Washington DC, 
Marges welcomed him back with an email with the subject line: “Welcome back 
in [sic] the country of Liverpool and Morris” (Marges 1997). The country of 
Liverpool and Morris was moving closer towards ending this situation. Liverpool 
dockers stepped up their international actions, whilst Morris was decided he had 
to put a stop to the situation. It was now clearly damaging both his reputation 
and that of the national TGWU leadership. 
 
Inter-union and intra-union communications 
 
 Some of the major European transport trade unions remained 
uncomfortable with the way in which the development of the Liverpool dockers’ 
campaign was impacting on their own organisations. The way in which 
communication was organised worried them. For instance, the chairman of the 
FNV 47  wrote a letter to two of its members, Ron Wiechels and Harry 
Kappelhoff, who had written to the TGWU about the Liverpool case. The 
problem here was that these two members used the letterhead of the FNV, yet 
they did not follow procedures in doing so. The content of their letter was also at 
odds with the FNV’s official position. The reprimand concluded: 
“the union board considers your working method careless and undemocratic, 
and you have compromised our position in an international context. If members 
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do not agree with the policy and working method of the union, they can discuss 
this within the union in the appropriate places. The union board expects that you 
will behave in accordance with union rules in the future” 48  (Waleson 
16/07/1997). 
It was becoming clear that the way in which internationalism was taking 
shape would have consequences for the way in which national unions operated. 
In fact, it was going to have consequences for the way in which internationalism 
or at least international union communications were to take place. In a meeting 
with senior ITF officials, it became apparent that the way in which the Liverpool 
dockers organised internationally, prompted the ITF to reconsider their internal 
communication strategies. Specifically, the way in which communications within 
the ITF and their affiliates followed a pyramidal model was unsuitable when 
quick action was needed. During the Liverpool dispute, the ITF was often unable 
to react appropriately due to the slowness of their procedures.  
 
International Day of Action – 8 September 1997 
 
The dockers could not afford to waste any time and, as the second 
anniversary of the dispute approached, they organised another international day 
of action. This time, however, there were more hurdles to overcome than before. 
The day of action was originally scheduled for 18 August, but in July it was 
decided to delay it until  8 September (MPSS 1997). The reasons for the change 
were many, including the increasing difficulty the dockers were facing in 
keeping the momentum going, with their unions becoming less sympathetic. The 
ITF was not requested to participate this time around, and it was clear that they 
would not have done so, if they had been asked (Marges 1997). In August 1997, 
Cockroft’s holiday had to be interrupted by an urgent fax from Marges regarding 
the ITF’s position on the International Day of Action. This was prompted by 
many ITF affiliates requesting an official position (Marges 1997). The 
International Day of Action was successful in achieving active participation in 
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 the US West Coast, Sweden, Japan and Australia.
where the Liverpool dockers achieved support from, whether in the shape of 
financial assistance or active
dispute. 
Figure 7.1. World-map of solidarity with the Liverpool Dockers
 
What is worth highlighting from this day of action was the ITF’s 
reaction. It was mentioned in their email bulletin dated 16 Sept
although the day of action was mentioned, Liverpool was significant by its 
absence. Brian McWilliams, President of the ILWU, sent a concerned letter to 
Cockroft: 
“[…] The item omits any reference to the Liverpool dockers when the express 
purpose of the action was to draw attention to their struggle.
The plight of the Liverpool dockers has touched a nerve among the ILWU rank 
and file, generating an enormous feeling of solidarity and concern for their fate. 
Disturbing incidents such as this ad
supporting the Liverpool dockers. It is very difficult for me to advocate and 
defend the ILWU’s commitment to working through the ITF when official 
publications display this level of indifference” 
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 The response illustrates the juggling exercise the ITF was becoming 
involved in. In this case, blaming the TGWU was the appropriate measure: 
“As usual we are caught on the horns of a dilemma in relation to the Liverpool 
dispute, and on this occasion I can only apologise for the editorial decision, 
which was made by me personally, not to include a reference to the Liverpool 
dispute in the recent edition of ‘ITF Info’. 
The TGWU is extremely sensitive to anything we say on the dispute at present, 
and in trying to avoid a reaction from them I clearly erred too far in the other 
direction. Rest assured that it will not happen again” (Cockroft 14/10/1997). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has analysed chronologically the development of the 
Liverpool dockers’ international solidarity campaign. The chapter has 
highlighted interaction of different ways of understanding trade union politics 
and action during the campaign. It is precisely this interaction that led to the 
development of irreconcilable and competing political articulations of solidarity. 
Firstly, the chapter has considered the factors that led to the international 
campaign with the Liverpool dockers. Although the leaderships of the two main 
trade union organisations (TGWU and ITF) believed that the dockers were 
pursuing a politically loaded strategy that was designed to weaken their 
leaderships, this chapter has argued that the pursuing of an international strategy 
arose from need. It developed when the length of the dispute indicated that it was 
different from previous disputes, and, crucially, when the dockers’ local and 
national strategies were almost exhausted. It grew out of a lack of available 
alternative strategies and it gave rise to a series of unintended consequences as 
this chapter has shown. 
This led to specific characteristics in the political articulation of solidarity 
at the international level. Throughout the twenty-five months of the international 
campaign different ideological strands of international trade unionism became 
evident, most notably in terms of a clash between syndicalist practices and large 
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social democratic union organisations. Particular national traditions of trade 
union organisation clashed when they met internationally. Whilst for the 
Liverpool dockers a constant tension between centralised bureaucratisation and 
rank-and-file agitation were two sides of the same coin, for European 
dockworkers these were seen as irreconcilable contradictions. The international 
strategy of the Liverpool dockers was lost in translation. 
Whilst the way in which the campaign was conceptualised and organised 
was directly related to the dockers’ historical experience with international trade 
union action, each new move was decisively shaped by the available options at 
the international level. New tactics were pursued which led to unintended 
consequences. This was because it was not the consequences but the feasibility 
of action that drove decisions. In particular, the development of more permanent 
and organised international dockers’ networks, which led to the creation of the 
International Dockworkers’ Council (IDC) in 2000, needs to be understood in 
this way. The Liverpool dockers showed a high degree of creativity and 
organisational capacity in the development of the international campaign for 
their reinstatement. What this chapter has shown is that strategic choices at the 
international level were made on the basis of the exhaustion of national resources 
and the availability of international ones.  
Finally, the creative use of trade union communication channels by the 
Liverpool dockers highlighted the inability of unions to control their internal 
communications in this case. This was due to two factors: the dockers’ 
determination to keep the control of the dispute within their own organisational 
frameworks (particularly the shop stewards’ committee and the Friday mass 
meetings) and the development of instant communication, in the form of fax and 
email, which happened alongside the dispute (Carter, Clegg et al. 2003), and 
which the dockers and their supporters were particularly quick and able to use to 
their advantage.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
 The Liverpool dockers’ dispute ended in defeat. The 500 sacked dockers 
failed to achieve reinstatement after 28 months of constant campaigning and 
hardship. This thesis has sought to understand the tensions and dynamics that 
shaped the way in which the dispute was conducted. The thesis started by asking 
how workers articulate solidarity in an age of economic restructuring and 
political deregulation. Throughout the preceding chapters it has become clear 
that this is a complex question with an equally complex answer. However, the 
way the answer has been developed has resulted in a core concern taking 
primacy over others: the availability of resources and the willingness and 
capacity to use them. The issue of resources adds complexity to some of the 
answers provided by the literature discussed in chapter one. Whilst that literature 
appears to focus on workers’ organisational capacities in light of their 
effectiveness in securing desirable outcomes, the thesis has, instead, considered 
effectiveness in a different manner. It has done so by arguing that the struggles 
that arise from the development, or non-development, of the political 49 
articulation of solidarity are crucial for understanding workers’ organisational 
capacities. 
 In order to develop the argument, the thesis proposed three analytical 
categories which have provided a framework to help understand the case. The 
three themes which have provided the analytical thread of the thesis are: 
1. the type of economic restructuring and political regulatory processes 
within each national economy, and also within each industry; 
2. trade union strategies; 
3. workplace and community experience and the construction of popular 
historical memories. 
Each chapter has contributed to the development of a theme, although not 
necessarily in a linear manner. For example, chapters two to five provide the 
core analytical tools that place the case study in context. However, their role is 
                                                     
49 The ‘political’ is understood as the arena that goes beyond direct bread and butter issues. 
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not just to contextualise the case study chapters that follow, but to build up the 
key analytical elements that the thesis develops. Therefore, chapter two has 
focused on understanding how the first analytical category illuminates factors 
relevant to the political articulation of solidarity. In agreement with those 
identified as ‘national optimists’ in chapter one (Regini 1992; Fairbrother and 
Yates 2003a; Frege and Kelly 2004), the specific domestic structures in which a 
labour movement finds itself do matter.  These structures include not just the 
national state, but also the specific institutional configuration in which a 
particular industry operates. Within this view, neo-Gramscian approaches such 
as Cox (1987) and Bieler (2006) offer some interesting distinctions on whether a 
particular productive sector is nationally or transnationally organised. Therefore, 
chapter two assesses the economic restructuring, political regulatory and 
deregulatory processes that affected employment in the British port industry.  
It becomes clear within the second chapter that the British port transport 
industry had traditionally been characterised by fragmentation. This 
fragmentation was particularly marked in two crucial areas, ownership of ports 
and employment. British ports, unlike many of their European or US 
counterparts, developed as conglomerates of business interests around shipping, 
cargo handling and warehousing. The state, whether in the form of a national 
state or a municipal authority, was not heavily involved in port matters. This 
meant that the British port transport industry grew in an uncoordinated fashion, 
without a common strategy. Such fragmentation would have consequences for 
the technological transformation that ports were to undergo during the latter part 
of the twentieth century. 
The radical change that the port industry underwent in its move from 
being labour-intensive to becoming capital-intensive after the 1960s appeared to 
take British ports by surprise. The introduction of containerisation, initially on 
the East Coast of the US, meant that ports such as Liverpool had to transform 
themselves quickly. Containerisation forced ports across the globe to utilise 
similar technology, as ships would need to be unloaded in the same way that they 
had been loaded in their port of origin. Up until then, little investment was 
needed to become an employer at the dockside, as most cargo was moved on 
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pallets, which required strength and skill, but no specific expensive technology. 
Technological change required a geographical relocation of ports, as they needed 
to be accessible by ships that were much larger in size. Warehouses no longer 
needed to be dockside, but heavy machinery such as fork-lift trucks and gantries 
did.   
The second and third parts of the chapter chart the regulatory and 
deregulatory political processes that have affected employment in British docks, 
with emphasis on the period when the National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) 
was in operation. This shows the piecemeal approach that successive 
governments took towards the difficulties that the industry faced. Throughout the 
period there was an underlying belief that the key problems during this period 
were due to the militancy of its workers, rather than with the industry itself 
(fragmentation, low investment, etc). Yet, as the chapter argues, fragmentation 
was precisely the largest challenge the industry faced, as demonstrated by the 
inability of successive British governments to develop a coherent and cohesive 
port transport policy. 
Chapters three and five consider the third analytical category proposed – 
which relates to historical experience and memory. Both chapters show, in 
different ways, the importance of historical experience both in the workplace and 
the community. However, the memory of that experience is not one that is 
required to be based on real events, but rather on a constructed experience. What 
is meant by this is that perceived historical identities and culture matter, 
regardless of how close to reality they may be. Two issues appear as crucial 
when considering memory. First, memory is constructed and therefore selective, 
but this inescapable process of selection must be analytically separated from 
myths and inventions. Such selective construction of memory is not necessarily a 
conscious act. For example, in chapter three, I mention how the sacked Liverpool 
dockers have several items of NUDL memorabilia which make reference to 
James Larkin, rather than to James Sexton. The dockers’ reference for that 
period, therefore, is to someone who was not the leader of the NUDL, whilst the 
actual leader appears to have been erased from their history. This selective 
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memory, at least in this case, appears to celebrate and legitimise a radical and 
transgressive leadership as opposed to a pragmatic and anti-heroic one.  
Second, it is important to identify and understand the creation of 
memories of events that never happened, but are still powerful. These invented 
memories become historical experience as new choices are made based upon 
them. As the interviews conducted for this research demonstrated the power of 
such memory cannot be underestimated in its ability to make history. The first 
appendix of this thesis has a larger reflection on the effect of this in research 
interviews. 
Chapter three considers the reasons why Liverpool’s political culture has 
been characterised as exceptional. The chapter focuses on two key aspects of 
Liverpool’s politics that have been characterised as distinctive, the development 
of local politics and the way in which trade union identities have evolved in 
Liverpool. The chapter argues that Liverpool has exceptional characteristics, but 
they are not simply because of idiosyncratic trade union identities or distinct 
local politics, but rather because of when these developments occurred. 
Chronology is critical. The chapter then assesses the dominant explanations 
provided by the literature on Liverpool’s exceptionalism, the role that ethnicity 
and sectarianism have played in the development of political culture, and the role 
of Liverpool’s over-reliance on a maritime economy throughout most of the 
period considered by the chapter. Some of the issues in this latter part of the 
chapter are picked up again in chapter five. 
Chapter four offers a crucial contribution to understanding the choice of 
available trade union strategies, particularly in terms of the tensions which 
contribute to the availability and feasibility of such choices. Although this 
chapter emphasises the second analytical category, trade union strategies, it 
argues that the choices available and the perceived feasibility of each option 
were directly related to the other two analytical categories. The chapter follows 
the organisational dynamics of the Transport and General Workers Union. The 
emphasis has been on the period between 1979 and 1997, a period marked by 
hostile legislation and a succession of governments clearly driven by anti-union 
animosity. The chapter argues that the union followed two strategies during this 
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period. First, under Ron Todd’s leadership, the union attempted to respond to 
these challenges within their existing organisational framework, seeking to 
manage a rapid rate of decline in the union’s key membership areas, such as 
transport. In contrast, Bill Morris’ leadership was far more proactive in an 
attempt to respond to decline. This distinction is crucial, because whilst Ron 
Todd’s leadership had very few options available, Bill Morris’ leadership could 
have pursued several different avenues.   
Todd’s leadership (1985-1992) was marked by a constantly changing and 
deeply hostile political and economic institutional environment, in which it was 
almost impossible to devise any kind of strategy beyond trying to survive day by 
day. Every day could unveil a new attack, whether it was in the form of anti-
trade union legislation, or in closures of largely unionised companies or large 
redundancy offers. During the 1980s unions had few options open to them, as it 
was difficult to ascertain what kind of institutional environment they were in. By 
the early 1990s, things had settled down as the new institutional model had 
stabilised. This meant that unions were able to assess the new environment and 
decide how to operate within that.  The new institutional model was clearly anti-
union, but at least then, they knew what that actually meant.  
As chapter four showed, the avenue chosen by Bill Morris’ leadership 
was one that would reinforce the union as a unitary organisation, limiting any 
searches for autonomy within it. Morris, who was initially elected with full 
support from the Broad Left, initiated a wide range of changes within the TGWU 
designed to deal with the three key challenges the union faced. Firstly, the union 
had a £12 million deficit. Secondly, membership decline throughout the 1980s 
meant that recovering the deficit via membership dues was not an option. 
Thirdly, the union had become organisationally disjointed, showing signs of 
strong factions controlling certain regions and leading to animosity between 
them. Whilst these were the challenges facing Bill Morris’ leadership, it was the 
way in which he dealt with them that highlights particular issues over trade union 
renewal strategies during the 1990s.  
Morris brought in a group of consultants who compiled the ‘Klein 
Report’. The report focused on the state of the TGWU at the time and offered 
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specific solutions, such as the merger of trade groups into industrial sectors, and 
the reduction in regional offices.  The relevance, as chapter four argues, lay 
within the emphasis on centralising the union’s structures, particularly the 
ruthless restructuring of Region 6, which is used in the chapter as an example of 
the changes being implemented. Crucially, however, the changes were not the 
product of internal democratic processes and debates, but rather brought in from 
the outside, through consultants. For many within the TGWU’s membership this 
resembled managerial strategy a bit too much. 
Yet Morris’ choice was not at odds with the TGWU’s historical 
experience: it connected with powerful traditions within the union. The thesis 
sketches the TGWU’s history with a particular emphasis on styles of leadership. 
This leads to the conclusion that both the union structures and the historical 
experience of the TGWU’s leadership have encouraged strong leaders. The 
union has historically given primary importance to keeping a diverse union 
together even if, at times, this has been at the expense of democratic practices 
per se. Such maintenance places a premium on effective leadership. 
Chapter five returns to some of the analytical themes considered in both 
chapters two and three. The chapter focuses on the type of employment relations 
that characterised the Port of Liverpool between 1989 and the start of the 1995-
1998 dispute. The chapter thus provides a direct background to the following 
chapters which deal with the dispute itself. The chapter considers the character of 
the relationships that developed in the port after the abolition of the NDLS. 
Within a different industrial context, it uses Phillips’ (2009) argument on 
workplace conflict as a crucial factor in the origin of an industrial dispute. In the 
case of the port of Liverpool, what Phillips calls “a fundamental breach of trust” 
(2009, p. 172) did not just happen between managers and workers, but, 
importantly, it also occurred between workers, their shop stewards and the union 
officials. The six years preceding the Liverpool dockers’ dispute were marked by 
a constantly deteriorating situation in the relationship between management, the 
union and workers.  
Finally, chapters six and seven are pivotal in understanding the actual 
organisational capacities available to the Liverpool dockers during their 28-
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month dispute. Chapter six focuses on the local dynamics of the dispute, with a 
particular emphasis on the relationship between the Liverpool dockers’ and the 
TGWU’s leadership as well as on the links that the dockers developed outside 
the structures of the union. Chapter seven, on the other hand, has focused on the 
international networks developed during the Liverpool dockers’ campaign for 
reinstatement. The findings analysed in these chapters will now be assessed in 
light of the literature reviewed in chapter one. The complexities of the case mean 
that each interpretation within the literature reviewed can find some aspects 
supportive of its claims. 
From amongst the pessimists Tilly (1995) and Silver (2003), the former’s 
argument that globalisation threatens labour rights would certainly be apt for a 
dispute that started the same year as his controversial article was published. His 
core argument, as quoted in chapter one, is that “globalization threatens 
established rights of labour through its undermining of state capacity to 
guarantee those rights” (Tilly 1995, p. 4).  This claim appears to be vindicated by 
large sections of this thesis. In particular, chapter six, which focuses on the local 
and national dynamics of the dispute, demonstrates how institutional legislative 
changes had a large impact on the kind of action, and the type of support, the 
Liverpool dockers were actually able to achieve. 
Tilly’s case is relevant to the analytical category proposed by this thesis 
which deals with processes of economic restructuring and political regulatory 
and deregulatory processes. Labour rights have been undermined under 
neoliberalism. Whether that process has occurred due to the state itself being 
undermined by globalisation, as Tilly argues, or by government choices, is of 
little relevance to this thesis. What matters is that workers’ organisational 
capacities have been significantly curtailed by a series of economic and political 
changes that have taken place at the global, national and local levels. The 
Liverpool dockers’ dispute is a clear example of industrial conflict within that 
neoliberal environment. This meant that the number of options available to the 
union were limited. The TGWU decided not to support the dispute officially by 
choosing to operate within the framework of diminishing labour rights.  
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The key point, in Tilly’s view, is that the organisational capacities of 
workers have been curtailed because the state is losing power vis-à-vis 
globalisation. Their only recourse, in his view, is that “if workers are to enjoy 
collective rights in the new world order, they will have to invent new strategies 
at the scale of international capital” (1995, p. 21). The dockers, it appears, agreed 
with Tilly. This was precisely the reason why they chose to bring the campaign 
for reinstatement to the international level. Chapter seven follows closely the 
decision the dockers took to set up a picket line on the US East Coast in 
December 1995, just over two months into the dispute. This choice was the 
direct result of the dockers’ realisation that their dispute could not be won if they 
just focused on a local or a national campaign. However, as the chapter 
demonstrates, these international strategies cannot just spring from an 
understanding of how international capital operates. They are also the outcome 
of how resources are configured. 
In the case of the dockers, the three analytical categories proposed by the 
thesis relate to each other in a way that made international action a logical 
choice; but the dockers also had the resources to make that choice a reality. 
Those resources included their own historical experience of internationalism, 
particularly during the 1980s. In their case, international action only appeared as 
an option when they realised that their available resources locally and nationally 
had been exhausted. Yet this presents a crucial challenge. Whilst their 
predicament made international action a choice this did not translate into that 
action being effective. The key issue was how to make international action 
effective when the existing local and national resources were ineffective. At one 
stage this appeared to work. The period leading up to the second offer in January 
1996 and up until March 1996 held the key, as chapter six shows.  
Whilst local and national resources had certainly been exhausted by 
December 1995, the success of international action that same month reactivated 
some of these already exhausted resources.  The initial shock that international 
action created within the maritime and port industry led to an over-inflated 
industry-related media reporting. This was highly beneficial for the dockers’ 
campaign.  
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On a different analytical level from Tilly, Silver’s argument (2003), 
based upon an abstraction of the conflict between capital and labour globally, 
can also help as a framework for analysing the case. Although the Liverpool 
dockers lost their dispute, their struggle did not go away. In fact, the 
international campaign and the networks that developed ensured that the conflict 
between capital and labour in the docks had not ended; it had just been 
temporally fixed in one particular location. Conflict followed the global docks in 
two characteristic ways. The triumph of the MDHC meant that other employers 
around the globe knew that, if they were prepared to accept a long fight, getting 
rid of unionised labour in the port was a possibility, provided local labour laws 
were sufficiently sympathetic to the employer. On the other hand, dockworkers 
had grown confident that if they were to be attacked, there was a network of 
contacts that could be called upon.  
The Liverpool dockers and their supporters realised that although the 
dispute was lost, they had built a strong international network of dockworkers 
that could be mobilised should a similar situation occur again elsewhere. The key 
was to ensure these networks were not lost. The development of international 
networks that arose from the Liverpool campaign led to the creation in 2000 of 
the IDC (International Dockworkers Council). Its slogan was homage to the 
dockers – “You’ll never walk alone again”. It has very quickly become a key 
organisation for international dockers who were outside the orbit of the 
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF). The impact of the Liverpool 
dockers’ campaign has also been felt outside the IDC and within the ITF.  
As chapter seven considers, the ITF’s ambivalence towards the dockers 
demonstrated that rigid international trade union structures were unable to react 
to the new environment adequately. Communication, to which I will return later, 
highlighted the rigid structures of the ITF. Its pyramidal structure, which meant 
that everything needed to be brought to the top before it could return to the 
bottom, meant the federation proved inadequate for the needs of transport 
workers. Rank-and-file workers within the ITF were unable to communicate with 
each other using existing structures. Instead, they would have to raise their own 
issues nationally, as a precondition for them to be considered elsewhere. This 
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time consuming activity proved ineffective when dealing with a situation where 
rapid action was required and where the affiliate was not officially supporting the 
dispute, even though some of their members were involved in it. 
A good example of the way in which the Liverpool dockers left a lasting 
legacy was the Australian waterfront dispute in 1998. In this case, a concentrated 
effort by both the employer (Patrick stevedores) and an anti-union government 
saw Australian unionised dockworkers locked out. What ensued was a very 
different story from that of the Liverpool dockers. The Maritime Union of 
Australia (MUA) rallied behind its members, and, rather than acquiescing in the 
neoliberal legislative environment, it challenged it on its own terrain. It went to 
the High Court, which ultimately saw the dockers’ jobs restored (McConville 
2000; Wiseman 2002). In this case, two factors were key to the outcome. The 
union supported the dispute and the International Transport Workers Federation 
also did so, to the point where it was threatened that its assets in London would 
be sequestrated. Two key issues distinguish the Australian waterfront dispute 
from the Liverpool dockers’ dispute. 
On the one hand, the MUA is a specifically maritime union, representing 
dockers and seafarers in contrast to the TGWU, which is a broad based union. 
This distinction is crucial. Whilst for the MUA an attack on dockers really was 
an attack on all, for the TGWU that was not the case, in fact dockers were one of 
their fast declining membership groups. This raises the question as to what is the 
most effective form of organisation for dockworkers? A broadly based one or a 
sectional one? The evidence is mixed. Whilst a broad base union is able to cope 
better with blows to specific sections of the organisation without necessarily 
damaging the organisation as a whole, it also appears as less willing to risk the 
future of the diverse organisation for a small section of workers. 
On the other hand, Australia’s labour laws were also characterised by a 
narrowing of the scope for lawful strike action, particularly after the election of 
the Howard Liberal-National Coalition in 1996. New legislation was introduced 
which meant that strike action was severely limited by time scales and arbitration 
procedures. Whilst the MUA action may have been in breach of this new 
legislation, the union was very quick to react. They actually brought the 
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employer to the Federal Court on charges of conspiracy and unfair dismissal 
(McConville 2000, p. 399-403). Yet, whilst the dispute can be considered a 
success in comparison with the Liverpool experience, it had its unresolved 
questions: 
“The successive court wins by the union did not automatically result in unionists 
returning to their jobs. Patrick’s, thought to have accumulated annual losses of 
$8 million, had restructured its business in September 1997 and was no longer 
the employer of MUA members inside Patrick’s terminals. The workers were 
technically employed by four distinct labor-hire companies, which, Patrick’s 
was quick to remind the courts, were insolvent. Losses of $56 milion were 
noted. On 7 April, the labor-hire companies had been placed under 
administration of the accounting firm Grant Thorton. The final High Court 
rulings could be seen, in effect, as forcing insolvent companies to continue to 
trade” (McConville 2000, p. 401-402). 
This shows that, as in Liverpool, the specific configurations of the 
conflict between capital and labour need to be understood in light of both macro-
structural factors, such as economic restructuring and political deregulation, as 
well as specific factors such as types of union organisation, strategy and specific 
changes in employment relationships. 
Although the case provides a contribution to both Tilly and Silver’s 
argument, it becomes apparent that their theoretical frameworks offer only 
limited possibilities when analysing the actual organisational capacities of a 
particular group of workers. This is because they both place an overarching 
emphasis on the power of structural forces, which are considered to determine 
workers’ organisational capacities. Whilst this thesis does not claim that 
structural constraints can be evaded, the case has shown that there are different 
ways to act within those constraints. In other words, agency does matter.  
Do the optimists offer a more useful framework? In chapter one, the 
optimists’ arguments were presented across both national trade union renewal 
strategies and internationalism as ways to counteract an increasingly global 
capital. The distinction is important, as in a sense what distinguishes these two 
types of optimists is how much power they think the state still retains. Or in 
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other words, to what extent national institutional arrangements still matter and 
how. The ‘national optimists’ as represented by Fairbrother’s work (Fairbrother 
2000; Fairbrother and Yates 2003a; Fairbrother 2009) have aptly informed the 
second analytical element of the thesis – trade union strategy. At the core of their 
argument is the claim that “national labour movements play a decisive role in 
how organizing is understood and strategically pursued” (Fairbrother and Yates 
2003b, p. 16). This is in line with the argument of the thesis, and particularly 
with the material presented in chapters four and six. The difference, however, is 
that renewal, in Fairbrother’s eyes will occur within an organisational model of 
unionism rather than within a service model. Chapter four, however, shows that 
such a dichotomy is unable to grasp the fact that the TGWU actually followed 
aspects of both models. For example, Bill Morris’ Link-up campaign to attract 
non-unionised workers (such as part-timers, women, ethnic minorities, etc.) falls 
within the organisational model. Yet bringing US consultants in to provide 
advice on how to rebuild the union is clearly an instance of service model 
unionism. 
It becomes difficult to ascertain how much of the literature is based on 
empirical observation and how much of it is based on prescriptive recipes. 
Fairbrother’s model questions whether the TGWU’s combined strategy can be 
considered one of renewal since it does not fall within the organisational model’s 
prescription. Nevertheless, Fairbrother’s research has a sound empirical basis. It 
starts off by considering the national institutional contexts within which unions 
operate and, within that, his work identifies the sectors that may experience such 
renewal. In his argument, the public sector is identified as having all the 
necessary advantages for renewal strategies to take hold, due to a relatively 
healthy level of trade union density within the sector. Whilst this may be the 
case, it leaves the question open as to what is feasible for unions operating in 
other sectors that may be less promising for renewal.  
In a rather more passionate fashion, and less concerned with specific 
sectors, Waterman and Munck (Munck and Waterman 1999; Waterman 2001; 
Waterman and Wills 2001; Munck 2002; Munck 2004; Waterman 2005; Munck 
2007) consider that the situation is not that bad after all, if only the right strategy 
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is pursued. That strategy would involve a unity between labour and other social 
movements that was able to counteract capital at the global level. Whilst the 
thesis partly critiques their argument as programmatic, rigid and failing to 
actually understand workers’ real organisational capacities, this work points 
towards a crucial aspect of workers’ internationalism in a neoliberal 
environment: communication. That became the single largest issue in the 
dockers’ international campaign. 
Chapter seven dedicates some space to issues of communication. One of 
the dockers’ innovations during the dispute was the use of the internet, a media 
that was in its infancy at the time. Whilst this has been considered in more detail 
elsewhere (Carter, Clegg et al. 2003), what became evident during the campaign 
was the effect that instant, and global, communications could have on 
organisationally and culturally rigid labour movements. Trade unions had 
become the centralisers of information, maintaining control over what is 
disseminated, how and when. One of the challenges the dockers posed to these 
formal organisations was in the breakdown of that system. For example, the 
traditional communication channels between the ITF, the TGWU and the 
dockers were soon challenged by the new media. The dockers were able to 
communicate immediately with other dockers across the globe bypassing the 
communication channels that had been put in place by established union 
procedures. Waterman and Munck’s fine eye for the importance of 
communication has been relevant to the case study. It points towards a more 
practical aspect of trade union strategy that some of the other approaches seem to 
miss in their quest to show deep structural dynamics.   
A familiar difficulty reappears. Whilst the case has vindicated Waterman 
and Munck’s emphasis on the importance of communications, it does not follow 
that communication will guarantee strategic effectiveness. Quite the contrary: in 
some instances rapid and uncontrolled communication can harm strategic 
effectiveness. In the case of the Liverpool dockers, the situation that developed 
during the summer and autumn of 1996, as explored in chapter six, is a perfect 
example. By that point, a combination of exhaustion, desperation and openness 
led the Liverpool dockers to lose some control over how the dispute was being 
224 
 
communicated. Issues such as John Pilger’s article in The Guardian probably did 
more harm than good to the dispute. Whilst the article publicised the dispute 
nationally, its frontal attack on the TGWU and its leadership further antagonised 
a difficult relationship. 
This was to prove dangerous. Whilst the relationship between the dockers 
and the TGWU had lacked any kind of honeymoon period and had already 
started a divorce procedure, it had some positive characteristics. The problem 
was that the dockers kept operating from within the union, yet permitted such 
public frontal attacks. The dockers’ multi-faceted communication strategy was 
certainly advanced for the period. An ‘open’ communication strategy had the 
advantage that crucial issues could be disseminated globally in a rapid manner. 
But it also meant that the range of ‘unintended’ consequences could be 
multiplied at any point. 
The old ghosts uncovered in chapter one have proven unhelpful when 
dealing with the case study at hand. It has become evident that there is no such a 
thing as a choice between bureaucratic trade unionism and rank-and-file 
activism. Instead, the case has shown that the two tendencies cohabit in tension. 
This cohabitation becomes more or less marked at different times. The key issue, 
the thesis has argued, is not which one wins, or which one is preferable or even 
feasible, but rather the dynamics that develop from the tensions between the 
two. Both the tensions and the dynamics are historically specific, because they 
are embedded within the resources available, which also affect the organisational 
capacities of workers. 
The literature appears to be divided between systemic approaches, which 
often give little space to workers’ organisational capacities, or programmatic 
approaches, which offer much wishful thinking but on a limited empirical basis. 
Within this division, a dichotomy arises, which is the juxtaposition of 
bureaucratised forms of trade unionism, or service models if we are to use a 
more fashionable term, and rank-and-filism, or organisational models. This 
dichotomy is unable to grasp the realities of workers’ organisational capacities in 
the 1990s. As this thesis has shown, a case such as the Liverpool dockers 
exemplifies that these two models are not mutually exclusive, but rather two 
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sides of the same coin. Research on workers’ organisations would benefit by 
focusing on the political articulations of solidarity that arise from the interaction 
between these two dynamics and the type of resources available. This last point 
brings the argument back to the three analytical categories proposed by the 
thesis. 
The first analytical category, economic restructuring and political 
regulatory processes, impacts on the systemic resources workers have at their 
disposal at particular times and in specific places. In the case of the Liverpool 
dockers, these included the restrictive legislative environment in which they had 
to operate their dispute. In other words, it impacted on the kind of support they 
were to receive, or not receive, from their union and other British workers. These 
macro changes were to define the institutional context in which their dispute 
would operate. Whilst this had a large and detrimental impact on their 
organisational capacities it was not the only factor to determine the resources 
available to them. One of the key challenges they faced was the changing 
character of work, which took specific forms in the port industry, as chapter two 
has shown, and which also had wider changes in two particular areas: 
employment became more fragmented in terms of types of contract of 
employment or different rates of pay for the same work, and security of 
employment was seriously eroded by an increasingly flexible labour market. 
The second analytical thread proposed by the thesis, trade union strategy, 
highlights a framework where agency does matter. The thesis argues how, from 
the early 1990s, the TGWU reacted to the new institutional environment by 
finding specific ways to respond to it. In particular, the types of renewal paths 
chosen by the union were to shape the type of resources available to workers. In 
the case of the dockers, it was clear that the union had moved towards a vision of 
defending the organisation as a whole, even if that meant that its actions would 
be at the expense of specific groups within the union. This was not new for the 
TGWU, but rather rooted in the union’s historical experience. 
The final analytical category, the way in which workplace and 
community experiences together with popular historical memories play a part in 
the configuration of the political articulation of solidarity, is also illuminated. In 
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fact, it was these ‘memories’ that placed available resources at the fingertips of 
the dockers. As chapter seven has extensively shown, the dockers did not just 
wake up one day and decided to go international. Such a decision was based on 
their previous experience of internationalism and the way in which dockers’ 
collective memory has been built around conceptions of international trade union 
action, in a manner which was unambiguously positive.  
 To conclude, this thesis has argued that understanding the way in which 
workers articulate solidarity in an age of economic restructuring and political 
deregulation requires a complex answer. This is because, as this thesis shows, 
different analytical categories interact in ways that illuminate the availability of 
different types of resources. Importantly, however, it is not just their availability 
that matters but also the ability of workers to utilise them. The Liverpool dockers 
showed an outstanding degree of creativity when it came to utilising all of the, 
rather limited, resources available to them.  
 No intellectual exercise can fully attempt to comprehend the way struggle 
is shaped and fought. All that can be attempted is to ensure that its lessons and 
analysis are able to increase our knowledge of what may work or not in the 
struggle against capital. I cannot find a better way of ending this thesis than with 
the words of one of the sacked dockers, George Langan from Birkenhead, who 
wrote, at the request of his wife, WoW member Dot Langan, a long entry of how 
he felt a few days after the dispute ended. The following words are just an extract 
of the eighteen pages he wrote: 
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Appendix 1. Dockworkers’ vocabulary 
 
Term Meaning 
Blue Union National Association of Stevedores and Dockers (NASD) 
  
Blue-eyed boys Dockworkers who had become the employers’ favourites 
and therefore were able to get work most of the time. 
 
Calling on The system in place to allocate work to the casual docker. 
Dockers had to attend a morning call to obtain work for 
the day. 
 
Containerisation Reduction of staff and facilities  by using containers and 
container ships, providing faster loading times 
 
Continuity rule A docker was entitled to complete any job he had started. 
 
Employer of last resort Port Authority position to absorb dockworkers whose jobs 
had become redundant (in place during the NDLS) 
 
Floaters (or drifters) Dockers that were unable or unwilling to gain regular or 
semi-regular employment and would only obtain work 
after everyone else had been allocated. 
 
Foreman A docker charged with initial responsibility over a gang of 
workers 
  
Free call Registered dockworkers’ allocation to a work gang; if 
unsuccessful they still got some pay under NDLS 
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Term Meaning 
 
Groupage  Groupage work was the loading and unloading of 
containers in warehouses outside the docks and where the 
work was done by non-registered dockworkers. Usually, 
the work was done at a much lower rate and with 
considerably worse conditions 
 
Palletisation Organising cargo in pallets to reduce loading times 
 
Scouse Lob Scouse – type of local stew which gave its name to 
the natives of Liverpool (Scouser) 
 
Welting The practice, believed to have been widespread in 
Liverpool, where only a reduced number of the gang 
works at any given time. 
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Appendix 2. TGWU membership data 1968-1999. 
 
Part 1. Membership changes by region 1968-1999 
 
TGWU- Annual membership figures by region 1968-1978 
Region 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1 352623 358310 390285 396123 411934 420926 450608 471619 496513 523754 536844 
2 69961 72839 81935 80799 83589 86307 90237 90342 96767 102723 107097 
3 112243 117021 129005 128317 133555 134864 137085 136600 140913 146354 150243 
4 71833 115388 111438 107223 109473 108568 110666 106809 110407 114697 115653 
5 246209 253128 270610 276470 317573 324060 334701 328004 341295 360327 376387 
6 102784 188970 208391 208327 217881 227490 236713 224496 230830 238374 239303 
7 118011 126442 129369 139044 153963 161216 166559 166300 167833 176080 181423 
8 68112 72082 75411 72042 74143 77085 82041 83193 85452 87571 89828 
9 71678 75636 82465 78961 82755 83564 87564 88103 92650 98406 100663 
10 43712 47959 52740 50212 51321 53269 52851 53823 58339 64201 65375 
11 96220 98504 101709 99542 100441 98343 99738 97639 99073 100489 100753 
12 74760           
13 39780           
PWG            
H.O. 5579 5328 5328 6074 9606 9804 8545 9237 9762 9762 9249 
Total 1473505 1531607 1638686 1643134 1746234 1785496 1857308 1856165 1929834 2022738 2072818 
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TGWU- Annual membership figures by region 1979-1989 
Region 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
1 550582 481920 445094 412650 393316 375279 362841 342956 329653 322332 299400 
2 109780 97841 88972 85931 82754 78797 76322 77904 75706 70766 65742 
3 151786 136590 127865 123174 119368 114055 103778 97482 92189 89154 88749 
4 116101 102553 90165 86323 80591 76984 74083 71699 70019 68606 67820 
5 379724 349715 288403 268182 251137 242337 234498 223843 220128 216360 221110 
6 233706 212783 188316 179957 172832 169085 164875 161626 164785 164566 160724 
7 179612 169143 156492 152287 145059 139407 135099 132374 126100 119654 113120 
8 89572 81644 73550 70534 65121 62843 60770 58484 60724 56259 55070 
9 98879 93085 86036 99836 93798 90531 87386 83165 81824 79111 76969 
10 66611 59858 54117 63632 59407 58540 55467 54237 54047 53248 51185 
11 100113 93030 88391 82277 78595 77600 73371 68666 67404 66774 64872 
12            
13            
PWG            
H.O. 9815 8809 8417 8208 5465 5097 5515 5508 6133 6023 6015 
Total 2086281 1886971 1695818 1632991 1547443 1490555 1434005 1377944 1348712 1312853 1270776 
 
TGWU- Annual membership figures by region 1990-1999 
Region 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 281866 266824 247042 207124 196304 192238 192526 189931 196287 198152 
2 63987 59646 52847 116094 109947 104710 103028 102.406 101940 99766 
3 83735 77649 70832 54355 50518 49953 48717 49.310 49368 51680 
4 65016 59857 56362 52457 50438 50153 49514 51.177 49203 51033 
5 219354 190826 169505 159008 160179 164131 165193 163.616 164976 157452 
6 160357 144319 132164 123257 119507 114397 110561 113.966 112538 109330 
7 109084 102163 96228 91212 88877 87016 84441 82.444 79676 80113 
8 49951 46576 43356 140936 134083 130063 126384 124.408 123670 120097 
9 75104 69922 65587        
10 47590 43559 40505        
11 62197 60008 57239        
12           
13           
PWG           
H.O. 5650 5282 4919 4664 3970 3889 4305 4.099 3967 3891 
Total 1223891 1126631 1036586 949107 913823 896550 884669 881357 881625 871514 
 
Note: following from the internal restructuring of the TGWU in 1992, discussed 
in chapter 4, the number of regions was reduced. 
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Part 2. Membership changes by trade group 1968-1999 
 
Please note:  
• Until 1984, the figure for Public services included civil aviation 
• Agricultural and Textile workers were new trade groups created in 1982 
• Trade groups changed considerably between 1967 and 1968 making 
comparison very difficult, hence only docks figures are included 
TGWU- Annual membership figures by trade group 1968-1978 
Trade 
Group 
 1968 1969  1970  1971 1972  1973 1974 1975  1976  1977  1978 
Docks, 
Waterwa
ys, 
Fishing, 
etc. 
65806 64025 63883 63021 58102 58673 58467 56231 53691 52493 51153 
Admin. 
Clerical, 
Technical 
65229 70370 86365 88059 93098 99817 113353 118901 125581 139247 149801 
Passenge
r 
169722 164646 163893 161493 148311 143042 145637 149377 148832 145963 144501 
Commerc
ial 
221339 183527 193855 206217 207540 205293 213092 211307 213804 220206 226290 
Power & 
Engineeri
ng 
300724 248376 263935 250966 255673 267291 271694 260203 268956 279103 278407 
Automoti
ve 
NA 78509 83594 86165 165561 170549 172811 163601 175860 190983 193458 
Building, 
etc. 
50831 52153 55613 52838 56429 58258 61242 64207 71901 75929 75055 
Building 
crafts 
14055 12943 13192 12515 12842 11476 13251 12615 12886 13290 14405 
Public 
services 
100664 124763 140172 145821 156484 166391 174892 188846 199767 210955 224225 
Food, 
Drink & 
Tobacco 
25988 148983 173403 172198 181292 185399 195920 199878 209272 225433 231796 
Chemical 
Oil 
Refining 
69935 118971 121144 126978 128952 131017 141621 137450 138025 144391 145494 
General 
Workers 
328844 201312 216733 213584 216886 223699 230016 227017 243532 256779 269845 
Textile 
Workers 
 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Agricultu
ral & 
Allied 
Workers 
 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Civil Air 
Transpor
t 
 included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
Retired 
members 
35731 38049 37512 37213 38127 36584 36846 37099 37361 36916 36984 
Free 
Cards 
24637 24980 25392 26066 26937 28007 28466 29433 30366 31050 31404 
Total 1473505 1531607 1638686 1643134 1746234 1785496 1857308 1856165 1929834 2022738 2072818 
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TGWU- Annual membership figures by trade group 1979-1989 
 
Trade 
Group 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Docks 
Waterw
ays, 
Fishing 
48126 44554 40132 35541 32663 30628 28895 28218 27275 26020 23827 
Admin. 
Clerical
Technic
al 
158622 146803 129357 119189 115037 110990 109099 105607 103506 96997 93093 
Passenge
r 
140373 128794 120044 114783 112452 110310 106622 98439 97247 92560 91900 
Commer
cial 
233105 208172 185800 171601 167525 160911 152010 143584 139313 136111 131100 
Power & 
Enginee
ring 
276392 241348 208285 182511 166970 157784 149074 147483 142146 134744 133946 
Automot
ive 
188881 168612 148429 131104 119268 110252 105895 100142 97092 97110 99094 
Building
, etc. 
74564 65877 59074 52635 49937 48045 45407 43790 44814 43913 42052 
Building 
crafts 
14195 13179 11735 9895 10570 9487 9109 8446 8768 9585 9279 
Public 
services 
230448 228025 215645 199149 194813 159096 153794 148707 141883 134850 125849 
Food, 
Drink & 
Tobacco 
233504 208551 190778 159212 160974 155261 150731 143378 139244 131757 128689 
Chemica
l Oil 
Refining 
140984 125060 110830 100437 93240 90290 87153 83688 80716 80233 77471 
General 
Workers 
277805 237953 205133 155856 145388 139015 129525 124765 127081 126319 123264 
Textile 
Workers 
NA NA not 
existing 
60000 51294 54506 52671 49228 48914 49275 46661 
Agricult
ural & 
Allied 
Workers 
NA NA not 
existing 
70000 53232 48746 45355 41322 40476 40603 36570 
Civil Air 
Transpo
rt 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
included 
in PS 
31940 34739 35713 36849 37597 35989 
Retired 
member
s 
37590 37923 36725 35313 35926 33359 32664 32735 29830 30435 27435 
Free 
Cards 
31697 32120 33851 35765 38154 39935 41262 42699 43558 44744 44557 
Total 2086281 1886971 1695818 1632991 1547443 1490555 1434005 1377944 1348712 1312853 1270776 
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TGWU- Annual membership figures by trade group 1990-1999 
Trade 
Group 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Docks, 
Waterways, 
Fishing, etc. 
20560 17820 16410 14425 13674 12185 11648 11523 11216 10935 
Admin. 
Clerical, 
Technical 
91941 88311 83641 77322 72451 70210 67733 74240 72839 72544 
Passenger 89927 82633 80505 76963 75795 76275 76381 76007 77957 80309 
Commercial 126859 116424 103551 89984 85817 80655 78300 78027 77020 76305 
Power & 
Engineering 
125186 108154 95794 84798 80115 81417 77519 74.302 72807 69133 
Automotive 97739 85800 77148 71011 71384 74427 74889 72616 72187 66623 
Building, 
etc. 
40684 36697 28495 22612 19401 17885 16837 16980 17670 18153 
Building 
crafts 
7832 8177 5436 3863 3515 3470 3483 3446 3352 3669 
Public 
services 
120096 116908 110785 101550 96642 94934 95504 94236 93738 94211 
Food, Drink 
& Tobacco 
124295 115757 107022 98520 94524 90888 90108 91435 93154 95304 
Chemical 
Oil Refining 
75543 68976 64331 59030 55045 53266 51845 50646 49988 47039 
General 
Workers 
117896 99880 89990 80254 78126 75646 74580 74732 73465 76535 
Textile 
Workers 
41344 37622 34055 31206 30475 29041 28095 26456 24.081 21.516 
Agricultural 
& Allied 
Workers 
35134 33222 30507 26997 25666 24038 23187 21776 21451 21091 
Civil Air 
Transport 
35784 34668 35437 35169 35454 37367 39765 38676 42923 44020 
Retired 
members 
31456 33209 30366 31882 32433 31416 30662 28432 27640 25386 
Free Cards 41615 42373 43113 43521 43306 43430 44133 47827 50137 51571 
Total 1223891 1126631 1036586 949107 913823 896550 884669 881357 881625 874343 
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Part 3. TGWU total membership, 1961-1999 
 
Year Total membership 
1961 1357521 
1962 1369718 
1963 1412603 
1964 1464663 
1965 1481565 
1966 1465662 
1967 1439288 
1968 1473505 
1969 1531607 
1970 1638686 
1971 1643134 
1972 1746234 
1973 1785496 
1974 1857308 
1975 1856165 
1976 1929834 
1977 2022738 
1978 2072818 
1979 2086281 
1980 1886971 
1981 1695818 
1982 1632991 
1983 1547443 
1984 1490555 
1985 1434005 
1986 1377944 
1987 1348712 
1988 1312853 
1989 1270776 
1990 1223891 
1991 1126631 
1992 1036586 
1993 949107 
1994 913823 
1995 896550 
1996 884669 
1997 881357 
1998 881625 
1999 871514 
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Appendix 3. Methodological notes and reflection 
 
These reflective notes consider the different methodological choices and 
their justifications for the research presented in this thesis. They are divided in 
four parts. Firstly, there is an exploration of case study research, considering the 
advantages and disadvantages it provides for research in politics. Additionally, 
this section allows me to offer a methodological justification for the case study I 
have chosen. The second part focuses on qualitative research as they are the main 
methods used in this thesis. In particular, I focus on archival research, qualitative 
interviews and observation. Finally, I present a reflection on the relationship 
between the researcher and the researched based around my own experience of 
conducting research in this topic.  
 
Case study 
 
 For this thesis I have chosen to study the Liverpool dockers’ dispute 
1995-98 as a case study. The research question focuses on how workers 
articulate solidarity in an age of economic restructuring and political 
deregulation. The question is then dissected into different aspects in order to be 
able to provide an answer which is able to consider all the different variables. In 
this case, the experience of restructuring and deregulation in a particular 
industry, together with the pattern of trade union renewal as well as the actual 
experience of workplace and/or community relationships may  or may not lead to 
different political articulations of solidarity.   
 The reason why it may present a challenge is in the distinction between 
case study and history. In this particular case, there is a very fine line. According 
to Yin “histories are the preferred method when there is virtually no access or 
control. The distinctive contribution of the historical method is in dealing with 
the ‘dead’ past – that is, when no relevant persons are alive to report, even 
retrospectively, what occurred and when an investigator must rely on primary 
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documents, secondary documents, and cultural and physical artefacts as the main 
sources of evidence. Histories can, of course, be […] about contemporary events; 
in this situation, the method begins to overlap with that of the case study” (2009, 
p. 11). However, there are two issues that can help distinguish between one 
method or the other: “The case study relies on many of the same techniques as a 
history, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the 
historian’s repertoire: direct observation of the events being studied and 
interviews of the persons involved in the events” (Yin 2009, p. 11). In a sense 
the Liverpool dockers’ dispute was “history in the making” (Davies 1996b). 
Although direct observation of the events studied has been impossible, as they 
had already happened when I started researching them, I have been able to 
observe the spaces and social situations in which some of the events occurred.  
 
Qualitative research 
 
 As the dispute remained unofficial for the two main trade unions 
involved, the TGWU and the ITF, records are scant. Furthermore, they are 
divided between different union officials who may not have deposited them into 
the relevant archives.  
Archival research 
 
“Not all manuscript or printed matter has evidential value: it is the mark 
of the ignoramus to believe a statement because he sees it in print” 
(Webb and Webb 1932, p. 98). 
 The above quote is a crucial warning for anyone involved in archival 
research. Although we are concerned about the authenticity and reliability of 
what someone might tell us orally, we appear to be more readily convinced of 
something when we see it in some form or another.  
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 I have encountered many different types of documents during my 
fieldwork. It is important to note, however, that as technology develops and 
becomes cheaper and easier to use more and more social research will need to 
deal with a varied repertoire of documents. However, the definition of what 
makes a document should be made clear. The Webbs have distinguished between 
two different types of ‘written word’: documents and literature. A document, in 
their distinction, “is an instrument in language which has, as its origin and for 
its deliberate and express purpose, to become the basis of, or to assist, the 
activities of an individual, an organisation, or a community”(Webb and Webb 
1932, p. 100, emphasis in the original). On the other hand, literature is “all other 
contemporaneous writings yielding information as to what purport to be facts, 
whether such writings originate in the desire for the intellectual, emotional, or 
artistic self-expression, or for the purpose of describing and communicating to 
others any real or imagined event.” (Webb and Webb, p. 100-101) In this case, I 
have encountered the following types of documents or literature (listed in no 
particular order): 
(1) Websites 
(2) Meeting minutes 
(3) Pamphlets 
(4) Audio and video recordings 
(5) Interview transcripts of the period 
(6) Personal diaries 
(7) Unpublished manuscripts 
(8) Newspapers and magazines 
The wide range of documents and literature listed above presents the 
researcher with many different sources of data as well as many challenges, some 
common to all types of document. However, there are some specific issues that 
need to be considered. 
Generally, all documentary research suffers from one major pitfall: “there 
is a shortage of data and […] the researcher has no control over the quantity and 
form of data” (Platt 1981b, p. 62). This was something I considered carefully. In 
this case, the Liverpool dockers’ dispute, this challenge was magnified. The 
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dispute had not been considered official by any organisation. The role of the 
organisations involved had not always been one of which they appear proud   
today. This means that many records were either never kept, or subsequently 
destroyed. The dockers themselves collected an archive of the dispute. In 
addition, the quantity of data I obtained was much larger than I had anticipated. 
This, together with the variety of documents I obtained,  meant that the process 
of sorting, organising and analysing has presented particular challenges,  
aggravated by the fact that much of the data has been collected together for the 
first time by me, rather than by a professional archivist. 
There is a problem with which documents survive an event, and 
therefore, may become available, as noted by Scott (1990): “In order to survive, 
documents must be ‘deposited’. This may be through publication in a form 
which is itself capable of survival, or by way of storage in a public or private 
archive or more prosaically in a cardboard box in an attic. Not all documents are 
deposited in a place in which they are likely to survive, some (e.g. official 
papers) are destroyed in an incinerator or shredder, others (e.g. personal 
documents and ‘ephemera’) may be thrown away, and all are susceptible to 
accidental destruction or loss. Sometimes deposit is a deliberate, systematic and 
selective process which results in the survival of an unrepresentative selection 
[…]” (Scott 1990, p. 25). In a dispute such as the one studied here this was 
indeed a danger I had to be aware of. 
In order to identify the validity and reliability of a document Platt offers 
advice on issues of evidence and proof: “(i) how to establish the authenticity of a 
document; (ii) whether the relevant documents are available; (iii) problems of 
sampling; (iv) how to establish the extent to which a document can be taken to 
tell the truth about what it describes; (v) how to decide what inferences can be 
made from a document about matters other than the truth of its factual 
assertions” (Platt 1981a, p. 33) Although this may act as a useful checklist, in the 
case of the documents I have encountered, they may not always be clear, or 
important for the research. Instead, the Webbs propose a different way of seeing 
documents:  
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“The exact date, authenticity, meaning of the terms used, and even the personal 
authorship of a document, are matters for research by the historian whether of 
ancient times or of recent events. In our investigations into comparatively 
modern social organisation the date, authenticity, and meaning of the terms used 
are seldom in question, whilst the personal authorship of a document is usually 
unknown, and in nearly all cases irrelevant to our investigation” (Webb and 
Webb 1932, p. 105, footnote). 
 
Furthermore, documents cannot be taken at face value. “The 
interpretative meaning of the document which the researcher aims to produce 
therefore is, in a very real sense, a tentative and provisional judgement which 
must be constantly in need of revision as new discoveries and new problems 
force the researcher to reappraise the evidence” (Scott 1990, p. 35). 
For the archival research part of my fieldwork, I visited the Modern 
Records Centre (MRC) at the University of Warwick. The files consulted can be 
seen in the tables accompanying the bibliography. I spent three days at the 
Centre during March 2009. There was very little relevant material, as the only 
file they had was Bill Morris’ file, which was fairly slim (containing just over 20 
documents). Their records of the TGWU’s Docks and Waterways National Trade 
Group Committee only had an incomplete set of minutes of their meetings. 
However, Unite’s national transport officer, Graham Stevenson, also allowed me 
full access to his professional archive at Unite’s headquarters in London, where I 
spent four days. This contained a full set of minutes of the TGWU’s Docks and 
Waterways National Committee from 1985 to 2000, which has proven 
invaluable. At the time I started my fieldwork, the ITF had not yet deposited 
their records of the period in the MRC. I was fortunate that the ITF allowed me 
to see their file on the dispute (a summary of which can be seen in the tables 
accompanying the bibliography) at their headquarters in London in October 
2008, a few weeks before they were sent to the MRC.  
Additionally, I have visited three further archives. I visited the TUC 
Library at the London Metropolitan University in April 2009. I obtained many 
conference proceedings and trade union reports relevant to the period in their 
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archives. Also, I visited two local archives in Liverpool. Firstly, the Central 
Library Archives, where I consulted the two local papers, the Liverpool Daily 
Post and the Liverpool Echo, which are held there in microfilm. Secondly, I 
visited the Merseyside Maritime Museum in the Albert Dock. There, an almost 
complete collection of Port News, the internal newspaper published by the 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Company for its employees, was consulted.  
However, these five archival sources did not yield sufficient information 
due to the unofficial nature of the dispute. Furthermore, many local archival 
sources have disappeared. A TGWU official in Liverpool informed me that when 
they moved from Transport House to Jack Jones House, the caretaker destroyed 
many papers, as they did not have sufficient space to store them in their new 
premises. Where I was fortunate was in the generosity of many of the 
participants in the dispute, whether sacked dockers or supporters. I was given 
extensive copies of their personal archives, including diaries, pictures, video and 
audio recordings, interview transcripts and a full set of the Dockers Charter, the 
newspaper the dockers published during the dispute. Due to the wide range of 
documents I have had access to, an assessment of them in terms of how to deal 
with different sources of data is required. 
 
Websites 
 
 Increasingly, political research will use resources which may be available 
only via websites. The labour movement has been perhaps slower in the use of 
the internet for many of its activities. However, if anything, the Liverpool 
dockers’ dispute has been considered unique for its use of the internet (Carter, 
Clegg et al. 2003). From November 1995, two months after the start of the 
dispute, the dockers’ supporters start using the internet as a way of publicising 
the dispute. This meant that, particularly after the start of international activities 
in December 1996, the dockers started to see the benefits of using the internet. 
An impressive archive of the dispute exists online: as different pamphlets, 
communications, debates emerged they were being posted on Labournet.  
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 Archival material posted on the internet offers a very accessible source of 
data for researchers, in terms of cost and availability. No travel needs to be 
organised and expenditure is reduced to a minimum. The materials are available 
twenty-four hours a day every day, so that no specific time needs to be booked or 
allocated. However, there are challenges of validity and accessibility. Anyone 
can post something on the internet. In the case of Labournet this is restricted as 
only those involved in the project are able to manage its online content. In the 
case of the Liverpool dockers’ dispute only two people were involved in the 
actual posting of content. Their effort paid off. Labournet contains the largest 
single organised archive of the dispute.  
 Accessibility is another issue to bear in mind. Content that is available 
today may not be available tomorrow. Data posted on websites is costly to 
maintain, not just in financial terms but also in terms of time. Particularly for 
unofficial websites (which may be run with very limited funds), the cost 
involved may mean that they can disappear as quickly as they appeared. In my 
case, I made sure I printed the complete archive held in Labournet in a Portable 
Document Format (PDF). Although this involved over two days of work, due to 
the large amount of material, it ensured that I can access the material regardless 
of what may happen to the website. 
 It is important, therefore, to consider present and future accessibility, 
which can be achieved either by printing the material in paper or by printing it 
electronically, as I did. Additionally, issues of reliability and validity can be 
overcome by cross-checking what is found on the internet. For example, 
Labournet holds many interview transcripts of some rank-and-file dockers’ 
opinions on the dispute. I had the opportunity to interview some of these 
dockers, who confirmed that those interviews did indeed take place. Similarly, I 
was able to check other documents or debates as they also existed in other 
formats. 
 Nevertheless, there were other materials available on websites relating to 
the dispute. Many political groups had placed reports on their websites about the 
dispute. These were more problematic. Whilst Labournet was dedicated 
exclusively to the reporting of the dispute, almost as a newswire, these other 
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websites had the objective of analysing the dispute according to their own 
political aims. The reliability of their information remains questionable. Hence, 
not all websites offer the same level of validity and reliability. This challenge 
may be particularly difficult when researching topics outside the orbit of 
officialdom. 
 
Meeting minutes 
  
I have used many meeting minutes in my research. Primarily, the meeting 
minutes of the Docks and Waterways National Trade Group of the TGWU 
during the 1990s have provided me with a useful source of data. I have also 
relied on the minutes of proceedings of the TGWU Biennial Delegate 
Conferences and of the House of Commons Select Committee designed to 
investigate the implications of the dispute for employment (1995).  However, 
these types of documents cannot be taken at face value. Yin reminds us that 
“documents must be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal 
recordings of events that have taken place. Few people realize, for instance, that 
even the ‘verbatim’ transcripts of official U.S. Congress hearings have been 
deliberately edited – by the congressional staff and others who may have 
testified – before being printed in final form” (Yin 2009, p. 103). I am unaware 
of the extent to which this type of editing has taken place in the documents I 
have analysed.  
 
Pamphlets 
 
 Pamphlets are designed to publicise the struggle and, as such, are highly 
subjective items of propaganda. This, however, does not mean that they are 
unusable for political research. In fact, they can yield vast amounts of 
information into the different conjectures and contingencies of the struggles, of 
the highs and the lows. The dockers’ dispute produced vast amounts of 
pamphlets. Under the heading of pamphlets, I consider the following documents: 
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- Press releases produced by the dockers 
- Circulars asking for solidarity 
- Dockers Charter, the newspaper of the sacked dockers, or The Dart, the 
newspaper of the new work force (Drakes), or The Record, the TGWU’s 
publication. 
- The two booklets produced during the dispute (one from the dockers and 
another from the Women of the Waterfront), which can be seen in the 
pictures below. 
- Leaflets 
In some of these types of material, authorship is clear, in other cases it is 
not. For example, press releases, circulars, newspapers and booklets are usually 
signed by a group (often by the Merseyside Port Shop Stewards Committee or 
the Women of the Waterfront). Leaflets are often unsigned and their authorship 
is difficult to ascertain. For example, I have obtained a leaflet containing the 
names and home addresses of the strike-breakers together with insulting 
nicknames. This leaflet is unsigned and it remains unclear where it may have 
come from. 
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Cover page of the booklet produced by the Women of the Waterfront (below): 
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Booklet produced by the Merseyside Port Shop Stewards Committee (below): 
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Audio and video recordings 
  
I was given access to over forty recorded audio tapes of mass meetings 
and interviews of the period. Additionally, I was given eight video tapes of 
solidarity actions, the TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference debate in 1997 in 
relation to the dispute, and a tape of the hearing at the House of Commons Select 
Committee. The first problem I faced was how to operate technology that is now 
obsolete. I was able to transfer the audio tapes to MP3 files so that I could listen 
to them from my computer. This was a very time consuming exercise. The video 
tapes were transferred for me onto DVD discs by the staff at the Alcuin Research 
Resource Centre (ARRC) at the University of York. The advantage of 
transferring old formats of recording into new formats is that I am now able to 
replay the recordings as many times as I need to (as I had to give the originals 
back).   
 
Interview transcripts of the period 
 
 Two members of the Merseyside support group, Greg Dropkin and Bill 
Hunter, completed many interviews with the sacked dockers during and after the 
dispute. For both of them the material may have ended up in a book. However, it 
has not happened. Both of them have given me the transcriptions of these 
interviews as they will not be completing their projects. I am very grateful for 
this. The transcriptions have provided me with two advantages. Firstly, I am able 
to use them to cross check my own interviews. I can check how memory plays a 
part in people’s recollection of something which happened 10 to 15 years ago. I 
can also check to what extent what someone tells me is part of their own script. 
People’s descriptions of events are often created rather than lived. In some cases 
I found a situation where the people I interviewed had scripted their memories 
and, as they were used to being interviewed, they just repeated their script. This 
proved difficult to overcome at first but, as I will explain later, I managed to do 
so. The transcriptions of the period helped overcome this as I already knew what 
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the script was; therefore I was able to prepare my own interviews more 
effectively. 
 Secondly, these transcripts give me an insight on how the participants in 
the dispute analysed the events as they were unfolding. Hindsight, knowing what 
happened afterwards, and time to assess and re-assess, meant that the responses 
they provided me with may have been based on a different analysis to the one 
they made at the time.  
 
Personal diaries 
 
 I have been kindly provided with two personal diaries compiled by shop 
stewards. Mike Carden kept a very thorough set of diaries throughout the dispute 
with daily entries, which he has made available to me. Terry Teague compiled a 
list of events as they were unfolding, which included references to what was 
being published in the media. 
 
Unpublished manuscripts 
 
 Additionally, three unpublished manuscripts have been made available to 
me by the authors, Graham Stevenson, Bill Hunter and Dave Cotterill. The first 
is a manuscript related to Stevenson’s experience as a national officer in the 
TGWU. The latter two are unpublished manuscripts related to the dockers’ 
dispute, which contained vast amounts of primary material collected during the 
dispute. 
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Newspapers and magazines 
 
 An important newspaper source has been Lloyd’s List, is a specialist 
newspaper for the shipping industry, published daily50 in London and with a 
global readership. Their role in reporting the dispute, as the main specialised 
newspaper, should not be underestimated. Apart from providing the most 
thorough reporting of the dispute besides the website Labournet, it was often 
seen to be reporting against the interested of the employers. Eric Leatherbarrow, 
MDHC’s communications manager, publicly complained about David Osler’s 
reporting of the dispute in the paper, as one-sided (on the side of the dockers) 
(Leatherbarrow 10/10/1996). Whether David Osler had sympathies with the 
dockers’ struggle is difficult to ascertain: as the main journalist reporting on the 
dispute his articles were never too friendly, nor were they full of animosity. It 
should be understood that the role of Lloyd’s List is to provide a reliable source 
of information for the shipping industry, and may sometimes place them in a 
battle of interests with the port management industry. Associations of port users 
(mainly formed by ship owners) and port owners or managers often have very 
different and contradictory short-term interests. In the case of a labour struggle 
such as this one, the shipping industry felt an undeserving victim (as in the case 
of the Neptune Jade which has been considered in the thesis) 
 The abundance and ease of access that newspaper reports offer in this 
case could provide many colourful and interesting quotes by the actors in the 
event under scrutiny. However, this could easily become a challenge: 
“Apparently, factual reports are frequently compiled from press releases, with 
journalists checking the basic story and following up one or two points. Such 
reports invariably include quotes from persons involved in the story – ‘Mr X 
said…’ – and a researcher may wish to use these quotes as evidence about the 
person concerned. But it should not be assumed that those quotes are direct 
transcriptions of the named person’s speech. The conventions governing the 
                                                     
50 Please note that Lloyd’s List does not have a Sunday edition. 
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press release as a genre require the inclusion of quotes in the text of the release” 
(Scott 1990, p. 146). 
 Bearing that in mind, press materials have been used with care. An initial 
chronology of the dispute was built using press material obtained by using the 
news search engine Lexis-Nexis. A chronological list of press articles related to 
the dispute can be found in the tables accompanying the bibliography. 
 
Qualitative interviews 
 
 I have interviewed fifty seven people. The characteristics of the 
interviews varied greatly. In some cases the interviews were group interviews, 
where more than one person was being interviewed at the same time. In other 
cases, the interviews took place over many sittings or sessions. The way in which 
respondents were chosen was via non-random sample designs, including 
‘snowball sampling’, where my initial contacts recommended other people for 
me to interview, and a certain degree of ‘quota sampling’, to ensure I had some 
representation from all the different groups (Burnham 2004). The sample of the 
interviews was as follows: 
 
Shop stewards 
1 Terry Teague 
2 Mike Carden 
3 Jimmy Davies 
4 Jimmy Nolan  
5 Bobby Morton 
6 Billy Jenkins 
7 Tony Nelson 
8 Andy Dwyer 
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Rank-and-file sacked dockworkers 
9 John Jenkins 
10 Colin Mitchell 
11 Billy Johnson 
12 Billy Barrett 
13 Tony Weedon 
14 Peter Wharton (boatman) 
15 Langan family (with Torside son) 
16 John Deaves 
17 John Farrell (ex-RDW) 
18 John (unknown surname) 
 
Women of the Waterfront 
19 Cathy Dwyer 
20 Sue Mitchell 
21 Mary Pendleton 
22 Trish (unknown surname) 
23 Irene Campbell 
24 Doreen McNally 
25 Dot Langan 
 
Port workers during and/or after the dispute 
26 Drake’s employee 1 
27 Drake’s employee 2 
28 Drake’s employee 3 
29 Drake’s employee 4 
30 MDHC port operation worker 1   
31 MDHC port operation worker 2 
32 Boatmen shop steward 1 
33 Boatmen shop steward 2 
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Transport and General Workers Union (relevant officials) 
34 Peter Clee 
35 Graham Stevenson 
36 Eddie Roberts 
37 Andrew Murray 
38 John Farrell (ex-TGWU) 
 
Employers 
39 Drake’s senior manager 
40 Coastal Containers Ltd ex- senior manager 
41 MDHC ex-senior manager 
 
Support groups 
42 Simon Pirani (London) 
43 Michael Lavalette (Liverpool) 
44 Dot Gibson (London) 
45 Greg Dropkin (Labournet) 
46 Chris Knight (London) 
47 Bill Hunter  (Liverpool) 
48 Steve Higginson (CWU- Liverpool) 
49 Dave Cotterill 
 
International support 
50 David Cockroft (ITF General Secretary)  
51 Frank Leys (ITF Dockers’ Secretary) 
52 Sarah Finke (ITF Women’s Officer) 
53 Kees Marges (ex-ITF Dockers’ Secretary) 
54 Bjorn Borg (President, Swedish Dockworkers Union) 
55 Peter Shaw (European Co-ordinator, International Dockworkers Council, IDC) 
56 Ray Familathe (International Affairs Director, ILWU) 
57 Julian Garcia (ex-president of the Spanish Dockworkers’ Union and of the IDC) 
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 The majority of the interviews were recorded with informed consent 
obtained at the beginning of the interview. They were semi-structured 
interviews. For the sacked dockworkers, the interviews consisted of four 
sections. The first section would cover basic information such as the length of 
time working in the docks, type of job they did there, employer and their 
relationship with the union. The second section would cover questions in relation 
to their personal experience of work. Thirdly, I would ask about trade union 
activities and how they may have changed over time. Finally, I asked them about 
the dispute and the solidarity networks built around it.   
 However, this more structured manner of interviewing was only useful 
during the first few interviews. As I became more familiar with the intricacies of 
the topic and the actors, my questioning became more specific to the actual 
person and their specific involvement and role. This distinction becomes evident 
as the length of the interviews appears to increase with time. Only one of my 
first ten interviews lasted just over an hour, the other nine were between 20 and 
40 minutes long. However, as the research evolved, some interviews would even 
last four or five hours, and took shape as conversations, where the respondents 
were also interested in finding out more about my research and findings.  
 The more an interviewee becomes a directing source towards new 
evidence or respondents, the more her or his role becomes that of an ‘informant’. 
This is an important distinction made by Yin (2009). Many of my interviewees 
became informants as they provided me with access to further interviewees as 
well as material that they had collected during the dispute. 
 
Observation 
 
 I had the opportunity to observe three very important settings. First, I 
visited the Port of Liverpool on three occasions, and each of them involved 
observation of different aspects of the port. Secondly, I had the opportunity to 
attend a mass meeting of ex-registered dockworkers at the Dockers Club in 
Liverpool. Finally, I visited the offices of the three main trade unions or 
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federations relevant to the research, the Transport and General Workers’ Union 
(their office in Liverpool, their North West office in Salford Quays and their 
headquarters in London), the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF, 
in London) and the International Dockworkers Council (IDC, in Barcelona). 
These observations, explained in more detail below, are important as “assuming 
that the phenomena of interest have not been purely historical, some relevant 
behaviours or environmental conditions will be available for observation” (Yin 
2009, p. 109). 
 
  
Port of Liverpool 
 
 I visited the Port of Liverpool on three occasions. On all three, I had 
arranged the visit in advance and I was always able to access areas and situations 
which would have normally been closed. In fact, other researchers that have 
conducted fieldwork around ports point out how “land-based facilities like ports 
and dockyards also possess a restricted character, so necessitating good relations 
with gatekeepers in order to gain access”  (Belousov, Horlick-Jones et al. 2007, 
p. 159). My first visit to the port was in November 2008 with the ITF Port 
Inspector. I was able to be driven throughout the port (including usually closed 
areas next to vessels). Additionally, I shadowed a labour inspection of a vessel.  
 ITF Port Inspectors carry out routine inspections on ships in order to 
make sure that basic ILO standards are kept for seafarers. The inspections 
include a visit to the facilities where seafarers live and checking that their wages 
have been paid, including any overtime they have done. During my visit, the 
vessel inspected was Greek, with a Polish flag and a Filipino crew. Their work 
and living conditions were acceptable compared to the pictures I had been shown 
of previous inspections. I was able, however, to have a brief view into the lives 
of those who work at sea. This was important as it helped me understand further 
the different types of workers who meet and work in a port. Having seen the port 
also helped me relate to the people I was researching as I could identify what 
they were talking about. The fact that it was a rainy, cold and windy November 
day also brought home the harshness of the elements that confront those working 
in a port. I came back cold, wet, with muddy boots and smelling of animal 
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ferments (one of the main imports going into the Port of Liverpool). It did feel 
like ‘field’ work.  
 
 
Dockers Club 
 
 I visited the Dockers Club in Anfield twice, and The Casa, the social 
centre created by the sacked Liverpool dockers, many times over the course of 
my research.  
 
Trade Union offices 
 
 The analysis of physical space is not something common in Political 
Science. It is more associated with other disciplines, such as Urban Studies or 
Geography and it is often overlooked by scholars in our discipline. I only started 
thinking about it later, during an interview, when the respondent brought up the 
issue of our location. The process of internal restructuring carried out by the 
TGWU during the 1990s, which has been analysed in the thesis, involved 
moving from offices in order to achieve cost-savings. It became evident that 
location and accessibility of trade union offices had become an issue in all the 
offices I visited (Liverpool’s Jack Jones House, Unite’s offices in Salford Quays 
and Unite’s headquarters in London). In all three cases, accessibility to the inside 
of the building was impossible except by prior appointment. In the first two 
cases there were issues of limited access by public transport and limited car park 
facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
 The relationship between the researcher and the researched  
 
 In this final section I want to offer a personal reflection of the research 
process. Reflection here means a pedagogical exercise designed to aid analytical 
consideration of the process as well as offering a transformative view of 
research. In other words, reflection is an integral part of the research process. 
Although many research methods textbooks in politics (Burnham 2004) do not 
give much thought to reflection, with the exception perhaps of ethical 
considerations, this has not always been the case. In Methods of Social Study, the 
Webbs give due importance to the way in which the researcher engages in the 
research process.  
Firstly, the way in which the research is designed  will automatically 
exclude certain answers, “the very terms in which the question was couched 
implied an answer of a particular kind, or at least excluded answers of some 
other kinds, about which we have not been thinking” (Webb and Webb 1932, p. 
35). This means that unless the researcher starts with an open mind, rather than a 
rather narrowing and strict question, many issues will be missed. In other words: 
“let the question to which you wish to find the answer do no more than suggest 
to you the particular social institution that you will study, and study that 
completely, irrespective of whether the knowledge of fact that you are gaining 
seems to bear upon your original question or not. This, in our experience, is the 
best way, and perhaps the only way, to avoid the danger of exaggerating the 
importance, or even misinterpreting the significance, of the first ‘promising’ 
discoveries that you make, and of failing to recognise others factors against 
which you have, unconsciously, some prejudice” (Webb and Webb 1932, p. 40-
41). 
 
‘It’s men’s talk love’ 
 
 During my first week in Liverpool, in January 2009, fieldwork was 
advancing very slowly. From the original help and encouragement received by 
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one of the shop stewards, it seemed that, during that week, my work was not 
necessarily top of their agenda. However, for me that was a problem, every day 
being away from home involved an expenditure I could seldom afford. Hence, 
after an unsuccessful first day, where I went back to my hostel with no 
interviews completed or arranged, I was determined that the following days had 
to be more successful. 
 By the next day, I had managed to catch another shop steward, unaware 
of what I was doing at first until I explained myself, and so I completed my first 
interview. He then provided me with further contact details of other people. 
Interestingly, however, that pattern would continually follow. Most of the shop 
stewards would steer me towards interviewing people within their support 
network, rather than actual sacked dockworkers or even other shop stewards. At 
that rate, I felt, I would never complete my fieldwork. My first interview, before 
starting fieldwork properly, had been with Chris Knight. Knight is a Professor of 
Anthropology at the University of East London and I had interviewed him in 
October 2008. Knight had been instrumental in the coordination between the 
Liverpool dockers and Reclaim the Streets during the dispute. Knight had also 
given me the phone number of two of the shop stewards. One of them was my 
original gatekeeper. The other had not yet been mentioned by anyone else.  
 So, I decided to call him. He was very nice and agreed to meet me the 
next day. Things were looking up for me as the next day was Wednesday and I 
knew many dockers met on a Wednesday afternoon at the Casa. Besides 
interviewing him I would have the chance to increase the rather limited list of 
contacts I had at that point. The interview went well. Afterwards he mentioned 
he was going to meet ‘his mates’ (these were a group of sacked dockers sat a few 
tables away from us). So, I asked if perhaps I could join them so that I could 
have a chance to talk to them. I was told that it would have been inappropriate 
for me to join them as they were drinking alcohol and ultimately ‘it was men’s 
talk’. That was a further hurdle I had to overcome.  
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Interviewing non-elites 
 
A topic is a topic to the researcher. It may be interesting, it may present a 
challenging puzzle to existing knowledge or it may bring issues of novelty to the 
way in which we understand certain concepts. But for those being researched, it 
is not a topic, it is their lives. No matter how obvious this may sound, it is 
something we often forget. Whilst I was designing my research strategy, 
completing the writing of chapters, my research area was just that, a topic. Once 
I got to Liverpool, reality hit home, and often, in a hard way. I, in a rather naive 
manner, expected that the people who participated in the events I was studying 
would also be interested in being studied. I expected that they would be proud of 
their historical significance. Although many of them are proud, there are few 
who appear to be able to reconcile the idea of historical significance with that of 
defeat. And in some cases the idea of defeat takes over the idea of historical 
significance. In such cases, the reactions to my requests for interviews stood in 
sharp contrast to the reactions of those who have negotiated the past in a 
different way. I have been placed in situations where I have felt very 
uncomfortable as it has been made evident to me that I have intruded in an area 
of their lives they would rather forget. In such situations, I have retreated 
promptly, avoiding further upset for the people I have contacted. I have often 
considered whether I should contact them again, but I have decided that it’s best 
to respect their decision. 
 A further point which is important to consider is the ‘celebrity’ status that 
the dockers had achieved. In 2000, Jimmy McGovern and Irvine Welsh 
embarked on a project to do a film of the dockers’ dispute. Many dockers were 
involved in the writing of the script, and yet many remain unhappy with the 
outcome. Often, in my interviews, Jimmy McGovern is quoted as having said 
‘don’t let facts get in the way of a good story’, in response to criticisms. As a 
film-maker, McGovern can afford, and possibly needs, to do so. In my case, 
entertainment is not the aim. However, this anecdote points towards a danger I 
soon became aware of. Many of my respondents had told their stories many 
times, and the stories may have got ‘better’ with time. The interview transcripts 
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that I had from Bill Hunter and Greg Dropkin, mentioned earlier, helped me 
identify such situations. Why let the truth get in the way of a good story? 
 
A double-edged sword – Barcelona 
 
 A researcher cannot act as an external entity with almost no identity. 
Instead, who we are, where we are from, how old we are and how we look will 
affect the way in which we are perceived. This became evident during my 
fieldwork. It is not something I had given much thought to before I went to 
Liverpool, however, I do believe it affected the way in which the people I was 
researching interacted with me. 
 Dockworkers are usually part of close knit communities with strong 
‘occupational cultures’ (Turnbull 1992). Additionally, ‘scousers’ appear to have 
a strong sense of difference and prize their difference as part of their identity. 
The dockers’ culture is also a very ‘macho’ culture, set around hard physical 
work, heavy drinking and sports (usually football and/or boxing).  I did not fit 
into any of the three. I was not part of their community, not just geographically, 
but occupationally. Many of the people who are engaged in oral history around 
Liverpool, and who the dockers are used to meet for interviews, have family 
links to their community. This was not the case for me. The first time I visited a 
working port was in November 2008, in Liverpool, as I mentioned earlier.  
 However, the two factors I thought would be my major obstacles, being a 
foreigner and a woman, actually helped. The summer before starting fieldwork 
(2008) I visited the headquarters of the International Dockworkers Council 
which are in my home city, Barcelona. I had arranged to meet Julian Garcia, the 
ex-president, and a man who had known the Liverpool dockers since the 1980s. 
Going to Liverpool after that meant that I was received positively, with positivity 
increasing the more they knew where I was from. Also, for example, being a 
woman also, eventually, allowed me to go to the pub with the dockers without 
drink being an issue, I was not expected to drink with them.  
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Documents in the ITF archive on the Liverpool dockers’ dispute 
Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
16/01/1996 Circular Letter regarding the 
situation 
Kees Marges 
(ITF Dockers 
Secretary) 
To all Dock 
Workers' 
Affiliates 
Circular No: 
15.D.3/1996 
23/01/1996 Email Regarding a phone 
conversation between 
Bill Morris and Kees 
Marges 
Kees Marges  David 
Cockroft 
  
30/01/1996 Fax Thanking ITF 
inspectors 
Jim Nolan Kees Marges   
29/05/1996 Fax Fund raising visits Jim Nolan General   
04/06/1996 Fax Regarding a letter from 
the ILWU and the ILA 
requesting ITF's action 
Mark 
Dickinson 
John Connolly 
(National 
Officer, Docks 
and 
Waterways, 
TGWU) 
SSD/AMD/E
JT1203 
07/06/1996 Fax International Update Jim Nolan General   
12/06/1996 Letter Regarding solidarity 
action taken by the ITF 
D. Cockroft  Brian 
McWilliams 
(ILWU 
President) 
SSD/DC/AM
D/1235 
12/06/1996 Letter Liverpool 
Dockworkers 
International Support 
request 
Jim Nolan General   
12/06/1996 Fax Notifying the ITF that 
the dockers’ union in 
Oslo has transferred 
NOK 5000 to the 
Liverpool Dockers 
Oslo 
Bryggearbeide
res Forening 
ITF   
19/06/1996 Letter Regarding solidarity 
action taken by the ITF 
D. Cockroft  John Bower 
(ILA 
President) 
SSD/DC/AM
D/1259 
21/06/1996 Letter by 
Fax 
Request to address the 
dockers' section of the 
ITF in the ITF's 100 
years celebration 
conference 
Jim Nolan Kees Marges   
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
24/06/1996 News story 
and update 
Regarding ACL's 
withdrawal from the 
Port of Liverpool 
24/06/1996 Fax with 
news 
stories 
Fax with 2 news stories 
sent to Cockroft before 
checking in at the Hotel 
Palace in Brussels 
ITF House David 
Cockroft 
  
10/07/1996 Email Email regarding legal 
procedures against the 
ILA from the MDHC 
Kees Marges  Katharine 
Reedy (ITF) 
  
11/07/1996 Circular 
 
From the ITF to its 
affiliates requesting 
financial support for 
the Liverpool Dockers 
To ITF 
Affiliates 
Organising 
Dockers and 
Seafarers 
Kees Marges 
& Mark 
Dickinson 
 
Circular No.: 
152/D.29/S.5
4/1996 
19/07/1996 Fax (date 
guessed) 
Thank you  for 
generosity and practical 
solidarity  
Jim Nolan Bro. David (?)   
24/07/1996 Letter by 
Fax 
Arranging a visit to 
Belgium by the 
Merseyside Port Shop 
Stewards  
Mark 
Dickinson 
(ITF Assistant 
General 
Secretary) 
Fons Geeraets 
(President 
BTB) 
ssd/ amd/ 
1332 
01/08/1996 Letter Concern regarding 
some of the Liverpool 
Dockers’ international 
activities 
D. Cockroft  Bill Morris    
15/08/1996 Notificatio
n of 
financial 
aid 
SEKO (Swedish union) 
has paid 1000 pounds 
into an account 
following ITF's circular  
No. 
152/D.29/S.54/SS.19/1
996, in solidarity with 
the Liverpool dockers 
Lars-Göran 
Holmgren 
(SEKO's 
National 
Secretary) 
ITF   
21/08/1996 Fax - Press 
release 
International 
Conference - 31  
August to 1 September 
Jim Nolan     
28/08/1996 Fax Attached is a news 
story from Labournet 
(7 August 1996) 
critical of the ITF 
D. Cockroft  Bill Morris    
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
28/08/1996 Letter by 
Fax 
Examples of the 
difficulties ITF 
affiliates are facing in 
their own ports 
D. Cockroft  Bill Morris    
03/09/1996 Letter by 
Fax 
Resolutions (x2) passed 
at the Liverpool Dock 
Workers’ International 
Conference 31 August 
to 1 September 1996 
Jim Nolan  Kees Marges Resolutions 
attached 
05/09/1996 Email ITF tries to sabotage 
Mersey conference 
Richard Flint  
FWD from 
Chris Bailey 
(Labournet) 
Kees Marges   
05/09/1996 Email Report on Dockers 
Conference 
Labournet  Forwarded 
within ITF 
  
09/09/1996 Email Giving the MDHC 
address and the fax 
number of the port 
operations managers 
Mark 
Dickinson  
Joan Hannah    
10/09/1996 Circular Explaining the situation 
in Liverpool and 
requesting letters of 
solidarity to be sent to 
the MDHC 
D. Cockroft  To all 
affiliated 
organisations 
Circular No.: 
186/ A.26 
(1996) 
18/09/1996 Fax/Letter To the MDHC 
requesting the 
reinstatement of the 
sacked dockers 
Shoshiro 
Nakanishi 
(President, All 
Japan 
Seamen's 
Union) 
Gordon 
Wadell 
(Chairman of 
MDHC) 
  
18/09/1996 Fax From Bob Baete with a 
fax he received the 
previous day from the 
sacked dockers 
Bob Baete 
(National 
Secretary 
"Ports" 
Belgische 
Transportarbei
dersbond) 
D. Cockroft & 
Kees Marges 
  
25/09/1996 Email Liverpool dockers and 
ITF, mention of Bob 
Baete 
Kees Marges  D. Cockroft    
26/09/1996 Internation
al update 
International solidarity 
w/ Liverpool dockers - 
from Antwerp and 
Zeebrugge 
Jim Nolan  Sent as a fax 
from 
01512070696 
to the ITF 
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
27/09/1996 Fax Four letters supporting 
the Liverpool dockers 
from: Christian Trade 
Union for Transport 
and Diamond Workers 
in Antwerp (CVD), the 
Association of Flight 
Attendants based in 
Washington DC, the 
Asociacion Argentina 
de Aeronavegantes and 
the Zimbabwe 
Amalgamated 
Railwaymen's Union  
Kees Marges  Bill Morris  D\F:\lorna\ks
\27-9.1 
27/09/1996 Email ITF Inspector called 
Jack requests time off 
to help out Liverpool 
dockers, not allowed 
Kees Marges  D. Cockroft    
27/09/1996 Email Regarding Bob Baete 
and Bill Morris 
Kees Marges  D. Cockroft    
28/09/1996 Article 
cutting 
  Lloyd’s List 
article 
    
01/10/1996 Fax Call for a negotiated 
solution 
Randall 
Howard 
(General 
Secretary 
TGWU S.A.) 
The Mersey 
Docks and 
Harbour 
Company 
  
03/10/1996 Set of 
letters 
Response to circular 
186/A.26 (1996) 
Brian 
McWilliams 
(President 
ILWU) 
David 
Cockroft 
  
05/10/1996 Article 
cutting 
About recent demo in 
Liverpool 
Socialist 
Worker 
    
09/10/1996 Email Internal email (not v 
interesting) 
Joan Hannah David 
Cockroft 
  
09/10/1996 Letter Morris thanks Baete for 
his support to the 
dockers and explains 
situation 
Bill Morris Bob Baete   
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
10/10/1996 Article 
cutting 
Letter to the editor 
complaining about the 
way David Osler has 
been reporting the 
dispute 
Eric 
Leatherbarrow 
(Communicati
ons Manager 
MDHC) 
Lloyd’s List 
editor 
  
15/10/1996 Set of 
letters 
European section of the 
ITF removing support, 
but at the same time 
sent a letter to the 
MDHC supporting 
international action and 
urging  a negotiated 
settlement 
Executive 
Board (W. 
Waleson, 
chairman) 
Vervoers 
Bond FNV 
Terry Teague, 
another letter 
to MDHC 
another to 
Kees Marges 
  
21/10/1996 Fax Letter from Nolan to 
Bill Morris regarding 
the ITF and the TGWU 
Jim Nolan Bill Morris   
21/10/1996 Fax Fax containing a letter 
from the MDHC to 
international unions 
expressing support to 
the dockers 
G. Mocho 
Rodriguez 
(Asociación 
Argentina 
Aeronavegant
es) 
Stuart Howart 
(ITF) 
  
21/10/1996 Letter Letter from the MDHC 
to unions offering 
support to the dockers 
P. T. Furlong 
(MDHC 
Managing 
director & 
Chief 
Executive) 
J. Smeets Esq. 
(General 
Secretary, 
Vervoers 
Bond FNV) 
  
22/10/1996 Fax & 
email 
Visit from Bowers to 
Britain, dockers request 
Kees to be in some 
meetings, frictions 
appear evident in ITF's 
internal email 
Kees Marges 
& Jim Nolan 
John Bowers 
& David 
Cockroft 
  
28/10/1996 Statement Arhus dockers request 
the ITF to be more 
active in supporting the 
dockers 
John Nielsen 
(Chairman of 
the General 
Assembly) 
ITF   
28/10/1996 Statement TGWU offering its 
commitment to 
"unfettered 
negotiations" 
Graham 
Stevenson 
David 
Cockroft 
  
29/10/1996 Letter & 
Cheque 
Cheque for $7500 from 
CAW-TCA Canada 
Jim O'Neil 
(CAW) 
David 
Cockroft 
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
 
30/10/1996 Letter Thank you  for a $7500 
donation from CAW-
TCA Canada 
Jim Davies L. Frampton   
30/10/1996 Letter Thank you  for a $2000 
donation from the 
Federation of Transport 
Petroleum & 
Agricultural Workers 
Jim Davies T. Thomas   
02/11/1996 Fax Request to receive 
more up-to-date 
information 
Kees Marges  Bill Morris & 
Graham 
Stevenson 
  
07/11/1996 Letter  Contacting the ITF 
regarding Baete 
Graham 
Stevenson 
David 
Cockroft 
  
20/11/1996 Email Set of emails regarding 
a move towards a more 
political organisation of 
dockworkers 
Kees Marges ITF affiliates 
(& particularly 
UGT) 
  
22/11/1996 Letter Important letter 
explaining the ITF's 
position 
David 
Cockroft 
Tom Dufresne 
(President 
Canadian Area 
ILWU) 
DC/jh 
26/11/1996 Letter   Richard Flint Bob Baete 
(Belgium) & 
Manfred 
Rosenberg 
(Germany) 
RJF/agf/Pres
s 
corresponden
ce - 
Liverpool 
dispute 
27/11/1996 Letter   Richard Flint Alan 
Rusbridger 
(editor of The 
Guardian) 
RJF/agf/Pres
s 
corresponden
ce - 
Liverpool 
dispute 
29/11/1996 Letter   Jim Nolan Bill Morris   
29/11/1996 Letter   Jim Nolan Bob Baete   
02/12/1996 Set of 
letters 
Bob Baete contacting 
the ITF 
Bob Baete 
(BTB) 
David 
Cockroft 
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
02/12/1996 Set of 
letters 
Nakamura contacting 
the ITF 
Masahiko 
Nakamura 
(Representativ
e ITF Japanese 
office) 
Kees Marges MN 
03/12/1996 Set of 
letters 
Correspondence 
between Morris and 
Nolan 
Bill Morris Jim Nolan   
03/12/1996 Set of 
letters 
Correspondence 
between TGWU and 
Turkish unions 
regarding TGWU's 
support for the dockers 
Bill Morris Kenan Kaya 
(Press 
Publishing 
Graphical and 
Packing 
Workers' 
Trade Union 
of Turkey) 
  
03/12/1996 Email Internal ITF email Kees Marges  Sarah Finke 
and Richard 
Flint 
  
03/12/1996 Set of 
letters 
Response to Jimmy 
Nolan 
Bill Morris Kees Marges   
03/12/1996 Set of 
letters 
  Graham 
Stevenson 
David 
Cockroft 
  
03/12/1996 Documents   Graham 
Stevenson 
David 
Cockroft 
  
03/12/1996 Email The BBC and Dutch 
RTL broadcasted a 
report on Liverpool 
Kees Marges Sarah Finke 
and Richard 
Flint 
  
03/12/1996 Set of 
letters 
TGWU’s position Bill Morris Kees Marges   
04/12/1996 Email Email about Graham 
Stevenson 
Kees Marges  Sarah Finke 
and Richard 
Flint 
 
04/12/1996 Fax Fax about the TGWU Sarah Finke David 
Cockroft 
  
04/12/1996 Email Email with several 
email reports 
Richard Flint Joan Hannah    
05/12/1996 Fax and 
letter 
Fax from Bob Baete 
with a fax he received 
the previous day from 
the sacked dockers 
Bob Baete 
(BTB) 
David 
Cockroft 
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
05/12/1996 Fax The TGWU requests a 
copy of the ITF letter 
sent to their affiliates 
Graham 
Stevenson 
Kees Marges   
05/12/1996 Fax An attached 
anonymous remit from 
‘Region 1’, asking for 
solidarity for the 
Liverpool dockers 
Graham 
Stevenson 
Kees Marges   
05/12/1996 Fax Confirming the ITF's 
support of the dockers 
David 
Cockroft & 
Kees Marges 
Dockers' 
Affiliates and 
ITF Inspectors 
  
05/12/1996 Press 
release 
ITF backs day of action Richard Flint  Press release   
05/12/1996 Fax Request from the ITF 
to the TGWU to check 
a fax before they send 
it off 
Sarah Finke Graham 
Stevenson 
  
05/12/1996 Fax Calling on unions to 
support the 
international day of 
action 
David 
Cockroft & 
Kees Marges 
Certain 
Dockers' 
Affiliates 
  
06/12/1996 Circular 
 
Encouraging unions to 
act on the day of action 
Mark 
Dickinson 
(ITF) 
ITF Inspectors 
& Co-
ordinators 
Circular n: 
246/SS.42/19
96 
06/12/1996 Fax Change to the date of 
the international day of 
action 
Sarah Finke Dockers' 
Affiliates 
  
07/12/1996 News 
clipping 
Bill Morris’ response 
in The Guardian to 
John Pilger 
      
09/12/1996 Email Internal ITF email 
about Bill Morris, and 
The Guardian article 
David 
Cockroft 
Mark 
Dickinson, 
Sarah Finke, 
Richard Flint, 
Kees Marges 
  
10/12/1996 Email Email (missing first 
page) about the issues 
between the British left 
and the dockers 
      
10/12/1996 News 
clipping 
News story about 
British left and the 
dockers 
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document 
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number/ 
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10/12/1996 Letter by 
fax 
Thanking the ITF Jim Nolan David 
Cockroft 
  
12/12/1996 Letter by 
fax 
Thanks to the ITF and 
a call for support in the 
January 1997 day of 
action 
Jim Nolan David 
Cockroft 
  
18/12/1996 Internation
al update 
The final position on 
negotiations 
Jim Nolan     
14/01/1997 Fax Liverpool international 
day of action 
20/01/1997 
M. Chaffart, 
Secretary of 
CVD 
(Belgium 
Union) 
D. Cockroft    
05/10/1997 News 
clipping 
and post-it 
News story in The 
Observer by Jimmy 
McGovern 
      
09/10/1997 Letter From Thamesport 
explaining they are not 
owned by MDHC and 
requesting all action 
against them to be 
stopped 
Derek Peters 
(Thamesport 
Director) 
David 
Cockroft 
  
09/10/1997 Letter by 
Fax 
From the National 
Council of Dockers' 
Unions of Japan 
(Zenkoku-kowan) 
advising they will 
boycott the Neptune 
Jade in solidarity with 
Liverpool 
Tetsuya 
Sakano 
(Chairman of 
Zenkoku-
Kowan) 
Merseyside 
Shop Stewards 
Committee, 
cc: Kees 
Marges 
  
09/10/1997 Letter by 
Fax and 
Post 
Thamesport is worried 
about the action being 
taken ‘around the 
world’ against the 
Neptune Jade.  
Mr Derek 
Peters 
(Director, 
Thamesport) 
David 
Cockroft 
  
13/10/1997 Set of 
letters 
File containing set of 
letters from TGWU, 
MDHC and the agreed 
offer sent to dockers to 
ballot 
Mr Furlong 
(MDHC) 
Bill Morris   
13/10/1997 Email Explanation of the 
ITF's position 
regarding the 
boycotting of Neptune 
Jade 
Kees Marges  Japanese 
email address, 
addressed to 
Mike 
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
13/10/1997 Email Regarding the Japanese 
boycott of the Neptune 
Jade 
David 
Cockroft 
Kees Marges   
13/10/1997 Email Further explanation 
regarding the Neptune 
Jade  
David 
Cockroft 
Kees Marges   
14/10/1997 Facsimile Letter from 
Thamesport requesting 
the ITF to stop 
Japanese dockworkers 
from boycotting the 
Neptune Jade 
Derek Peters 
(Thamesport 
Director) 
David 
Cockroft 
  
14/10/1997 Letters Exchange of letters 
between the ITF and 
the ILWU, the ILWU 
complaints that no 
mention has been made 
of the Liverpool 
dispute in the ITF 
email bulletin, the ITF 
apologises and blames 
it on the TGWU 
Brian 
McWilliams 
(ILWU) 
David 
Cockroft 
  
14/10/1997 Letters Exchange of letters 
between Thamesport 
and the ITF regarding 
the boycotting of 
Neptune Jade in Japan 
      
14/10/1997 Email Regarding the boycott, 
it says that there were 
two Liverpool guys in 
Japan  
David 
Cockroft 
Kees Marges   
16/10/1997 Email From Japan regarding 
boycott action of the 
Neptune Jade 
Unknown (but 
from Japan) 
David 
Cockroft 
Sender: 
QWK11030
@niftyserve.
or.jp 
20/10/1997 Email Cockroft has become 
aware the Liverpool 
dockers are planning to 
meet the ITF and he is 
not aware of it, as it 
would require the 
agreement of Bill 
Morris 
David 
Cockroft 
Jim Nolan   
20/10/1997 Internation
al update 
The TGWU has 
'imposed' a ballot, not 
including Torside  
Jim Nolan International 
supporters 
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Date Type of 
document 
Explanation From To Reference 
number/ 
Subject line 
23/10/1997 Update Ballot refusing 
MDHC's offer 
Jim Nolan International 
supporters 
  
28/10/1997 Internation
al update 
Report of international 
solidarity action in 
Dublin 
Jim Davies     
16/12/1997 Internation
al update 
Request for 
international solidarity 
after a failed attempt at 
ending the dispute 
Jim Nolan International 
supporters 
  
27/01/1998 Fax Letter from Morris to 
Cockroft explaining the 
dispute has ended 
Bill Morris  D. Cockroft    
28/01/1998 Letters Two letters, first from 
Morris to Cockroft, 
then back, explaining 
the Liverpool Dispute 
has ended 
Bill Morris to 
Cockroft 
Reply back WM RC 
LRD & 
DC/jh 
28/01/1998 Fax From John Bowen 
(ILA) to the ITF 
containing the stoppage 
leaflet produced by the 
Merseyside Port Shop 
Stewards 
John Bowen 
(ILA) 
D. Cockroft    
29/01/1998 Circular Circular explaining that 
the Liverpool dispute 
has ended 
D. Cockroft 
and Kees 
Marges 
All ITF 
affiliated 
unions 
representing 
Seafarers and 
Dockers 
Circular Nº 
22/S.6/D.5/1
998 
17/03/1998 Fax Fax with the ILO 
petition 
Russ 
Bargmann 
(ILWU) 
D. Cockroft    
01/04/1998 Email From David Cockroft 
to the ILWU 
explaining why he 
doesn't think presenting 
a complaint to the ILO 
is such a good idea 
politically 
D. Cockroft Russ 
Bargmann 
(ILWU) 
  
14/04/1998 Fax  ILWU informing the 
Liverpool dockers that 
they will not be 
submitting an ILO 
complaint as they are 
unable to do so 
Brian 
McWilliams 
(ILWU) 
Jim Nolan and 
Bobby Morton 
(MPSS) 
BMCW/lk 
(ncng52) 
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Date Type of 
document 
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number/ 
Subject line 
Unknown Handwritte
n note 
Note with a phone 
number from Sean 
Woods (Radio 
Liverpool) who wants 
an interview with the 
ITF 
      
Unknown List of 
phone 
numbers 
List of TGWU 
officials' phone 
numbers 
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Lexis-Nexis news articles related to the Liverpool dockers’ dispute 
1995-98 
Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
30/09/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey strikers sacked after 
dispute closes terminals 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
02/10/1995 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Dockers in Picket Protest Mark Thomas, PA 
News 
02/10/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Liverpool dockers step up 
action 
Dick Rooney 
03/10/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool port strikers reject 
new contracts 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent and 
Dick Rooney 
04/10/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey dockers seek 
settlement 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
06/10/1995 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Striking Dockers Sacked Mark Thomas, PA 
News 
06/10/1995 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 1B 
Liverpool row forces lines to 
use other ports 
Janet Porter, Journal 
of Commerce Staff 
11/10/1995 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home 
Page, pg. 
11 
Docks battle men to meet Martyn Halsall 
11/10/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool dockers deadlock Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
18/10/1995 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 8B 
Maritime Briefs Wire and Staff 
Reports 
24/10/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Mersey recruits new 
workforce 
Dick Rooney 
31/10/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Liverpool suspends ro-ro 
decision 
Dick Rooney 
04/11/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 8 Labour hits out at Mersey 
dispute 
Dick Rooney 
09/11/1995 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 12B 
Liverpool under scrutiny as 
some lines plan to re-turn 
 
Janet Porter, Journal 
of Commerce Staff 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
03/12/1995 The 
Independent 
Britain, 
Pg. 7 
Pickets' last stand in 
Liverpool docks; A bitter 
industrial dispute 
reminiscent of the 1970s is 
being played out by the 
Mersey 
Decca Aitkenhead 
07/12/1995 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Untitled Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
07/12/1995 PR 
Newswire 
Europe 
General 
and City 
News 
T and G demands talks over 
Mersey Docks Dispute 
Unknown 
07/12/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Letter to the Editor: The 
facts of the Mersey Docks 
dispute 
Eric Leatherbarrow, 
Communications 
manager at the 
MDHC 
08/12/1995 The 
Guardian 
Home 
Page, pg. 
4 
News in brief: TGWU 
support for Liverpool 
Dockers 
Seumas Milne 
08/12/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Union calls for talks on 
sacked Mersey dockers 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
10/12/1995 Manchester 
Guardian 
Weekly 
UK News, 
Pg. 10 
Dockers make last stand Martyn Halsall 
11/12/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Mersey Docks faces fresh 
union action 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
13/12/1995 The 
Independent 
News, Pg. 
6 
Unions flex their muscles in 
pay disputes 
Barrie Clement, 
Labour Editor 
13/12/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool threat over jobs Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
17/12/1995 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Bid to end port dispute Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
19/12/1995 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Dockers dispute talks 
adjourned 
Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
20/12/1995 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
City Page, 
Pg. 17 
Flying pickets chase ships by 
plane; Workface/Dock 
workers step up casual 
labour dispute 
Seumas Milne 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
21/12/1995 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 6B 
NY, Montreal, Sydney 
Dockworkers rally in 
support of fired 
Liverpudlians workers target 
5 lines resuming calls at UK 
port 
Janet Porter & Alan 
Abrams 
22/12/1995 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 1B 
ACL pressed to support 
dockers fired in Liverpool 
ship line says it may leave 
European port 
Janet Porter & Alan 
Abrams 
29/12/1995 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 ACL in threat to pull out of 
Mersey over docks dispute 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
09/01/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Fresh attempt to solve 
Liverpool docks dispute 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
10/01/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Sacked dockers picket port Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
11/01/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 1B 
Liverpool dockers accelerate 
campaign for global support 
Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
11/01/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey dockers picket 
Sheerness 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
16/01/1996 Extel 
Examiner 
Company 
News; 
Other 
Mersey Docks does not 
expect loss of ACL business: 
spokesman 
Unknown 
17/01/1996 The Times Business Mersey Docks Carl Mortished 
17/01/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 1B 
Maritime Briefs Wire and Staff 
Reports 
19/01/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 16 ACL leaves Mersey Docks in 
suspense 
Andrew Guest, 
Marine Industries 
Correspondent 
20/01/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Major raps sacked Liverpool 
dockers 
James Brewer 
22/01/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 3B 
New Owner puts 
Thamesport back on the map 
in the United Kingdom 
Janet Porter, Journal 
of Commerce Staff 
25/01/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Sacked dockers cash offer 
'final' 
Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
25/01/1996 London 
Stock 
Exchange 
Aggregated 
Regulatory 
News 
Service 
(ARNS) 
Trading 
statement 
Mersey Docks. Statement re 
Industrial Dispute, etc. 
MDHC 
25/01/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey move Unknown 
26/01/1996 The Times Business Mersey dockers given final 
offer 
Carl Mortished 
26/01/1996 The Times Business Mersey docks Carl Mortished 
27/01/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
City Page, 
Pg. 36 
Liverpool Docks Strikers 
reject peace proposal 
Martyn Halsall 
30/01/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 1B 
Fired Liverpool 
Dockworkers to vote on 
compensation offer 
Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
31/01/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Sacked dockers set to reject 
Mersey offer 
John Prescott 
08/02/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Docks deadlock as workers 
reject peace offer 
Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
08/02/1996 Extel 
Examiner 
Company 
News; 
Other 
Mersey Docks & Harbour 
says regrets union's rejection 
of payments package 
Unknown 
09/02/1996 The Times Business Mersey Docks shares fall as 
offer is rejected 
Unknown 
09/02/1996 The 
Independent 
News, Pg. 
2 
Docks dispute Unknown 
09/02/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool dockers reject 
offer on payoff 
John Prescott 
13/02/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Maritime, 
Pg. 1B 
Liverpool dockers seek ILA 
support 
Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
13/02/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Features 
Page, Pg. 
17 
At last, a break in the storm 
against unions 
Paul Foot 
13/02/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Liverpool dockers in port 
blockade plan 
John Prescott 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
15/02/1996 London 
Stock 
Exchange 
Aggregated 
Regulatory 
News 
Service 
(ARNS) 
1995 
Preliminar
y Results 
Mersey Docks. Final results MDHC 
16/02/1996 The Times Business Mersey Docks Carl Mortished 
16/02/1996 The Times Business Port dispute sees Mersey 
Docks slip 
Martin Barrow 
16/02/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Front, Pg. 
1A 
Liverpool dockers push 
global boycott 
Janet Porter, Journal 
of Commerce Staff 
16/02/1996 The 
Independent 
The 
investmen
t column 
Mersey sails through strife Tom Stevenson 
16/02/1996 The Daily 
Mail 
  Pickets unload £4m from 
profit at Mersey 
Shirley Skeel 
16/02/1996 Lloyd's List   Mersey Docks profits down: 
Costs of capital expenditure 
and dispute settlement offer 
set to total £38m 
John Prescott 
17/02/1996 The Times Business Eastender inspired by spirit 
of Liverpool 
Christine Buckley 
23/02/1996 Investors 
Chronicle 
Pg. 72 Company results: Mersey 
Docks & Harbour 
  
23/02/1996 The 
Independent 
Life, Page 
6 
Pride and protest on the 
Mersey, Four hundred 
sacked dockers have fought 
for five hard months. Now 
they sense an unlikely victory 
Decca Aitkenhead 
01/03/1996 Extel 
Examiner 
Company 
News; 
Other 
Dockers union calls for fresh 
talks in Mersey Docks 
dispute 
Unknown 
01/03/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Union seeks end to Mersey 
Docks dispute 
Sean Moloney, 
Shipping 
Correspondent 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
10/03/1996 The 
Independent 
Real Life Sabotage their systems and 
steal their stationery...; ... Or 
why not try a spot of 
'underperforming'? Or how 
about a good, old-fashioned 
strike? Alex Spillius reports 
that even in the downsized 
Nineties, disgruntled 
employees are discovering 
they still have the power to 
bite back 
Alex Spillius 
13/03/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 New talks on Liverpool docks 
row 
Sean Moloney, 
Political Editor 
14/03/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home 
Page, pg. 
9 
US support for Dock strikers Martyn Halsall 
17/03/1996 The 
Independent 
Business, 
pg. 3 
Port takes legal action in US; 
More acrimony over moves 
by sacked Liverpool dockers 
Patrick Tooher 
19/03/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool row escalates as 
union warns ACL 
Sean Moloney, 
Political Editor 
21/03/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey dockers win ITF 
support 
Gerrit Wiesmann, 
Freight Markets 
Reporter 
22/03/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 MDHC withdraws US 
injunction bid 
Gerrit Wiesmann, 
Freight Markets 
Reporter 
26/03/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 16 Mersey supporters in Drake 
protest 
Gerrit Wiesmann 
28/03/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Fury over call to end 
Liverpool dock strike 
Gerrit Wiesmann, 
Freight Markets 
Reporter 
02/04/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Mersey docks strike talks Gerrit Wiesmann, 
Freight Markets 
Reporter 
03/04/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Fresh bid to end Mersey 
docks deadlock 
Political Editor 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
17/04/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Both sides entrenched in 
stand-off at Liverpool: No 
talks planned as seven-month 
port dispute shows no signs 
of ending 
Michael Murphy 
20/04/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Merseyside dockers brief 
MPs 
Chief Correspondent 
21/04/1996 The 
Observer 
The 
Observer 
News 
Page, Pg. 
3 
Dockers and Dons unite in 
wrath against Thatcherism's 
high priest 
Barry Hugill 
23/04/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
4B 
Shot fired as dockers picket 
in Liverpool 
Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
23/04/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Mersey scuffles result in 
arrests 
Julian Bray, Chief 
Correspondent 
06/05/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Features 
Page, Pg. 
11 
Contracts that show no 
Mersey 
Paul Foot 
08/05/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
2B 
Inside Talk - Alan Abrams 
Few companies making 
money off the world wide 
web 
Alan Abrams 
15/05/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey strike peace bid Sean Moloney, 
Political Editor 
21/05/1996 Extel 
Examiner 
Company 
News; 
Other 
Mersey Docks to push for 
docks dispute resolution 
before Acas 
Unknown 
22/05/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 14 Owners welcome Mersey 
arbitration 
Ian Gronback 
27/05/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Norse Irish moves to beat 
Mersey dispute 
Sean Moloney, 
Political Editor 
06/06/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey docks vote on 'final 
offer' 
Sean Moloney 
12/06/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 12 Mersey dockers reject final 
offer 
 
Felicity Landon 
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Title Author 
19/06/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey offer lapses after 
ballot refusal 
Political Editor 
20/06/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Church bid to rescue Mersey 
talks 
Julian Bray 
21/06/1996 The Times Business Port of Liverpool loses ACL 
service 
Carl Mortished 
21/06/1996 AFX News Markets, 
Stocks 
London shares close lower Unknown 
22/06/1996 The Times Business Mersey Docks Unknown 
22/06/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey Docks sacks 80 
workers 
Julian Bray, Chief 
Correspondent 
24/06/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey Docks to sue US 
longshoremen 
Anthony Poole 
25/06/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
3B 
Mersey sues ILA over ACL's 
move from Port of Liverpool 
Janet Porter, Journal 
of Commerce Staff 
25/06/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 ILA denies boycott plan John McLaughlin, 
New York 
Correspondent 
30/06/1996 The 
Observer 
The 
Observer 
City Page, 
Pg. 21 
Port to create 500 jobs Martyn Halsall 
02/07/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 6 Special report on 
Merseyside: Liverpool hits 
new high despite dispute 
Felicity Landon 
02/07/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 6 Special report on 
Merseyside: Port diversity 
and road costs help 
throughput 
Felicity Landon 
04/07/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 14 Mersey dispute closes 
companies 
Sean Moloney, 
Political Editor 
09/07/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 £1.6m Medway- KPMG 
settlement 
Unknown 
16/07/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
2B 
Four UK strikers bring their 
cause to Montreal Port 
Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
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Title Author 
16/07/1996 The Globe 
and Mail 
(Canada) 
News, Pg. 
A4 
Quebec Montreal port hit by 
protest 
CP 
16/07/1996 The Gazette 
(Montreal, 
Quebec) 
News, Pg. 
A3 
Liverpool longshoremen 
target shipper: Disgruntled 
dockers tie up port 
Mike King and 
Katherine Wilton 
23/07/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Container firm in port switch 
re-think 
Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
24/07/1996 The Times Business Mersey Docks regains 
contract lost in strike 
Carl Mortished 
24/07/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
2B 
ACL going back to Liverpool Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
24/07/1996 The 
Independent 
Business, 
pg. 18 
Dockers to continue Mersey 
campaign 
Chris Godsmark, 
Business 
Correspondent 
24/07/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 ACL goes back to Liverpool 
today 
Andrew Grey 
30/07/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 14 Felixstowe confirms bid for 
ACL business 
David Osler 
30/07/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 5 Leading article: Mersey 
renewal 
Unknown 
01/08/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
New Union bid to end docks 
dispute 
Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
03/08/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 12 Union call for new Mersey 
talks 
Andrew Grey 
09/08/1996 Investors 
Chronicle 
Pg. 50 Tips of the Week: Mersey 
Docks - Mersey Docks is 
ready to rebound - Never sell 
on a strike is an old stock 
market adage that has been 
largely ignored in the case of 
Mersey Docks. Its current 
bout of industrial unrest has 
badly knocked the shares. 
The worst, though, looks to 
be over 
Unknown 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
21/08/1996 London 
Stock 
Exchange 
Aggregated 
Regulatory 
News 
Service 
(ARNS) 
  Mersey Docks. Interim 
results 
MDHC 
22/08/1996 The Times Business Dutch courage Carl Mortished 
22/08/1996 The Times Business Mersey losses force sale of 
Eurolink 
Carl Mortished 
22/08/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
4B 
Liverpool cargo traffic sets 
record despite row 
Janet Porter, Journal 
of Commerce Staff 
22/08/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
1B 
A year later, fired UK 
dockers still fighting to turn 
the tide 
Janet Porter, Journal 
of Commerce Staff 
22/08/1996 The 
Independent 
Business, 
Pg. 19 
Mersey Docks says dispute 
may drag on 
Tom Stevenson, City 
Editor 
22/08/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey docks peace bid: New 
bid to end long and bitter 
industrial dispute as 
Liverpool port company 
reports slide in earnings 
Julian Bray 
24/08/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 2 Mersey Docks forecast is cut Andrew Grey 
30/08/1996 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion , pg. 
1B 
Briefs Wire and Staff 
Reports 
05/09/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool strike due to 
'unofficial elements' 
David Osler 
28/09/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 2 A year later and bitter 
Liverpool docks dispute 
festers on 
David Osler 
29/09/1996 The 
Observer 
The 
Observer 
News 
Page, Pg. 
2 
Ravers join the Mersey 
Dockers' March 
Danny Penman 
30/09/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Police injured in picket line 
clashes 
Mark Thomas, PA 
News 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
01/10/1996 The 
Independent 
Business, 
Pg. 18 
Market report Patrick Tooher 
02/10/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Society 
Pg. 5 
New Politics: Building a 
bridge in dock green; eco 
activists are broadening their 
horizons and joining striking 
dockers. 
John Vidal 
02/10/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 16 Liverpool picket violence 
deplored 
David Osler 
04/10/1996 Investors 
Chronicle 
Pg. 108 Survey: Merseyside - Mersey 
Docks lays ghosts to rest 
Deborah Mulhearn 
16/10/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Mersey strikers claim 
support action 
David Osler 
07/11/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 14 Docker 'fired at pickets' Unknown 
13/11/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 12 Crash cancels Mersey talks Unknown 
23/11/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Weekend 
Pg. 14 
They Never Walk Alone John Pilger 
07/12/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Weekend 
Pg. T94 
Last word: The Final Say: 
Weekend Letter: Union Dues 
Bill Morris 
08/12/1996 The 
Independent 
Sunday 
Review 
Thirty years that shook the 
world; In 1967, Ken Loach 
made a film about the 
Liverpool dock strike. This 
autumn, the director was 
back on Merseyside filming 
striking dockers. 
Decca Aitkenhead 
14/12/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Features 
Pg 5 
Today's marching orders; 
John Pilger reports on the 
continuing Liverpool dock 
strike which makes its 
presence felt in a London 
march today 
 
John Pilger 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
16/12/1996 Daily Mirror Features, 
Pg. 1 
Save our jobs; Dockers take 
fight to London 
Unknown 
17/12/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
‘Final offer' to sacked 
dockers 
Mark Thomas, PA 
News 
17/12/1996 AFX News Company 
News; 
Strikes, 
Wages 
Mersey Docks makes 'final' 
28,000 stg offer to sacked 
Liverpool dockers 
Unknown 
18/12/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home 
Page, pg. 
6 
News in brief: New offer to 
dockers 
Seumas Milne 
18/12/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey Docks boosts offer to 
sacked workers 
David Osler 
19/12/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home 
Page, pg. 
2 
TV Review: Loach keeps the 
fires burning 
Seumas Milne 
19/12/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Mersey offer unlikely to end 
dispute 
David Osler 
20/12/1996 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Sacked dockers reject 
£28,000 pay-offs 
Mark Thomas, PA 
News 
21/12/1996 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home 
Page, pg. 
4 
News in brief: Dockers reject 
'final' offer 
Seumas Milne 
21/12/1996 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey dockers reject 
'ultimate closing' package 
David Osler 
04/01/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Weekend, 
pg. T63 
Lastword: The Final Say: 
Weekend Letter: Bill Morris 
Merseyside Port Shop 
Stewards 
04/01/1997 The 
Economist, 
U.S. Edition 
World 
Politics 
and 
Current 
Affairs, 
Britain, 
pg. 52 
Militancy on the Mersey Unknown 
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section 
Title Author 
14/01/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Mersey docks battle leads  to 
day of action 
David Osler 
15/01/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Pg. 1A Dockers promise global 
stoppages 
Janet Porter in 
London and Bill 
Mongelluzzo in Long 
Beach, Calif. 
15/01/1997 Associated 
Press 
Worldstrea
m 
Financial 
pages 
West Coast longshoremen to 
join international protest 
Jan. 20 
E. Scott Reckard 
16/01/1997 The San 
Francisco 
Chronicle 
Business, 
Pg. D1 
Protest may shut bay ports Ilana DeBare 
18/01/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Weekend 
pg. T78 
Lastword: The Final say: 
Weekend letter: Liverpool 
Docks Dispute 
Bill Morris 
20/01/1997 Monday, 
AM cycle 
Business 
News 
Dockers shut West Coast 
ports in sympathy with 
British longshoremen 
Unknown 
20/01/1997 Traffic 
World 
Pg. 35 ILWU Supports Shutdown; 
One-day action at 5 West 
Coast ports to support 
dockworkers at Port of 
Liverpool 
Terry Brennan 
21/01/1997 Tuesday, 
PM cycle 
Business 
News 
Walkout stalls work at West 
Coast ports 
Unknown 
21/01/1997 The 
Oregonian 
(Portland, 
Oregon) 
Business, 
Pg. B16 
Dockers shut West Coast 
ports in sympathy with 
British longshoremen, the 
bottom line 
Staff and wire reports 
21/01/1997 CNN 
Newsnight 
News, 
Domestic 
Longshoreman strike in 
California in show of support 
for British Compatriots 
Don Knapp and 
Kathleen Kennedy 
21/01/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 2 Liverpool terminal disrupted David Osler 
22/01/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Pg. 1A Just as expected, dockers 
walk out across the globe 
 
Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
306 
 
Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
22/01/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool protesters held David Osler 
21/01/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
City Pg. 
22 
Mersey militancy threatens 
Ford and Docks 
Seumas Milne 
25/01/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Peace hope in Liverpool 
dispute: Sacked dockers 
offer labour supply co-
operative proposal to Mersey 
Docks and Harbour 
Company 
David Osler 
27/01/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Pg. 4B Fired Liverpool workers to 
form company that supplies 
dock labor 
Journal of Commerce 
Staff 
31/01/1997 Associated 
Press 
Worldstrea
m 
Internatio
nal news 
Futile, protracted strike 
measures unions' decline in 
Britain 
Robert Seely 
10/02/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Union in Mersey pool plan David Osler 
11/02/1997 Financial 
Times 
News UK TGWU seeks to end docks 
dispute 
Robert Taylor, 
Employment editor 
19/02/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 5 Letter: No tension between 
union and officials 
Graham Stevenson 
25/02/1997 Extel 
Examiner 
Company 
news, 
other 
TGWU 'anxious' to see 
progress in Mersey Docks 
talks 
Unknown 
25/02/1997 AFX News Company 
news, 
earnings 
Interview: Mersey Docks & 
Harbour in talks with union 
over labour supply company 
James Davey 
25/02/1997 AFX News Company 
News, 
earnings 
Analysts looking to edge up 
Mersey Docks & Harbour 
1997 pretax forecasts 
Unknown 
26/02/1997 The Times Business Mersey Docks dispute costs 
group £800,000 
Sarah Cunningham 
26/02/1997 Financial 
Times 
Companie
s and 
finance 
UK: Mersey Docks hit by 
Eurolink costs 
Richard Wolffe 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
26/02/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 New Mersey strike threat David Osler 
27/02/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, Pg. 
2B 
Record traffic reported at 
Port of Liverpool 
Janet Porter 
28/02/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 18 Mersey Docks accused in 
pilotage row: MP's secret 
talks with firm's managers 
David Osler 
12/03/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Editorial / 
Opinion 
Pg. 11A 
Dockworkers join forces 
worldwide 
Jack Heyman 
02/04/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Mersey dockers may reject 
plan 
David Osler 
03/04/1997 Financial 
Times 
  Survey- Merseyside: Port of 
Liverpool: New-look docks 
sail to records 
Ian Hamilton-Fazey 
12/04/1997 Timber 
Trades 
Journal 
Pg. 4 Mersey dockers reject latest 
offer 
Unknown 
23/04/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 16 Check internet for strike 
plans, warns lawyer 
Unknown 
23/04/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 16 Peaceful Mersey meeting David Osler 
24/04/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 5  Fax across the Mersey Monitor 
01/05/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 5 Unions are unlikely to rock 
the boat 
David Osler 
15/05/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Liverpool dockers in talks 
with MPs 
David Osler 
22/05/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 3 Canadian dockers host 
deregulation forum 
Unknown 
28/05/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 TGWU in port conditions 
push 
David Osler 
NO 
ARTICLES 
JUNE 1997 
        
01/07/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 12 Mersey labour study 
complete 
David Osler 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
08/08/1997 The 
Independent 
Business ‘No end in sight' for Mersey 
Docks dispute 
Andrew Yates 
10/08/1997 The 
Observer 
The 
Observer 
Home Pg. 
10 
Uphill struggle for forgotten 
strikers 
Seumas Milne 
14/08/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 African union joins Mersey 
dispute 
Dee Rissik, Africa 
Editor, and David 
Osler 
15/08/1997 Investors 
Chronicle 
Pg. 40 Tips of the Week: Mersey 
Docks & Harbour - Sector: 
transport - Share price: 332p 
- Happy berth days - BUY 
Unknown 
04/09/1997 Daily Mail Pg. 27 Gaddafi human rights prize 
for two dock strike wives 
Andrew Loudon 
05/09/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion Pg. 
13A 
‘Sympathy' job action to shut 
W. Coast ports 
Bruce Barnard 
08/09/1997 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
International strikes back 
sacked dockers 
Melanie Harvey, PA 
News 
08/09/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool dockers predict 
solidarity 
David Osler 
09/09/1997 The 
Independent 
News Pg. 
2 
Solidarity for sacked dockers Unknown 
09/09/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Liverpool dockers boost Justin Stares 
10/09/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 5 Leading article: Rough 
justice 
Unknown 
13/09/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 New study reveals fall in 
Liverpool ship calls 
David Osler 
14/09/1997 The 
Observer 
The 
Observer 
features 
pg. T5 
Local heroine Libby Brooks 
19/09/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 New dispute threat at Mersey 
docks 
David Osler 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
21/09/1997 The 
Independent 
News Pg 
10 
No going back at Liverpool 
docks; Pickets fight on 
despite two years of TUC 
and labour indifference 
Ros Wynne-Jones 
26/09/1997 The Mirror Features, 
Pg. 24, 25 
Heroes or fools? It depends 
on whether we still place 
value on dignity and 
collective support 
Brian Reade 
27/09/1997 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
City at Standstill as 
thousands march for sacked 
dockers 
Maria Breslin, PA 
News 
27/09/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home pg 
5 
Sacked Mersey docks men 
vow to fight on 
Emily Sheffield 
30/09/1997 The San 
Francisco 
Chronicle 
Business 
pg C2 
Longshoremen Boycott 
Freighter, they honour picket 
line for Liverpool workers 
Ilana DeBare 
30/09/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Police break up dockers' 
demos 
David Osler 
02/10/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Neptune Jade bids to beat 
boycott 
David Osler 
03/10/1997 Business 
Times 
(Singapore 
Press 
Holdings 
Ltd) 
Business Neptune Orient Lines, NOL 
HD: US court orders dockers 
to work on NOL 
Unknown 
04/10/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Thamesport quashes union 
claim 
David Osler 
05/10/1997 The 
Observer 
The 
Observer 
review pg. 
3 
This article is written by the 
man who wrote Cracker, 
Hillsborough and The Lakes. 
If you're expecting the usual 
story of passion, grit and 
broken hearts, you're not 
trying hard enough 
Jimmy McGovern 
07/10/1997 Daily Mail Pg. 15 Why the dockers are putting 
their shirts on Blair's sons 
Unknown 
07/10/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 10 Jade sails Howard Williams 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
12/10/1997 The 
Observer 
The 
Observer 
review pg. 
2 
Letter: We haven't betrayed 
the dockers 
Bill Morris 
18/10/1997 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Union starts ballot over 
docks dispute 
Maria Breslin, PA 
News 
20/10/1997 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Dockers to vote on marathon 
dispute 
Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
20/10/1997 Financial 
Times 
News UK Docks strike set for 
conclusion 
Robert Taylor 
21/10/1997 The Times Business Vote on dock pay offer Unknown 
21/10/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Mersey Docks peace hopes 
rise 
David Osler 
22/10/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion, g. 
14A 
Vote could put an end to 
strife at Liverpool 
Aviva Freudmann 
22/10/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 5 Leading article: Mersey 
hopes 
Unknown 
23/10/1997 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Bitter docks dispute has 
lasted two years 
Alan Jones, Industrial 
Correspondent, PA 
News 
24/10/1997 The Times   Final offer rejected by 
dockers 
George Sivell 
24/10/1997 The Times   Mersey Docks Unknown 
24/10/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Transporta
tion pg. 
14A 
Former employees reject 
company's offer; The final 
settlement outvoted by 2-to-1 
Aviva Freudmann 
24/10/1997 The Herald 
(Glasgow) 
Pg. 15 Solid support in a long 
campaign 
Duncan Black and 
Susan Carden 
24/10/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home pg. 
4 
Ballot win strengthens 
workers' quest for justice 
David Ward 
24/10/1997 Financial 
Times 
News UK Dockers stay on strike after 
offer rejected 
Sheila Jones and 
Andrew Bolger 
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Date Source Page n./ 
section 
Title Author 
24/10/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 Dockers turn down final 
offer 
David Osler 
25/10/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home pg. 
11 
Liverpool dockers furious 
over deadline for payoff 
David Ward 
28/10/1997 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Liverpool dockers take 
protest to Dublin 
Chris Parkin, PA 
News 
28/10/1997 Press 
Association 
Home 
News 
Sixty Liverpool dockers 
'accept peace deal' 
Maria Breslin, PA 
News 
29/10/1997 The Mirror News, pg. 
2 
Docks battle hits Dublin; 
sixty Liverpool dockers on 
strike accept £28,000 peace 
settlement 
Unknown 
29/10/1997 Journal of 
Commerce 
Editorial / 
Opinion 
Pg. 7A 
Japan ports revisited Jack Heyman 
29/10/1997 The 
Independent 
News pg. 
8 
Striking dockers break ranks 
over pay deal 
Unknown 
29/10/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
Home Pg. 
8 
Sixty sacked Liverpool 
dockers take cash pay-off 
David Ward 
29/10/1997 Financial 
Times 
News UK Striking dockers 'split on 
offer' 
Andrew Bolger, 
Employment 
correspondent 
25/11/1997 Lloyd's List Pg. 14 Cardiff hit by docker protest David Osler 
24/12/1997 The 
Guardian 
The 
Guardian 
features 
pg. 4 
Real lives: Turkey and 
scouse; As the Liverpool 
dock strike approaches its 
third year, the families 
involved are hardly in a 
festive mood. 
  
20/01/1998 Lloyd's List Pg. 1 UK dockers bid to strengthen 
union 
David Osler 
 
 
 
